Lonnie Kade Welsh v. Michael Searcy

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
• Decided: April 30, 2026
• Docket: 07-25-00216-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00216-CV

LONNIE KADE WELSH, APPELLANT

V.

MICHAEL SEARCY, ET AL., APPELLEES

On Appeal from the 154th District Court Lamb County, Texas Trial Court No. DCV-20525-21, Honorable William C. Sowder, Presiding

April 30, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant, Lonnie Kade Welsh, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial court’s

summary judgment order. Now pending before the Court is Appellees’ motion to dismiss

the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

BACKGROUND

Welsh is confined in a facility housing individuals who have been civilly committed

as sexually violent predators. In 2021, Welsh filed suit against twenty-five defendants, now Appellees, asserting numerous claims arising from his treatment at the civil

commitment center. His petition alleged causes of action for: (1) violations of the

Fourteenth Amendment relating to property rights; (2) an unconstitutional taking under

the Fifth Amendment; (3) conversion; (4) abuse of process; (5) Fourteenth Amendment

violations based on failure to train or supervise; (6) Fourteenth Amendment violations

concerning freedom from restraint; (7) civil assault; (8) Fourteenth Amendment violations

involving unlawful punishment; (9) false imprisonment; (10) private nuisance; (11) libel;

(12) negligence; (13) Fourteenth Amendment violations for excessive force, including

bystander liability; (14) invasion of privacy; and (15) intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

Appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment on four of the claims:

freedom from restraint, assault, excessive force and bystander liability, and false

imprisonment. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment only as to those

claims.

ANALYSIS

Appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments or from

interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har-Con

Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex.

1998) (per curiam). “[W]hen there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an

order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every

pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes

of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06.

2 Here, the trial court’s summary judgment order does not include any finality

language, nor does it dispose of Welsh’s remaining claims against Appellees. See

Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205–06. Accordingly, the order is interlocutory, and we find no

statutory basis permitting an interlocutory appeal. Appellees have therefore moved to

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Welsh has filed a response but failed to

demonstrate grounds for continuing the appeal.

Because there is no final judgment or otherwise appealable order before the Court,

we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

Per Curiam