Lonnie Lee Poslof v. Carlos Arce, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 27, 2025
• Docket: 5:24-cv-06146
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 Case No. 24-cv-06004-PCP 7 LONNIE LEE POSLOF, 24-cv-06146-PCP Plaintiff, 8 ORDER DISMISSING 6146 ACTION v. WITH LEAVE TO AMEND IN PART; 9 DISMISSING 6004 ACTION WITH 10 CARLOS ARCE, et al., P SH RE O J W U D C I A C U E S ; E D ; E G N R Y A IN N G TI M NG O TIONS TO Defendants. MOTIONS FOR A SCREENING 11 ORDER

12 Re: Dkt. Nos. 38, 48 in Case No. 24-cv- 06004; Dkt. Nos. 29, 35, 37 in Case No. 24- 13 cv-06146

14 15 Lonnie Poslof, an inmate at the Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) in Soledad, 16 California, has two pending pro se civil rights actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Poslof v. 17 Arce, Case No. 24-cv-6004-PCP (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 21, 2024) (“6004 Action”); Poslof v. Cal. 18 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., Case No. 24-6146-PCP (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 25, 2024) (“6146 Action”). 19 Mr. Poslof’s motions to show cause are denied. Mr. Poslof’s motions for a screening order 20 are granted, in that this order screens the Second Amended Complaints. 21 For the reasons stated below, the 6146 Action is dismissed with leave to amend as to Mr. 22 Poslof’s excessive force and state-law claims only. All other claims are dismissed with prejudice. 23 There being no surviving claims other than those pending in the 6146 Action, the 6004 Action is 24 dismissed with prejudice. 25 I. Procedural Background 26 The facts underlying Mr. Poslof’s claims are discussed in the sections analyzing each 27 claim. See infra III. 1 In August 2024, Mr. Poslof filed five civil rights actions in this District.1 The first lawsuit 2 was dismissed on abstention grounds and for failure to prosecute, and Mr. Poslof voluntarily 3 dismissed the second and third actions. 4 Mr. Poslof moved to amend the Complaint in the 6004 Action and filed a First Amended 5 Complaint in the 6146 Action. The Court reviewed the pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 6 and in one order dismissed every claim. Dkt. No. 28.2 The Court granted leave to amend as to 7 some claims and provided detailed instructions on how to amend. See id. 8 Mr. Poslof subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 6146 Action, and a 9 First Amended Complaint and then a Second Amended Complaint in the 6004 Action. The 10 operative pleading in each action thus is a Second Amended Complaint. The Second Amended 11 Complaint is identical in both actions. Compare Dkt. No. 32 with Dkt. No. 47 in the 6004 Action. 12 Mr. Poslof’s Second Amended Complaint now is before the Court for review. 13 II. Legal Standard 14 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 15 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must 16 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 17 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 18 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 19 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 20 Even though a pro se litigant is entitled to a liberal interpretation of his complaint, that 21 complaint still “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 22 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 23 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017) 24 (affirming dismissal of a pro se prisoner complaint which did not meet the plausibility standard) 25

26 1 See Poslof v. Arce, Case No. 24-cv-5444-PCP (N.D. Cal., injunctive relief motion filed Aug. 15, 2024); Poslof v. Arce, Case No. 24-cv-5446-PCP (N.D. Cal., mandamus petition filed Aug. 12, 27 2024); Poslof v. Warden, Case No. 24-5447-PCP (N.D. Cal., mandamus petition filed Aug. 14, 1 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 2 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 3 for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 4 III. Analysis 5 In his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Poslof states that he wishes to sue for excessive 6 force, false disciplinary reports, deliberate indifference to his medical needs, deprivation of access 7 to the courts, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California’s Bane Act. 8 See SAC at 13–18. Only these claims are at issue.3 See London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 9 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original 10 complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint.”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 11 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (where an amended complaint did not name all the defendants to an 12 action, they were no longer defendants). 13 A. Abstention and Exhaustion 14 In his FAC, Mr. Poslof stated that he had filed state court lawsuits regarding the same 15 events complained of therein, and that he was pursuing unexhausted claims. In its order screening 16 the FAC, the Court explained that Mr. Poslof could not pursue claims that were unexhausted, nor 17 claims that were barred under the Younger or Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrines. See Dkt. No. 18 28 at 3–5 (citing references to state court litigation and unexhausted claims). Because Mr. Poslof 19 had raised these issues, the Court required Mr. Poslof to state on amendment whether each claim 20 had been exhausted and/or had been raised in state court. 21 Rather than the claim-by-claim response required by the Court, Mr. Poslof makes blanket 22 3 In the SAC, Mr. Poslof discusses unsanitary housing conditions and damage to property but does 23 not bring a claim for these alleged wrongs. Cf. SAC at 13–19 (listing claims). The Court notes that Mr. Poslof already has pursued a state-court action regarding these alleged wrongs. See infra III.D 24 (describing Mr. Poslof’s state-court litigation). The Court previously cautioned Mr. Poslof that he could neither simultaneously pursue state- and federal-court actions on the same issue, nor could 25 he challenge an unsatisfactory state-court decision in federal court. See Dkt. No. 28 at 2–5 (explaining the Younger and Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrines). Mr. Poslof asserts that his 26 federal actions “ha[ve] nothing to do with the cases filed in the state Court,” and indicates he will voluntarily dismiss his 6004 Action and proceed only with his 6146 Action to “eliminate 27 confusion and misunderstanding.” Dkt. No. 29 at 2. The Court therefore assumes that Mr. Poslof 1 statements that he fully exhausted all claims before filing suit, and that his claims have not been 2 raised to state courts and therefore abstention is not required. See Dkt. No. 28; see also SAC at 19. 3 Mr. Poslof asks the Court to obtain and review state court records to evaluate his abstention 4 argument, see Dkt. No. 29, and attaches incomplete and disorganized administrative records to 5 support his exhaustion argument, see SAC at 20–116. 6 For screening purposes, the Court will assume that abstention is not required and that Mr. 7 Poslof has exhausted his claims. This is not a finding on either issue. At a later time and with a 8 complete record, defendants may be able to move to dismiss Mr. Poslof’s actions on either 9 ground. 10 B. Supervisory Defendants 11 The Court previously explained to Mr. Poslof that he could not sue defendants merely 12 because they supervised others. See Dkt. No. 28 at 7–9. In the SAC, Mr. Poslof sues Warden Arce 13 and Deputy Wardens Ortega, Schuyler, and Fonseca (together, “Executive Defendants”) because 14 they “were responsible for the discipline and supervision of all named defendants and are each 15 personally involved when they were contacted by the plaintiff himself.” SAC at 2–3. 16 Again, Mr. Poslof cannot sue the Executive Defendants merely because they supervise 17 others. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit … each Government official, his or her 18 title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 19 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.”). That 20 the Executive Defendants “were responsible for the discipline and supervision” of other 21 defendants does not render them liable. 22 Similarly, the fact that Mr. Poslof told the Executive Defendants of his injuries after those 23 injuries occurred does not render them liable. Mr. Poslof’s admission that the Executive 24 Defendants learned of his injuries after the fact shows that the Executive Defendants did not 25 actually and proximately injure Mr. Poslof. See Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 26 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013). 27 The Executive Defendants are DISMISSED from this action WITHOUT LEAVE TO 1 C. Medical Needs Claim 2 Mr. Poslof claims he was given inadequate mental health care by Defendant Mendez, a 3 doctor at SVSP, and various Doe defendants employed in providing mental health care at SVSP. 4 See SAC at 4, 15–16. This claim fails because Mr. Poslof’s allegations reveal he was given prompt 5 medical care. 6 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth 7 Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 8 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on 9 other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 10 Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986). The failure to provide prescribed medication 11 properly may constitute deliberate indifference. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th 12 Cir. 2012) (finding plaintiff stated a claim for deliberate indifference where plaintiff’s failure to 13 receive prescribed treatment was due to defendant’s failure to properly request the treatment and 14 then inexplicable cancellation of a second treatment request). A determination of “deliberate 15 indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical 16 need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. 17 Failure to treat a prisoner’s mental health needs may violate the Eighth Amendment. See Doty v. 18 County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a mentally ill prisoner may 19 establish unconstitutional treatment on behalf of prison officials by showing that officials have 20 been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 21 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (analyzing mental health care requirements as part of general health 22 care requirements). 23 Mr. Poslof states that he “suffers from numerous conditions including hearing voices,” and 24 “takes numerous medications to treat his conditions.” SAC at 7. He claims that between August 7 25 and August 9, 2024, he harmed himself three times. Id. He was placed on suicide watch. See id. 26 After several days on suicide watch, Mr. Poslof “noticed” that he was no longer receiving 27 one-on-one observation, but the occupant of a neighboring cell was. See id. Mr. Poslof asked the 1 nurse responded that Mr. Poslof was “no longer on one-on-one suicidal watch,” Id. Mr. Poslof 2 responded that he “[was] suicidal and [he was] going to act on it,” tore open his mattress, and used 3 cloth from the mattress to make a rope with which be began to strangle himself. Id. The unit 4 officer walked up to Mr. Poslof’s cell “and demanded that Mr. Poslof remove this cloth from his 5 neck.” Id. When Mr. Poslof was nonresponsive, this officer immediately “pressed his emergency 6 code button, summoning the other officers.” Id. Medical staff entered the cell, handcuffed Mr. 7 Poslof, took him to a nurse for examination, and then placed him in a holding cage. See id. 8 Later that day, while Mr. Poslof still was under observation by staff, Defendant Mendez 9 visited him. See id. at 8. Mr. Poslof informed Defendant Mendez that he was suicidal, and 10 Defendant Mendez stated that he did not believe Mr. Poslof. See id. “This is when Mr. Poslof 11 decided to look for something that will cut his arm,” found a broken piece of plastic, and applied it 12 to his inner forearm. See id. “[T]hen the officers and Defendant Mendez called for a code again to 13 be seen by a nurse.” Id. 14 Mr. Poslof never claims to have been deprived of appropriate medication, and his 15 allegations reveal that he never was deprived of mental health care. When he harmed himself, he 16 was placed on suicide watch. When he felt neglected and threatened suicide, officers immediately 17 intervened to stop him and immediately obtained medical care for him. When he again attempted 18 to harm himself with a piece of plastic, medical staff again was immediately summoned. Per his 19 own statements, no defendant was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Poslof’s mental health needs. 20 The Court previously dismissed this claim because it was unsupported by facts and needed 21 to be pursued in a separate action. See Dkt. No. 28 at 17. Now that Mr. Poslof provides additional 22 facts, his claim fails as a matter of law. The medical needs claim accordingly is DISMISSED 23 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. 24 D. Excessive Force Claim 25 Mr. Poslof alleges that on August 9, 2024, he was subjected to excessive force by multiple 26 officers. See SAC at 8–10. As defendants to this claim, he names SVSP officers Adams, Aguirre, 27 De La Rosa, Escalante, Espinosa, Lopez-Vargas, Obodozie, Parks, Retamoza-Ramirez, Reynoso, 1 For an excessive force claim, the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a 2 good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 3 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986); 4 Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying “malicious and sadistic” 5 standard to claim that prison guards used excessive force when attempting to quell a prison riot 6 but applying “deliberate indifference” standard to claim that guards failed to act on rumors of 7 violence to prevent the riot). 8 Here, Mr. Poslof alleges that he had a meeting with Defendant Adams on August 9, 2024, 9 regarding Mr. Poslof’s housing assignment. SAC at 8. Mr. Poslof remained in Defendant Adams’s 10 office “for about five hours,” and “ended up falling asleep in this office in the chair.” Id. at 9. He 11 “was rudely awakened” by defendants De La Rosa, Escalante, Espinosa, Lopez-Vargas, Obodozie, 12 Retamoza-Ramirez, Santana-Zambrano, and ten Doe defendants. Id. These defendants “grabbed 13 Mr. Poslof’s forearms . . . then slammed [him] to the ground [o]n the office floor.” Id. “[A]ll 14 officers began to lift Mr. Poslof and walked him out as a hogtied victim then again slammed Mr. 15 Poslof’s face into the concrete.” Id. Mr. Poslof represents that these officers’ actions were 16 captured by their body cameras and by unit stationary cameras, and that “Mr. Poslof has 17 personally reviewed th[is] footage[].” Id. Mr. Poslof was taken to a nearby hospital and given “3–4 18 stitches.” Id. at 10. 19 With additional details, Mr. Poslof may be able to state an excessive force claim against 20 defendants De La Rosa, Escalante, Espinosa, Lopez-Vargas, Obodozie, Retamoza-Ramirez, 21 Santana-Zambrano, and the ten Doe defendants. Mr. Poslof should explain which defendant took 22 each injurious action. For example, seventeen defendants could not simultaneously grab Mr. 23 Poslof’s two forearms, so Mr. Poslof should either name the defendants whose hands touched his 24 forearms, or state that he is unsure which defendants did so. Similarly, “all officers” could not 25 simultaneously lift Mr. Poslof; even if all seventeen officers stood perfectly shoulder-to-shoulder, 26 the diameter of that circle would be far larger than a single person. Mr. Poslof should identify 27 which officers were in physical contact with his person, and when, and which officers were nearby 1 footage, but cannot identify the responsible officer, then he should state as much rather than 2 implausibly claiming that all officers took that action at the same time. 3 Mr. Poslof names an additional eighteen defendants to this claim without identifying any 4 wrongdoing on their part. Compare SAC at 2–3 (naming defendants Adams, Aguirre, Parks, and 5 an additional fifteen Doe defendants) with id. at 8–10 (not stating what these defendants did 6 during the excessive force incident). Indeed, the facts suggest these defendants may not have been 7 present during the application of force to Mr. Poslof’s person. See e.g., id. (stating that defendant 8 Adams had left the office). On amendment, Mr. Poslof must either dismiss these defendants or 9 identify exactly what they did during the excessive force incident. 10 The Court previously warned Mr. Poslof to “avoid exaggerating or editorializing, because 11 this makes it difficult to discern whether the facts give rise to a claim.” Dkt. No. 28 at 18. The 12 Court reminds Mr. Poslof of this warning and gives Mr. Poslof one final opportunity to provide 13 plausible facts implicating all named defendants. 14 E. Disciplinary Reports Claim 15 Mr. Poslof claims that he was assessed a rules violation report (“RVR”) and subsequently 16 placed in administrative segregation following “false[] claim[s] Mr. Poslof had committed the acts 17 of ‘battery on a peace officer.’” See SAC at 14–15. 18 The Court already explained to Mr. Poslof that this claim fails as a matter of law. See Dkt. 19 No. 28 at 20–21. A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or 20 wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. 21 Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 22 (2d Cir. 1986).4 As long as Mr. Poslof was afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary 23

24 4 See also Garrott v. Glebe, 600 F. App’x 540, 542 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting there is no federally recognized right for a prisoner to be free from false accusations); Allah v. California, 182 F.3d 924 25 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (affirming the dismissal of a claim that disciplinary results were false, and citing Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951, for the rule that an “allegation that filing a false 26 disciplinary charge against an inmate is not actionable under § 1983 where procedural due process protections are provided”); Mulqueen v. Gutierrez, 934 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished) 27 (“Mulqueen was afforded all the process that he was due in his ample disciplinary hearing; there 1 hearing, which he does not contest, see generally SAC, his allegations of a fabricated charge fail 2 to state a claim under § 1983. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140–41 (7th Cir. 1984). 3 Mr. Poslof’s claim that officers filed false disciplinary reports against him is DISMISSED 4 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. 5 F. State-Law Claims 6 Mr. Poslof asserts state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) 7 and violation of California’s Bane Act. SAC at 17–18. 8 Mr. Poslof premises his IIED claim on the assault. See id. at 18. Because Mr. Poslof’s 9 mental injury is tied to an underlying physical injury, the IIED claim will be cognizable once Mr. 10 Poslof states a cognizable excessive force claim. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil 11 action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility for 12 mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or 13 the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).) 14 The viability of Mr. Poslof’s claim under the Bane Act likewise depends upon his stating a 15 cognizable excessive force claim. The Bane Act was enacted to address hate crimes and civilly 16 protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are secured by federal or 17 state law, where the interference is carried out “by threat, intimidation or coercion.” Reese v. Cnty. 18 of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a)). The 19 elements of a Bane Act claim are essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim, with the 20 added requirement that the government official had a specific intent to violate a constitutional 21 right. See Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles, 113 F.4th 888, 907 (9th Cir. 2024). In the excessive 22 force context, it is not enough for the Bane Act plaintiff to show an intention to use force that the 23 jury ultimately finds unreasonable; rather, the plaintiff must show that “the defendants ‘intended 24 not only the force, but its unreasonableness, its character as “more than necessary under the 25 circumstances.’” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045 (citations omitted). Here, if Mr. Poslof can provide facts 26 suggesting officers indeed slammed his face into the ground twice, that would be sufficient to state 27 a claim under the Bane Act against those officers. G. Court Access Claim 1 Mr. Poslof claims he was deprived of access to the courts by Defendant Tomlinson, an 2 SVSP librarian. Mr. Poslof alleges that Defendant Tomlinson refused to provide Mr. Poslof with 3 “[ten] copies” of certain documents, instead informing him that “[three] will suffice.” SAC at 12, 4 31. Mr. Poslof argues that this deprived him of the chance “to file with the California Supreme 5 Court.” Id. Mr. Poslof also alleged that Defendant Tomlinson refused to e-file certain papers on 6 his behalf, citing court rules that only pleadings and other case-opening documents could be e- 7 filed in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Id. at 11–12. The Court therefore assumes Mr. Poslof intended 8 also to claim that Defendant Tomlinson prevented him from litigating in this District. The exhibits 9 to the SAC show that Defendant Tomlinson’s actions occurred on several days in September 2024, 10 after the 6004 and 6146 Actions were filed. See id. at 28–34 (showing Mr. Poslof requested copies 11 on various days in September 2024). 12 Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 13 343, 350 (1996). To establish a claim for any violation of the right of access to the courts, the 14 prisoner must prove that there was an inadequacy in the prison’s legal access program that caused 15 him an actual injury. See id. at 349–51. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the 16 inadequacy in the prison’s program hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous claim 17 concerning his conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. at 351, 354–55. The prisoner must 18 describe the underlying non-frivolous claim well enough to show that “the ‘arguable’ nature of the 19 underlying claim is more than hope.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002) (footnote 20 omitted). 21 Here, Mr. Poslof does not describe an underlying non-frivolous claim and so fails to state 22 an essential element of a court-access claim. See generally SAC. Judicially noticeable facts reveal 23 that amendment would be futile because Mr. Poslof did not suffer any actual injury because of 24 Defendant Tomlinson’s actions.5 25

26 5 The Court properly may consider state court records and its own docket. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson 27 Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (Federal courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those 1 As to his ability to litigate in state court, judicially noticeable facts reveal that Defendant 2 Tomlinson’s actions did not prevent Mr. Poslof from accessing the California Supreme Court. At 3 the time Mr. Poslof requested copies from Defendant Tomlinson, he already had an appeal 4 pending at the California Supreme Court regarding the conditions of his confinement during a 5 period of administrative segregation. See Poslof v. Allen, Appeal No. S286650 (Cal. S.Ct. filed 6 Aug. 29, 2024, summarily denied October 2, 2024) (stating that this was an appeal from the Fifth 7 Appellate District); see also Poslof v. Allen, Appeal No. F088390 (Cal. Ct. App. filed July 26, 8 2024, summarily denied Aug. 15, 2024) (describing the subject matter of the appeal). The docket 9 reveals that Mr. Poslof filed a request for judicial notice in that appeal on September 24, 2024. See 10 id. As Defendant Tomlinson pointed out to Mr. Poslof, the California Supreme Court requires only 11 “an original and [two] copies of any supporting document,” such as a request for judicial notice, 12 rather than the ten copies requested by Mr. Poslof. Compare Cal. Ct. R. 8.44(a)(3) with SAC at 31. 13 It is thus apparent that Defendant Tomlinson’s provision of three copies rather than ten did not 14 prevent Mr. Poslof from accessing the California Supreme Court during the time in question to 15 litigate his ongoing appeal. Nor did Defendant Tomlinson’s actions prevent Mr. Poslof from filing 16 a habeas action in the California Supreme Court: Judicially noticeable records reveal that Mr. 17 Poslof asked the California Supreme Court to review a lower court’s denial of a habeas petition on 18 February 7, 2025. See In re Poslof on H.C., Appeal No. S289199 (Cal. S.Ct. filed February 7, 19 2025, summarily denied March 19, 2025). His lack of success before the California Supreme 20 Court notwithstanding, judicially noticeable records reveal that Mr. Poslof was able to access that 21 Court. 22 As to his ability to litigate in federal court, Defendant Tomlinson’s refusal to e-file non- 23 pleadings on Mr. Poslof’s behalf did not deprive him of court access and was in accordance with 24 this District’s rules. This District requires inmates at certain prisons “to submit to the Court case- 25 initiating documents for civil rights cases by electronic mail.” N.D. Cal. Gen. Order 76. Case- 26 initiating documents include “an initial complaint” and “a document submitted together with an 27 1 initial complaint.” Id. at 76(3). “All documents other than” these case-initiating documents “shall 2 be sent and served through the mail.” Id. at 76(9). Mr. Poslof’s own allegations reveal that he was 3 not attempting to submit case-initiating documents, so Defendant Tomlinson’s refusal to e-file 4 those documents was correct and cannot be said to have deprived Mr. Poslof of access to the 5 courts. Indeed, this court’s records reveal that Mr. Poslof was actively litigating five civil rights 6 actions by September 2024 and filed several dozen documents during that month alone. See Poslof 7 v. Arce, Case No. 24-cv-5444-PCP (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 15, 2024, dismissed Jan. 3, 2025); 8 Poslof v. Arce, Case No. 24-cv-5446-PCP (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 12, 2024, dismissed Jan. 3, 9 2025); Poslof v. Warden, Case No. 24-5447-PCP (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 14, 2024, dismissed Jan. 10 3, 2025); 6004 Action (filed Aug. 21, 2024); 6146 Action (filed Aug. 25, 2024). 11 Because Mr. Poslof fails to state a court-access claim, and judicially noticeable facts reveal 12 that amendment would be futile, Mr. Poslof’s claim for denial of access to the courts is 13 DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. 14 IV. Conclusion 15 1. Mr. Poslof may be able to state cognizable claims for the use of excessive force, 16 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California’s Bane Act. These claims 17 are dismissed with leave to amend. Amendment shall be in the 6146 Action. Leave to amend 18 extends only as to these three claims. 19 2. Mr. Poslof’s other claims are not cognizable and are dismissed with prejudice. 20 There being no surviving claims in the 6004 Action, that lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice for 21 failure to state a claim. 22 3. Mr. Poslof’s motions to show cause are denied. His motions for a screening order 23 are granted. 24 4. Mr. Poslof’s THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT in the 6146 Action shall be filed 25 within thirty-five days from the date this order is filed. The third amended complaint must 26 include the caption and civil case number used in this order (24-cv-6146-PCP) and the words 27 THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. In his third amended complaint, Mr. Poslof 1 intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California’s Bane Act. An amended 2 || complaint supersedes the original complaint. See London, 644 F.2d at 814 (“[A] plaintiff waives 3 all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 4 || complaint.”); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262-63 (where an amended complaint did not name all the 5 defendants to an action, they were no longer defendants). 6 5. It is Mr. Poslof’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court 7 || informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of 8 Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 9 || do so will result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 10 || Civil Procedure 41(b). 11 6. Mr. Poslof is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number on any 12 || document he submits to the Court for consideration. 13 7. The Clerk shall file this order in both the 6004 and the 6146 Actions. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: October 27, 2025

P. Casey Pitts 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28