Long v. Dossett

732 So. 2d 773, 1999 WL 252694
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 28, 1999
Docket98-1160
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 732 So. 2d 773 (Long v. Dossett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Long v. Dossett, 732 So. 2d 773, 1999 WL 252694 (La. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

732 So.2d 773 (1999)

Richard Patrick LONG, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Catherine West DOSSETT, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 98-1160.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 28, 1999.
Writ Denied June 4, 1999.

*774 Helen Scott Johnson, Jennifer Stuller Nehrbass, Lafayette, for Richard Patrick Long.

Gordon Peter Sandoz II, Francis A. Olivier III, Sunset, for Catherine West Dossett.

BEFORE: DOUCET, C.J., SAUNDERS, AND SULLIVAN, Judges.

SAUNDERS, Judge.

This appeal arises from a child custody proceeding wherein the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the mother of her minor child. Winter Jade Long is the *775 minor child of Richard Patrick Long, hereinafter "Appellant," and Catherine West Dossett, hereinafter "Appellee." After a trial on the merits, the trial judge granted joint custody to both parties with Appellee assigned domiciliary parent. Upon review, we maintain the joint custody rule and affirm the designation of Appellee as domiciliary parent.

FACTS

Winter Jade Long was born on December 18, 1992. On October 6, 1995, by a child custody order, Appellant and Appellee were granted split domiciliary status over Winter based on stipulations made by the parties. As per the order, each parent enjoyed custody over Winter for six months of each year until Winter reached school age, whereupon a new plan was to be implemented. Winter has now reached school age, and each parent seeks sole custody over the minor child or, in the alternative, primary domiciliary status under a joint custody plan. After a trial on the merits, the trial court ordered that the parties shall have joint custody over Winter, with Appellee designated as primary domiciliary parent.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

Appellant argues that the trial judge operated under an error of law, and therefore, on appeal, the evidence presented at trial should be reviewed de novo. In Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, 97-0577 (La.2/6/98); 708 So.2d 731, the supreme court performed a de novo review when it found that the trial court misapplied La. Civ.Code art. 131. The trial court made its analysis under the old presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child. The 1993 amendments to La.Civ. Code art. 131 removed that presumption, and therefore the standard was applied erroneously, making a de novo review necessary. Citing Evans, Appellant argues that legal error was made in the matter before us when the trial judge failed to view the factors of La.Civ.Code art. 134 as a whole and, instead, placed too much emphasis on the relationship between Winter's parents. We note, the Evans court made no mention of La.Civ.Code art. 134; rather, its discussion focused on La.Civ. Code art. 131 and the effects of the amendments thereto. Nevertheless, it is true, as Appellant asserts, that La.Civ. Code art. 134 factors are nonexclusive and the weight given to each factor is left up to the discretion of the trial court. La.Civ. Code art. 134, Comment (b). In his Ruling and Order, the lower court cited La. Civ.Code art. 131 and Muller v. Muller, 94-281 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94); 643 So.2d 478, when it stated that it must consider the best interest of the minor child. Appellant asserts that the lower court's citation of Muller somehow indicates that the trial court inappropriately applied La. Civ.Code art. 134 factors to this matter. The trial court listed the factors of La.Civ. Code art. 134 and explained:

The trial of this matter consisted of almost eight days of testimony and the introduction of approximately sixty exhibits. The court then interviewed the child in chambers, not as to her preference, but in an effort to test the credibility of some of the trial testimony.

Appellant's request for a de novo review is premised on a mere allegation that because the lower court granted domiciliary status to Appellee, who focused much of her argument on the relationship between the parents, the trial judge committed legal error under La.Civ.Code art. 134 by focusing on the parents and not Winter's best interest. We find this conclusion unsupported by the record and find no legal error therein. Accordingly, a de novo review is unnecessary.

B. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

Appellant asserts that the lower court abused its discretion and manifestly erred when it appointed Appellee as domiciliary parent. It is well settled that the fact *776 findings of a trial court or jury will not be disturbed on review absent a finding of clear or manifest error. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). Considering the review of a child custody order, Justice Tate explained in Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 1129, 254 So.2d 603, 605 (La.1971):

Upon appellate review, the determination of the trial judge in child custody matters is entitled to great weight. He is in a better position to evaluate the best interests of the children from his total overview of the conduct and character of the parties and the children and of community standards. His discretion on the issue will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse thereof.

In the present matter, the trial court's order was made necessary by the 1995 custody arrangement which made modification necessary once Winter reached school age. The need to alter the custody agreement when Winter reached this age was foreseen by the 1995 trial court and provided for in the language of its order which granted equal joint custody to the parents "until the minor child begins school at which time the parties shall submit a new implementation plan in writing or submit the issues to the Court." The record indicates that the earlier order was made pursuant to a stipulated agreement; hence, the 1995 order is not a "considered decree," therefore the heavy burden of a showing that the present custody arrangement is "so deleterious to the child" or a showing that the harm of change is substantially outweighed by its advantages need not be made by the movant. Hensgens v. Hensgens, 94-1200, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir.); 653 So.2d 48, 52, writ denied, 95-1488 (La.9/22/95); 660 So.2d 478, citing Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La.1986).

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732 So. 2d 773, 1999 WL 252694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/long-v-dossett-lactapp-1999.