IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JASON DEAN LONG,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 20-3145-SAC
KEVIN FRIEND, Sheriff, Linn County Sheriff’s Department,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Jason Dean Long, a prisoner currently being held at the Anderson County Jail in Garnett, Kansas, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff is ordered to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) alleges his constitutional rights were violated in February of 2017 when he was chained to a bench at the Linn County Jail for four days. Mr. Long states he had called an ambulance because he was suicidal, and he was taken to jail instead of to a hospital. A judge then told the sheriff’s department to chain him to the bench rather than put him with the prisoners. Plaintiff names as defendant Kevin Friend, the current sheriff of Linn County. He claims violation of his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or employee of such entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Additionally, with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has a duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Upon completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. Discussion Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal because it is untimely. The statute of
limitations for § 1983 claims “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). The Court therefore applies Kansas's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60–513(a)(4); Brown v. Unified School Dist. 501, Topeka Public Schools, 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). While state law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Id. at 388 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1983
action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JASON DEAN LONG,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 20-3145-SAC
KEVIN FRIEND, Sheriff, Linn County Sheriff’s Department,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Jason Dean Long, a prisoner currently being held at the Anderson County Jail in Garnett, Kansas, brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff is ordered to show cause why his complaint should not be dismissed. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) alleges his constitutional rights were violated in February of 2017 when he was chained to a bench at the Linn County Jail for four days. Mr. Long states he had called an ambulance because he was suicidal, and he was taken to jail instead of to a hospital. A judge then told the sheriff’s department to chain him to the bench rather than put him with the prisoners. Plaintiff names as defendant Kevin Friend, the current sheriff of Linn County. He claims violation of his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or employee of such entity to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Additionally, with any litigant, such as Plaintiff, who is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court has a duty to screen the complaint to determine its sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Upon completion of this screening, the Court must dismiss any claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2)(B). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. Discussion Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal because it is untimely. The statute of
limitations for § 1983 claims “is drawn from the personal-injury statute of the state in which the federal district court sits.” Mondragon v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008). The Court therefore applies Kansas's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60–513(a)(4); Brown v. Unified School Dist. 501, Topeka Public Schools, 465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). While state law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Id. at 388 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1983
action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Since the injury in a § 1983 case is the violation of a constitutional right, such claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Commission, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). It plainly appears from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 26, 2020. Plaintiff’s alleged claim accrued in February of 2017, more than two years prior to the filing date of this complaint. Consequently, unless tolling applies, Plaintiff’s claim is untimely. In certain limited circumstances, the statute of limitations may be subject to tolling. Because the Court applies the Kansas statute of limitations in § 1983 cases, it also looks to Kansas law for questions of tolling. Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff has
the burden of establishing a factual basis for tolling the limitations period. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1980); Slayden v. Sixta, 825 P.2d 119, 122 (Kan. 1992). Generally, a Kansas court cannot extend the limitation period except as provided by statute. McClain v. Roberts, 304 P.3d 364 (Table), 2013 WL 3970215, *3 (Kan. App. Aug. 2, 2013), citing Underhill v. Thompson, 158 P.3d 987, 995 (Kan. App. 2007). Kansas law provides that a prisoner is presumed to be a person under a legal disability so that the limitation period would be tolled until the disability is removed (here, when the person is released). K.S.A. 60–515(a). However, the statute further provides that “if a person imprisoned for any term has access to the court for
purposes of bringing an action, such person shall not be deemed to be under legal disability.” K.S.A. 60–515(a). Therefore, to be entitled to tolling under K.S.A. 60-515(a), a prisoner must have been denied access to the courts such that he could not file within the limitation period, something that Mr. Long has not claimed. McClain, 2013 WL 3970215 at *3, citing see Bulmer v. Bowling, 4 P.3d 637, 639 (Kan. App. 2000); Parker v. Bruce, 109 F. App’x 317, 319 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion). Kansas also recognizes the doctrine of equitable tolling but seems to apply it only where defendants did “something that amounted to an ‘affirmative inducement to plaintiff to delay bringing the action.’” Friends University v. W.R. Grace & Co., 608 P.2d 936, 941 (Kan. 1980) (quoting Rex v. Warner, 332 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1958)). The record fails to support a claim that Defendant affirmatively induced Plaintiff into delaying his filing of this suit. In addition, at least one Kansas appellate court has applied the equitable tolling standard for habeas cases in the context of a § 1983 action. See McClain, 2013 WL 3970215 at *3. That standard provides for equitable tolling where a litigant has been pursuing his rights diligently and
some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391 (2013) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010)). Plaintiff does not demonstrate diligence or any extraordinary circumstance that would entitle him to equitable tolling of the limitation period. A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by an indigent plaintiff if it is patently clear from the allegations as tendered that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1258. Because Plaintiff did not file his complaint within the two-year limitation period and because Plaintiff does not establish a factual basis for tolling the limitation period, Plaintiff’s action is subject to dismissal as barred by the statute of limitations.
IV. Response Required For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is therefore required to show good cause why his complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff is warned that his failure to file a timely response may result in the complaint being dismissed for the reasons stated herein without further notice. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted to and including August 14, 2020, in which to show good cause, in writing, why his complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: This 15th day of July, 2020, at Topeka, Kansas.
s/_Sam A. Crow_____ SAM A. CROW U.S. Senior District Judge