Loop v. NE College

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedDecember 15, 1997
DocketCV-97-022-M
StatusPublished

This text of Loop v. NE College (Loop v. NE College) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loop v. NE College, (D.N.H. 1997).

Opinion

Loop v . NE College CV-97-022-M 12/15/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Taylor H . Loop

v. Civil N o . 97-22-M

New England College

O R D E R

New England College has filed two motions seeking to dismiss

claims and, alternatively, to strike particular allegations in

professor Taylor Loop’s complaint. NEC argues that Loop’s

contract claims are barred by the applicable statute of

limitations and that particular allegations pertaining to a prior

age discrimination suit are barred by the doctrine of collateral

estoppel. For the following reasons, the court denies both

motions.

The standard applicable in evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion

for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as the

standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Lanigan v . Village of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 4 6 7 , 470 n.2 (7th

Cir. 1997). In both cases, the court’s inquiry is a limited one,

focusing not on “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but

whether [he or she] is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims.” Scheuer v . Rhodes, 416 U.S. 2 3 2 , 236 (1974) (motion to

dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In making its inquiry,

the court must accept all of the factual averments contained in the complaint as true, and draw every reasonable inference in

favor of the plaintiffs. See Garita Hotel Ltd. Partnership v .

Ponce Fed. Bank, 958 F.2d 1 5 , 17 (1st Cir. 1992) (Rule 12(b)(6)

motion); Santiago de Castro v . Morales Medina, 943 F.2d 129, 130

(1st Cir. 1991) (Rule 12(c) motion).

A. Motion to Dismiss Contract Claims (Document No. 14)

NEC contends that because Professor Loop received notice in

December 1993 of its intent to terminate his employment,

effective in June 1994, Loop’s breach of contract cause of action

accrued in December 1993, and, the three-year limitations period

expired in December 1996, before he filed his complaint in this

case. In response, Loop correctly points out that “the statute

of limitations in a contract action does not begin to run until a

breach of the contract occurs.” Metropolitan Property &

Liability Ins. C o . v . Walker, 136 N.H. 5 9 4 , 598 (1993). Based

upon the facts alleged in the complaint, Professor Loop’s

employment at NEC was not finally and irrevocably terminated

until June 1994. 1 NEC’s reliance on precedent interpreting the

accrual of discrimination claims arising from adverse employment actions are inapposite. NEC’s motion to dismiss is denied.

1 Loop alleges in his opposition to NEC’s motion that, in addition, his administrative appeal of the termination continued until August 1994. Because those facts are not alleged in the complaint, however, they are not considered in deciding this motion.

2 B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or to Strike (Document No. 19) NEC also contends that certain allegations in the complaint concerning Professor Loop’s 1988 age discrimination suit against NEC, which ended in a defendants’ verdict in 1991, are barred by the preclusive effect of the verdict. Plaintiff responds that the allegations are included not to pursue the same age discrimination claim, but to support his claim that NEC unlawfully retaliated against him for having pursued the age discrimination action in the first place.

Since Loop is not asserting an age discrimination claim based on the previously litigated events, there is no pending claim precluded by the prior judgment. The current age discrimination claim, distinct from the retaliation claim, appears to be based upon Loop’s allegations relative to the termination of his employment in 1994. Taken as a whole, the challenged allegations serve to explain Loop’s prior

discrimination suit against NEC, and thus the court declines to strike the allegations.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motions (document

nos. 14 and 19) are denied.

3 SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge December 1 5 , 1997 cc: John S . Krupski, Esq. Paul L . Nevins, Esq. Andrew D. Dunn, Esq.

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Related

Hirst ex rel. Lunt v. Dugan
611 A.2d 616 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1992)

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