Long v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Long v. State

578 So. 2d 288, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 3771, 1991 WL 63756

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedApril 24, 1991

DocketNo. 88-02328

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 578 So. 2d 288 (Long v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Long v. State, 578 So. 2d 288, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 3771, 1991 WL 63756 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

HALL, Judge.

Victoria Long contends the trial court erred in denying her motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial on charges of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, living from earnings of prostitution, and keeping a house of ill fame. She contends the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.¹ We find no merit in her contentions and sustain her convictions on racketeering, conspiracy, and living off earnings. We reverse, however, Long’s conviction for keeping a house of ill fame.

As we stated in Wolfe v. State, 576 So.2d 915 (Fla.2d DCA, 1991), our supreme court overturned the ill fame statute as unconstitutionally vague. See Warren v. State, 572 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1991). Warren v. State reversed earlier supreme court and district court of appeal decisions interpreting the ill fame statute as constitutional. Since the Warren opinion had not yet been filed at the time of Long’s conviction, the trial court did not have the benefit of that decision.

Though Long’s conviction and sentence for keeping a house of ill fame must be reversed, we find the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish Long’s guilt for the lesser included offense of keeping a house of prostitution under section 796.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). See Wolfe v. State. As we are authorized to do under section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1987), we direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser included offense and to resentence Long accordingly.

Because we are setting aside one conviction while allowing the others to [289]*289stand, the presumptive sentence under the guidelines could change. Therefore, a new scoresheet must be prepared for all of Long’s convictions. If the scoresheet reflects a change in the presumptive sentence, Long must be resentenced on all convictions.

Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded with directions consistent with this opinion.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.

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HALL, Judge.

Victoria Long contends the trial court erred in denying her motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial on charges of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, living from earnings of prostitution, and keeping a house of ill fame. She contends the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.¹ We find no merit in her contentions and sustain her convictions on racketeering, conspiracy, and living off earnings. We reverse, however, Long’s conviction for keeping a house of ill fame.

As we stated in Wolfe v. State, 576 So.2d 915 (Fla.2d DCA, 1991), our supreme court overturned the ill fame statute as unconstitutionally vague. See Warren v. State, 572 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1991). Warren v. State reversed earlier supreme court and district court of appeal decisions interpreting the ill fame statute as constitutional. Since the Warren opinion had not yet been filed at the time of Long’s conviction, the trial court did not have the benefit of that decision.

Though Long’s conviction and sentence for keeping a house of ill fame must be reversed, we find the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish Long’s guilt for the lesser included offense of keeping a house of prostitution under section 796.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). See Wolfe v. State. As we are authorized to do under section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1987), we direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser included offense and to resentence Long accordingly.

Because we are setting aside one conviction while allowing the others to [289]*289stand, the presumptive sentence under the guidelines could change. Therefore, a new scoresheet must be prepared for all of Long’s convictions. If the scoresheet reflects a change in the presumptive sentence, Long must be resentenced on all convictions.

Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded with directions consistent with this opinion.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

578 So. 2d 288, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 3771, 1991 WL 63756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/long-v-state-fladistctapp-1991.

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