Loomis v. Connecticut Fire Insurance

117 P. 642, 16 Cal. App. 532, 1911 Cal. App. LEXIS 270
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 28, 1911
DocketCiv. No. 678.
StatusPublished

This text of 117 P. 642 (Loomis v. Connecticut Fire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loomis v. Connecticut Fire Insurance, 117 P. 642, 16 Cal. App. 532, 1911 Cal. App. LEXIS 270 (Cal. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinion

CHIPMAN, P. J.

The action is to recover upon a policy of fire insurance issued by defendant and covering certain-goods of plaintiff while contained in the two-story brick building number 521 Fourth street, north side, between B and Mendocino streets, Santa Rosa. The loss occurred April 18, 1906, -by fire. Defendant based its defense upon the following clause in the policy: “If the building or any part *534 thereof fall, except as the result, of fire, all insurance by this policy on such building or its contents shall immediately cease.”

The cause was tried by a jury and plaintiff had the verdict on which judgment was duly entered. The appeal is from the judgment on the verdict and the order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.

In addition to the general verdict the jury answered certain particular questions as follows:

“1. Did the building . . . fall as a whole from a cause other than fire before plaintiff’s stock of goods was attacked by fire? No.
“2. Did said building fall as a whole from any cause after plaintiff’s stock of goods was attacked by fire? No.
“3. Did a part or parts, not constituting a material or substantial part of the building . . . fall from a cause other than fire bef ore said stock of goods was attacked by fire ? No.
“4. Was not answered because the answer to No. 3 was No.
“5. Did a part or parts of the building .-. . fall from a cause other than fire after plaintiff’s stock of goods was attacked ? No.
“6. Was not answered because of the last negative answer.
7. Did a material or substantial part or parts of said building . . . fall from a cause other than fire before plaintiff’s stock of goods was attacked by fire? No.
“8. Was not answered because of this negative answer.
“9. Did the building ... or á material part thereof fall from a cause other than fire prior to the occurrence of fire in said building? No.
“10. Did the building ... or a material part thereof, fall from a cause other than fire after the occurrence of fire therein ? No.”

While urging certain errors committed by the trial court, appellant states that the principal grounds relied upon for a reversal are: First, that the court erred in permitting plaintiff to introduce evidence of a waiver by defendant of the plaintiff’s compliance with the provision of- the policy relating to the furnishing of notice of loss, -and, second, that the jury, in finding upon the issues presented to it under the “fallen building” clause, “wholly disregarded the undis *535 puted evidence before it” and “based its conclusion solely upon its prejudice against the defendant.”

We find it unnecessary to consider the first objection.

After a careful examination and aroalysis of the testimony, we are satisfied that it appears, without substantial conflict in the testimony, that a material and substantial part of the front wall fell before the fire attacked the building or the goods of plaintiff.

There was evidence sufficient to show that the rear wall and the side walls of the building, except toward the front, were not materially damaged, although there is evidence to the contrary. As to the second story front wall there is much evidence that it went out as far down as the floor of the second story and that the front part of the roof was down to this floor, slanting back to where it was not disturbed. The testimony relates to what certain witnesses observed at the rear of the building on Fifth street, and what certain others observed at its front on Fourth street. Only one witness, Frank Muther, the chief of the fire department, seemed to have been in a position to observe the entire building, and he was the one most likely to have made his observations with a cool head and some deliberation. Both parties quote quite freely from his testimony. He was called by the defendant. He resided two blocks from Fourth street. He had a store at No. 513 and plaintiff’s store was No. 521, east in the same block. He testified: “When the shock first began I was in my bed, that was two blocks from Fourth street. As soon as I could stand on my feet and gather myself together, I slipped on .part of my clothes and took the rest in my hands and I skinned down the street toward Fourth street. . . . When I went up toward my store I went somewheres around the center of the street. I know where the Loomis store ivas. I was at 513 and his number was 521. That was the same block, I -believe, same side of the street. I saw my store and all the other stores that morning. I went up on top of them. Q. What store did you go on top of? A. Well, it was about fifty feet between my store and Loomis’; I won’t be positive exactly which store these conditions were. It was either the electric light works or the store next door. I got up on the roof by climbing over the debris. The debris came from the top of the buildings. I saw the front and back of *536 the Loomis store that morning, and I was on top of it. The roof was in pretty good condition in the rear but it was not in the front. In front the upper story had fallen down through the awning, as far as the windows were concerned, but the lower story, I think was in pretty good tact. The side walls also stood in the middle of the building. The front part of the roof slanted toward the front. The top of the roof had not sagged down or settled uniformly, because some of the windows had fallen down farther out than the other and the roof lay promiscuously, and it was uneven. With reference to the floor in the second story, the roof was in some places down pretty low and in some places seemed to be pretty near intact. Of course, the walls was broken more or less. I couldn’t say as to the floor of the second story, whether it was broken, because I was on top of it. I couldn’t see down through where there was any holes broken through, anything of that kind. I don’t think there was. I couldn’t swear positively. The building in front was faced with cast-iron and the lintels that crossed were out. Them buildings were only just faced; this cast-iron stuff was only there for a veneer. It didn’t hold nothing, and they were all shook away on every building in the block. The lintels were the cast-irons that went over the doors of the lower story in front. They had gone out into the street or on to the sidewalk, but the brick did not. The lintels all left the buildings on every building, in the block, because they were all cast-iron veneer. They are not built into the building; only stuck up there. On the Fourth street side the awning, the top, the fire wall was pretty well broken down, and went through the building and some places it had broken the windows and some of the parts between the windows were down; some stood up uneven, of course. The rear wall was not down, and the roof was resting in the center. The front part of that building was the worst, the Fourth street side. The roof might have been resting on the second floor right in front where the front broke out. I went into that building from Fourth street by climbing over the debris. I had no ladder there.

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Bluebook (online)
117 P. 642, 16 Cal. App. 532, 1911 Cal. App. LEXIS 270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/loomis-v-connecticut-fire-insurance-calctapp-1911.