Lopez-Campos v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: 23-873
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VERONICA LOPEZ-CAMPOS; et al., No. 23-873 Agency Nos. Petitioners, A212-975-367 A212-975-366 v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 18, 2025**

Before: CANBY, S.R. THOMAS, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Veronica Lopez-Campos and her child, natives and citizens of Honduras,

petition pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order

dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying their

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Arrey v. Barr,

916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019). We grant the petition for review and remand.

Substantial evidence does not support the agency’s determination that

petitioners failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground. See Corpeno-Romero

v. Garland, 120 F.4th 570, 582 (9th Cir. 2024) (petitioner’s family status “caused

the gang members to initiate their threats and remained front and center during his

encounters with them” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also

Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2021) (“That an

unprotected ground . . . also constitutes a central reason for persecution does not

bar asylum.”); Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017)

(the less demanding “a reason” standard applies to withholding of removal claims).

Further, we are not confident that the agency considered all probative

evidence of the Honduran government’s inability or unwillingness to protect

petitioners, including petitioners’ statements that the police exchanged weapons

and information with gang members, and documentary evidence of widespread

government corruption and impunity for offending officials. See Antonio v.

Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2023) (remand warranted where agency

may have failed to consider all probative evidence of government’s inability or

unwillingness to protect petitioner from persecution); Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d

2 23-873 762, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2011) (agency decision cannot stand where there is any

indication it did not consider all evidence before it, including “failing to mention

highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence”); Bringas-Rodriguez v.

Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (nonreporting of

persecution to authorities does not create a “gap” in the evidence that requires a

higher standard of proof).

Thus, we grant the petition and remand to the BIA to reconsider petitioners’

eligibility for asylum and related relief, and for any further proceedings consistent

with this disposition. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002) (per curiam).

In light of this disposition, we need not reach petitioner’s remaining

contentions. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts

and agencies are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they

reach).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

The government must bear the costs for this petition for review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

3 23-873