Lopez Bonilla v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 16, 2024
• Docket: 22-1977
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 16 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BLAS LOPEZ BONILLA, No. 22-1977 Agency No. Petitioner, A072-681-759 v. MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 14, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: GILMAN***, N.R. SMITH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Blas Lopez Bonilla, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review

of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision denying his motion to reopen

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation. deportation proceedings. The BIA denied the motion as untimely and held that

because Lopez Bonilla failed to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief he

sought, the changed-country-conditions exception did not apply. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Fonseca-Fonseca v.

Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2023). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), and we review under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Perez-

Camacho v. Garland, 54 F.4th 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2022). The BIA abuses its

discretion if its conclusions are “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id.

(citation omitted).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Lopez Bonilla failed

to establish a prima facie case for asylum and withholding of deportation, given his

failure to show membership in a particular social group. A cognizable particular

social group must be “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable

characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the

society in question.” Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir.

2021) (citation omitted); accord Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237

(BIA 2014). Here, the BIA correctly determined that Lopez Bonilla’s proposed

particular social group, “El Salvadorans who oppose gang violence,” is not

cognizable. As the BIA held, the proposed group is not sufficiently particular

because it lacks clear boundaries, criteria, and parameters for inclusion. See

2 22-1977 Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 2021). Moreover, the BIA

correctly determined that the proposed group lacks social distinction. Lopez

Bonilla has put forth no evidence showing that Salvadoran society views those

who oppose gang violence as a distinct group, see id.; Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963

F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2020), nor do the Salvadoran government’s actions to curb

gang violence demonstrate as much.

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in determining that Lopez Bonilla failed

to establish a prima facie CAT claim. Lopez Bonilla’s country-conditions

evidence is too general to establish that he faces “a particularized and non-

speculative” likelihood of torture if deported to El Salvador. Park v. Garland, 72

F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis omitted). He makes no argument to the

contrary.

Because Lopez Bonilla has not demonstrated “a reasonable likelihood that

the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied,” the BIA did not abuse its

discretion in denying his motion to reopen on that basis. Sarkar v. Garland, 39

F.4th 611, 622 (9th Cir. 2022).

PETITION DENIED.

3 22-1977