Longval v. Superior Court Department of the Trial Court

770 N.E.2d 993, 437 Mass. 1018, 2002 Mass. LEXIS 427
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedJuly 9, 2002
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 770 N.E.2d 993 (Longval v. Superior Court Department of the Trial Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Longval v. Superior Court Department of the Trial Court, 770 N.E.2d 993, 437 Mass. 1018, 2002 Mass. LEXIS 427 (Mass. 2002).

Opinion

The plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment of a single justice of this court on his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The single justice correctly denied the requested relief.

In his complaint, the plaintiff challenged a Superior Court order that, while conditionally allowing his application for waiver of filing fees in a civil action filed against the Department of Correction, also required the plaintiff to file a so-called “canteen account and savings account” statement within 30 days; the order provided that the complaint would be dismissed, without prejudice, if the statement was not timely filed. The plaintiff did not file the statement, and a judgment of dismissal (without prejudice) entered accordingly.

The claims raised in the plaintiff’s complaint could have been addressed during the ordinary trial and appellate process in the underlying case.1 Declaratory or injunctive relief ordinarily are not appropriate where such alternative [1019]*1019remedies are available.2 Temple v. Marlborough Div. of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 395 Mass. 117, 132-133 (1985), citing Jacoby v. Babcock Artificial Kidney Ctr., Inc., 364 Mass. 561, 564 (1974) (“It is generally acknowledged that procedures for declaratory relief cannot be used as substitutes for appeal”). See Bates v. Superior Court, 432 Mass. 1021, 1022 (2000), and cases cited (“The plaintiff could have obtained the type of relief he sought by appealing from the dismissal of his Superior Court action. The single justice properly concluded that the plaintiff could not, in lieu of pursuing his available appellate remedy, obtain a declaration under G. L. c. 231A by recasting the issue in terms of a personal dispute with the Superior Court judge”), and cases cited. This is not an extraordinary case where there is reason to dispense with the usual requirements.

The case was submitted on briefs. Norman L. Longval, pro se. Ginny Sinkel, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

We affirm that portion of the judgment that pertains to the request for injunctive relief, and remand the case to the county court for entry of a judgment declaring that, because of the available appellate remedy, the plaintiff’s action does not state a controversy and cannot be maintained under G. L. c. 231A.

So ordered.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
770 N.E.2d 993, 437 Mass. 1018, 2002 Mass. LEXIS 427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/longval-v-superior-court-department-of-the-trial-court-mass-2002.