UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JEFFREY LONG CIVIL ACTION VERSUS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT NO. 24-00001-BAJ-EWD OF HOUSING URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL. RULING AND ORDER Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a self-styled Motion To Reinstate Case Pursuant To Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(b) and an Emergency Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Temporary Restraining Order (Docs. 70, 71, the “Motions”). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will deny the Motions. I, BACKGROUND Plaintiff sued four Defendants in state court for breach of contract but failed to identify the contract allegedly breached. (See Doc. 1-2). Plaintiff also failed to describe how the contract was breached and each Defendants’ role in the alleged breach. See id. Ultimately, Plaintiffs Complaint failed to make specific allegations of any kind. See id. Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS”) removed this case to federal court, asserting this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See Doc. 1). Eventually, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Defendants SLS, Dean Morris L.L.C., and GMFS, LLC without prejudice for failure to state claim. (See Docs. 42, 48).
A review of the record demonstrates that in the eleven months following the removal of this action to this Court, Plaintiff never served the two remaining Defendants, United States Department of Housing [and] Urban Development (“HUD”) and GMFS, Inc. During that time, the Court provided Plaintiff numerous extensions of time in which to find an attorney to represent him and serve Defendants HUD and GMFS, Inc. (See Docs. 46, 53, 57, 60, 62). In the Court’s final Order giving Plaintiff additional time to find counsel or to pursue the case pro se, the Court warned that failure to serve the remaining Defendants by November 15, 2024, would result in the Court’s adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and the dismissal of the case. (See Doc. 62). Because Plaintiff did not comply with the Court’s final Order, despite having nearly six months to find an attorney, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's case without prejudice. (See Doc. 64). Nearly three months after the Court dismissed Plaintiffs case, Plaintiff filed two motions: one requesting a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction, and another requesting to amend the Complaint to add Defendants the Court previously dismissed, SLS and Dean Morris, L.L.C., as well as a Defendant not previously a party to the action, Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing. (See Docs. 67, 68). The Court rejected both of Plaintiffs requests, determining that for Plaintiff to proceed with his claims, Plaintiff must file a separate cause of action, or file a motion to reinstate this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b). (See Doc. 69). Plaintiff then filed the current Rule 60(b) Motion and a second Motion for a
TRO and preliminary injunction. (See Doc. 70; Doc. 71). Liberally construed, Plaintiffs Motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction seeks relief from all named Defendants proceeding with a foreclosure sale slated for May 21, 2025. (See Doc. 71). Plaintiff requests that the Court “immediately halt the foreclosure and pending acquisition of his property located at 4872 Harbor Lane, Greenwell Springs, Louisiana 70739.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff asserts that in a new Notice to Occupant Pending Acquisition (“NOPA”) dated April 4, 2025, the newly involved mortgage servicer, Carrington Mortgage Services, notified Plaintiff of the May 21 foreclosure sale date. (d.). Plaintiff argues that the imminent transfer of title and possession is improper owing to his “ongoing claims of fraud, unlawful servicing, and violations of HUD regulations.” (Id.). In support of these assertions, Plaintiff provides the April 4, 2025 NOPA, an earlier NOPA from January 3, 2025, an FB] Complaint Confirmation and Email Follow-Up that Plaintiff sent to the FBI to report his HUD allegations, and a copy of his Rule 60(b) Motion. (See Docs. 71-1, 71-2, 71-8, 71-4). In support of Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion, Plaintiff provided the Court with the same documentation, aside from the April 4 NOPA, which he argues serves as “new evidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). (See Doc. 70-1, 70-2, 70-3). Plaintiff further contends that the facts underlying his TRO request constitute “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6). (See Doc. 70 at 2).
Il. DISCUSSION Although the Court previously denied Plaintiffs first TRO request because Plaintiff had not submitted a Rule 60(b) Motion, Plaintiff has now done so. Because Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion and TRO rely on largely the same facts, the Court will consider both Motions together. A. Relief from Judgment or Order. Plaintiff first requests relief from the Court’s Judgment dismissing the case. Rule 60(b) provides that relief from a prior order may be had for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b), (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, (4) a void judgment, (5) a judgment that has already been satisfied, is no longer equitable, or has effectively been overturned, or (6) any other reason that justifies such relief. Plaintiff has not provided any factual assertions to support the applicability of any of the first five subsections of Rule 60(b). As described in the Court’s previous order dismissing the case, Plaintiffs failure to find an attorney or serve Defendants over the course of nearly six months does not constitute excusable neglect. Additionally, as noted in greater detail below, Plaintiff has not properly verified how the April 4 NOPA is “new evidence” for his claims against Defendants. Further, Plaintiff not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which allows the Court to vacate a prior order for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Rule 60(b)(6)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JEFFREY LONG CIVIL ACTION VERSUS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT NO. 24-00001-BAJ-EWD OF HOUSING URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ET AL. RULING AND ORDER Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a self-styled Motion To Reinstate Case Pursuant To Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(b) and an Emergency Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Temporary Restraining Order (Docs. 70, 71, the “Motions”). For the reasons outlined below, the Court will deny the Motions. I, BACKGROUND Plaintiff sued four Defendants in state court for breach of contract but failed to identify the contract allegedly breached. (See Doc. 1-2). Plaintiff also failed to describe how the contract was breached and each Defendants’ role in the alleged breach. See id. Ultimately, Plaintiffs Complaint failed to make specific allegations of any kind. See id. Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS”) removed this case to federal court, asserting this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See Doc. 1). Eventually, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Defendants SLS, Dean Morris L.L.C., and GMFS, LLC without prejudice for failure to state claim. (See Docs. 42, 48).
A review of the record demonstrates that in the eleven months following the removal of this action to this Court, Plaintiff never served the two remaining Defendants, United States Department of Housing [and] Urban Development (“HUD”) and GMFS, Inc. During that time, the Court provided Plaintiff numerous extensions of time in which to find an attorney to represent him and serve Defendants HUD and GMFS, Inc. (See Docs. 46, 53, 57, 60, 62). In the Court’s final Order giving Plaintiff additional time to find counsel or to pursue the case pro se, the Court warned that failure to serve the remaining Defendants by November 15, 2024, would result in the Court’s adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and the dismissal of the case. (See Doc. 62). Because Plaintiff did not comply with the Court’s final Order, despite having nearly six months to find an attorney, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's case without prejudice. (See Doc. 64). Nearly three months after the Court dismissed Plaintiffs case, Plaintiff filed two motions: one requesting a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction, and another requesting to amend the Complaint to add Defendants the Court previously dismissed, SLS and Dean Morris, L.L.C., as well as a Defendant not previously a party to the action, Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing. (See Docs. 67, 68). The Court rejected both of Plaintiffs requests, determining that for Plaintiff to proceed with his claims, Plaintiff must file a separate cause of action, or file a motion to reinstate this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b). (See Doc. 69). Plaintiff then filed the current Rule 60(b) Motion and a second Motion for a
TRO and preliminary injunction. (See Doc. 70; Doc. 71). Liberally construed, Plaintiffs Motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction seeks relief from all named Defendants proceeding with a foreclosure sale slated for May 21, 2025. (See Doc. 71). Plaintiff requests that the Court “immediately halt the foreclosure and pending acquisition of his property located at 4872 Harbor Lane, Greenwell Springs, Louisiana 70739.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff asserts that in a new Notice to Occupant Pending Acquisition (“NOPA”) dated April 4, 2025, the newly involved mortgage servicer, Carrington Mortgage Services, notified Plaintiff of the May 21 foreclosure sale date. (d.). Plaintiff argues that the imminent transfer of title and possession is improper owing to his “ongoing claims of fraud, unlawful servicing, and violations of HUD regulations.” (Id.). In support of these assertions, Plaintiff provides the April 4, 2025 NOPA, an earlier NOPA from January 3, 2025, an FB] Complaint Confirmation and Email Follow-Up that Plaintiff sent to the FBI to report his HUD allegations, and a copy of his Rule 60(b) Motion. (See Docs. 71-1, 71-2, 71-8, 71-4). In support of Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion, Plaintiff provided the Court with the same documentation, aside from the April 4 NOPA, which he argues serves as “new evidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). (See Doc. 70-1, 70-2, 70-3). Plaintiff further contends that the facts underlying his TRO request constitute “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6). (See Doc. 70 at 2).
Il. DISCUSSION Although the Court previously denied Plaintiffs first TRO request because Plaintiff had not submitted a Rule 60(b) Motion, Plaintiff has now done so. Because Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion and TRO rely on largely the same facts, the Court will consider both Motions together. A. Relief from Judgment or Order. Plaintiff first requests relief from the Court’s Judgment dismissing the case. Rule 60(b) provides that relief from a prior order may be had for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b), (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party, (4) a void judgment, (5) a judgment that has already been satisfied, is no longer equitable, or has effectively been overturned, or (6) any other reason that justifies such relief. Plaintiff has not provided any factual assertions to support the applicability of any of the first five subsections of Rule 60(b). As described in the Court’s previous order dismissing the case, Plaintiffs failure to find an attorney or serve Defendants over the course of nearly six months does not constitute excusable neglect. Additionally, as noted in greater detail below, Plaintiff has not properly verified how the April 4 NOPA is “new evidence” for his claims against Defendants. Further, Plaintiff not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which allows the Court to vacate a prior order for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Rule 60(b)(6)
“is a catch-all provision, meant to encompass circumstances not covered by Rule 60(b)’s other enumerated provisions. Here, Plaintiff asserts that the facts underlying his TRO request necessitate reopening this case. However, as noted below, Plaintiff has not complied with Rule 65(b)(1)’s verification and notice requirements, which would allow the court to address the substance of Plaintiffs TRO request. For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs request to reinstate this action. B. Temporary Restraining Order. Although, as previously noted, the Court will not re-open the case at this time, the Court addresses Plaintiffs request for a TRO and preliminary injunction. This is because Plaintiffs TRO request is relevant to its decision regarding whether Plaintiffs action should be reinstated. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 65(b)(1) governs Plaintiffs request for a TRO and provides: The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). Plaintiff has failed to comply with either requirement of Rule 65(b)(1). Plaintiff seeks a TRO based on new facts not set forth in his original Complaint, yet does not include sufficient verification attesting to these new facts. In support of Plaintiffs new allegations, aside from Plaintiffs own submissions to the FBI, Plaintiff provides
only two NOPAs, which notify Plaintiff of the impending foreclosure and pending acquisition of his property. (See Docs. 71-1, 71-2). Plaintiff, however, does not provide the Court an affidavit or amended verified complaint attesting that the foreclosure and upcoming acquisition facilitate “fraud, unlawful servicing, and violations of HUD regulations,” or any law at all. Additionally, Plaintiffs motion does not include a certificate describing his efforts, if any, to provide notice to Defendants’ counsel, or to explain the reasons why such notice should not be required. Plaintiffs failure to comply with Rule 65(b)(1)’s verification and notice requirements, standing alone, is a sufficient basis to deny his request for a TRO. See Stevenson v. Benjamin, No. 19-cv-637 (M.D. La. February 17, 2021) (denying pro se plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order due to failure to comply with Rule 65’s notice requirements); Hampton v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., No. 16-cv-632, 2016 WL 5796886, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2016) (same); Spears v. Scales, No. 15-11-SDD-RLB, 2016 WL 8774069, at *1 (M.D. La. July 13, 2016) (same). Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 65(b), the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion, (Doc. 70), be and is hereby DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs request for a TRO and/or a
preliminary injunction, (Doc. 71), be and is hereby DENIED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this \1- y of April, 2025
JUDGE BRIAN A. JAC N UNITED STATES DIS T COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA