Long v. State

914 S.E.2d 784, 321 Ga. 360

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: April 8, 2025
• Docket: S25A0116
• Status: Published

Opinion

321 Ga. 360 FINAL COPY

S25A0116. LONG v. THE STATE.

WARREN, Presiding Justice.

Appellant Danny Long was convicted of malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Edmond Irvin.1

Long’s sole contention in this appeal is that the trial court erred by

not accepting the jury’s verdict finding him guilty of voluntary

manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder. Because the trial

court did not err in this respect, we affirm.2

1 Irvin’s first name is also spelled “Edmund” sometimes in the record.

2 The crimes occurred on April 30, 2019. In October 2019, a Coweta County grand jury indicted Long for malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated assault, two counts of aggravated assault (one against Irvin and the other against Evelyn Roman), terroristic threats, and criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark. The terroristic-threats count was nolle prossed before the jury trial, which was held from June 28 to July 2, 2021. The jury ultimately found Long guilty of the remaining counts, and the trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison for malice murder, 20 consecutive years for the aggravated assault against Roman, and five consecutive years for criminal use of an article with an altered identification mark. The felony- murder count was vacated, and the trial court merged the count of aggravated assault against Irvin. Long filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in April 2024. Long filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 1. As pertinent to Long’s only contention, the record shows the

following. The indictment charged Long with malice murder and

felony murder, both predicated on the same aggravated assault “by

shooting” Irvin, as well as other crimes. At Long’s request, the trial

court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser

offense of both malice murder and felony murder. The jury then

deliberated and returned a verdict, finding Long guilty of voluntary

manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and also guilty of

felony murder, among other crimes.

The trial court silently reviewed the verdict form (but did not

publish the verdict aloud), sent the jury out, and informed the

parties of the jury’s findings. The prosecutor argued that the court

was authorized to reject the verdict pursuant to Ingram v. State, 290

Ga. 500 (722 SE2d 714) (2012). Long’s trial counsel asserted that the

court should accept the verdict and sentence Long for voluntary

manslaughter, rather than felony murder. The trial court concluded

that it was authorized to reject the verdict under Ingram and did so;

the court then brought the jurors back to the courtroom and

2 instructed them to continue deliberating. At the prosecutor’s

request, which Long’s trial counsel opposed, the trial court later

instructed the jury: “[I]n this case, [Long] cannot be found guilty of

both voluntary manslaughter and felony murder.” The jury

ultimately returned a verdict, which the trial court published,

finding Long guilty of malice murder and felony murder, among

other crimes, and Long was sentenced to serve life in prison for

malice murder.

2. Long contends that the trial court erred by rejecting the

jury’s initial verdict of guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and

felony murder. That claim fails.

As we explained in Ingram, when a “jury renders a verdict for

voluntary manslaughter, it cannot also find felony murder based on

the same underlying aggravated assault.” 290 Ga. at 502 (citation

and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, a trial court is authorized to

refuse to accept such a verdict. See id. at 502-503 (holding that “the

trial court properly refused to accept the [jury’s] initial verdict

finding [the a]ppellant guilty of both felony murder and voluntary

3 manslaughter” and required the jury to continue deliberating

because “the same aggravated assault charge was both the predicate

felony for the felony murder charge and the act underlying the

voluntary manslaughter charge”). Here, as in Ingram, the jury

initially found Long guilty of both voluntary manslaughter and

felony murder based on the same aggravated assault—the act of

shooting Irvin. Under those circumstances, the trial court was

authorized to refuse to accept the verdict and to instruct the jury to

continue its deliberations. See id.

Long nevertheless argues—without mentioning Ingram—that

the trial court was required to accept the jury’s first verdict and

sentence him for voluntary manslaughter, rather than felony

murder, pursuant to the modified-merger rule that this Court

adopted in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992). That

rule provides that when a trial court accepts a jury’s verdict of guilty

of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on the same

underlying aggravated assault, the court must sentence the

defendant only for voluntary manslaughter. See id. at 865-867. But

4 Edge did not address whether a trial court is authorized to reject

such a verdict. Ingram controls that issue. And Ingram expressly

relied on Edge’s modified-merger rule in concluding that a trial court

is authorized to reject a verdict finding a defendant guilty of both

voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based on the same

underlying aggravated assault. See Ingram, 290 Ga. at 502-503

(explaining that “the jury could not find [the a]ppellant guilty of both

felony murder and voluntary manslaughter because, as charged, the

crimes were subject to the modified merger rule” and citing Edge).

In sum: Ingram controls the trial court’s refusal to accept the

jury’s initial verdict here, and the trial court did not err under that

precedent. Accordingly, Long’s only claim in this appeal fails. See

Ingram, 290 Ga. at 502-503.3

3 Quoting language in a footnote in Edge, Long also mentions in his brief

in this Court that the jury was not instructed that “if it finds provocation and passion with respect to the act which caused the killing, it could not find felony murder, but would be authorized to find voluntary manslaughter.” 261 Ga. at 867 n.3. But Long did not list the omission of this instruction as an enumeration of error. See Mims v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 854 n.2 (854 SE2d 742) (2021). And in any event, we have held that such an instruction is not required, Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 790 n.3 (809 SE2d 765) (2018), and here, the jury charge as a whole essentially covered the principle outlined in the language

5 Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, LaGrua, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.

Decided April 8, 2025.

Murder. Coweta Superior Court. Before Judge Sakrison.

Matthew S. Nestrud, for appellant.

John H. Cranford, Jr., District Attorney, Robert W. Mooradian,

Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,

Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm,

Matthew B. Crowder, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys

General, for appellee.

quoted above. We also note that Long does not contend that the trial court’s rejection of the jury’s initial verdict implicates double-jeopardy principles. Cf. McElrath v. Georgia, 601 U.S. 87, 96 n.4 (144 SCt 651, 217 LE2d 419) (2024) (expressly declining to “address the Double Jeopardy Clause’s application to a trial judge’s rejection of inconsistent or incomprehensible jury findings under state law”); id. at 98-99 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that “[n]othing that we say today should be understood to express any view about whether a not-guilty verdict that is inconsistent with a verdict on another count and is not accepted by the trial judge constitutes an ‘acquittal’ for double jeopardy purposes”). We therefore do not address that issue. 6