Longley v. McGeoch

80 A. 843, 115 Md. 182, 1911 Md. LEXIS 131
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedFebruary 23, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 80 A. 843 (Longley v. McGeoch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Longley v. McGeoch, 80 A. 843, 115 Md. 182, 1911 Md. LEXIS 131 (Md. 1911).

Opinion

*184 Pearce, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Oourt.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, making perpetual an injunction previously granted by that Court, and also adjudging both defendants to be guilty of contempt in violating the terms of the preliminary injunction outstanding, and ordering that the defendant corporation forfeit and pay a fine of one hundred dollars as a penalty for having violated said injunction.

The three plaintiffs are residents of a suburban settlement in Baltimore County, called Bognel Heights, just beyond the western limits of Baltimore City, and are owners of real estate located there.

The defendant, William M. Longley, is a resident of Baltimore City, and is president of the other defendant, The W. M. Longley Quarry Company, a body corporate, with its principal office in Baltimore City. William M. Longley is the owner of a tract of land adjacent to the property of the plaintiffs, upon which is a quarry of stone which is operated by the W. M. Longley Quarry Company.

The amended bill of complaint alleges that this quarry is distant about 900 feet from the dwelling of the complainant, Harry N. McGeoch, and from the dwelling of the complainant, Lewis Bihy, and about 600 feet from the water works of the complainant, William T. Pfeiffer; that there are a considerable number of other dwellings on said heights occupied by the families of the owners or tenants; that prior to February 15th, 1909, William M. Longley was operating said quarry under the name of the W. M. Longley Quarry Company, blasting and exploding by dynamite large quantities of stone for sale for various uses, and that frequent complaints had been made to him of the consequence of such blasting, and that he had been notified that unless he desisted from blasting in such a way as to throw rocks and stones upon complainants’ premises, proceedings would be taken to enjoin him, but he nevertheless continued to blast and to throw rocks and stones upon complainants’ property, injuring the same and endangering the lives of them and their *185 families; that on February 15th, 1909, said Longley leased said quarry to said quarry company, which has ever since continued blasting in the same manner and with the same results almost every day in the week except Sunday, and frequently at intervals during the whole day, rendering it necessary at times for those in the neighborhood to seek some secure and protected place when the blastings are about to occur; that injury has been done to the property of complainants and others at the heights, and workmen there engaged in work have been compelled to quit their labor to avoid personal injury; that sometimes, both before and after February 15th, 1909, there was an attempt to give notice a few moments in advance of a blast, but such notice could not reach the residents of the Heights in time to enable them to protect themselves, even if the defendants could justify their blasting by such notice; that the complainants and their families cannot safely enjoy their lawns and premises or the avenues on the Heights on account of such blasting, which is a constant menace to life and limb, and an injury to their property rights.for which there is no adequate remedy except in equity.

The prayer of the bill is, for themselves, and all others interested therein, and who may be made parties to the proceeding, for a perpetual injunction against each of the defendants prohibiting them and their servants from casting rocks and stones upon the premises of complainants and others similarly situated, and from so conducting said quarry as to interfere with the free use of the avenues and roads through said Heights by the complainants and any others entitled to use them, and for a preliminary injunction in the meantime, for the same purpose; and also for general relief.

A preliminary injunction was issued June 11th, 1909, prohibiting said defendants or their servants or agents “from throwing or casting any stone, boulder or rock upon the portions of the property of Rognel Heights, located in Baltimore County, which the complainants and others similarly sit *186 uated are entitled to use and occupy, and from the use of what is known as mud blasting, or from in any manner menacing or endangering the safety of the complainants, and all other persons residing in Rognel Heights and from carrying on the operations of said quarry so as to interfere with, the free use and passage by the complainants and all other persons on said Heights of the avenues and roads leading through said Heights, until the further .order of said Court in the premises.

The original bill was filed by Harry 1ST. McGeoch alone against Wm. M. Longley alone. To that bill a demurrer was interposed by the defendant on March 12th, 1909, and while that was pending, Wm. T. Pfeiffer and Lewis .Bihy were by order of Court made parties plaintiffs. The grounds of the demurrer were three in number: First, that the quarry was wholly in Baltimore County, and, therefore, the Circuit Court of Baltimore City was without jurisdiction; second, that the prayer for relief was vague and indefinite and seeks the aid of a Court of Equity for persons unnamed and not parties to the cause; and third, that the prayer for process was not in accordance with section 147 of Article 16 of the Code, and,. therefore, bad in substance. This demurrer was overruled May 12, 1909, and a preliminary injunction granted, which was afterwards, on June 4th,. dissolved, it then becoming known that the quarry had been leased to the quarry company on February 15th, 1909, and it was, therefore, a necessary party. Thereupon, with leave of Court, the amended bill was filed on June 11th, making the, W. M. Longley' Quarry Company a co-defendant. It does not appear from the Record that the demurrer to the original' bill was renewed to the amended bill, and we should not, therefore, notice it, but for the fact that the appellee in his brief has devoted several pages to its discussion, which suggests that it is possible the demurrer was again interposed, there being no docket entries embraced in the Record, and we shall, therefore, briefly consider it as if renewed to the amended hill, in which the prayer for relief is unchanged, *187 but the prayer for process contains the name and residence of Wm. M. Longley, and the name and place of the principal office of the defendant corporation.

Eirst.—Injunction operates in personam. If the person is within the jurisdiction it is not material that the subject matter may be without the jurisdiction. This is the general rule, 22nd Cyc, 906; Miller’s Equity, section 570; Phelps’ Juridical Equity, p. 307; Carroll v. Lee, 3 G. & J. 504; Dorsey v. Omo, 93 Md. 74; Phelps V. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298.

Second.—The prayer for relief is definite and certain as to the plaintiffs named, and is not rendered vague and indefinite because it embraces such other residents of Rognel Heights as are alleged to suffer in like manner from that blasting complained of, and who may appear and be made parties to the proceedings.

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Bluebook (online)
80 A. 843, 115 Md. 182, 1911 Md. LEXIS 131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/longley-v-mcgeoch-md-1911.