Long, T. v. Denlinger, D.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 14, 2018
Docket416 MDA 2017
StatusUnpublished

This text of Long, T. v. Denlinger, D. (Long, T. v. Denlinger, D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Long, T. v. Denlinger, D., (Pa. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

J-A26008-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TIMOTHY G. LONG IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v.

DOUGLAS K. DENLINGER AND DAVID ISAAC LUTZ

Appellees No. 416 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered February 17, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Civil Division at No(s): 2015-01435

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, AND RANSOM, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2018

Timothy G. Long appeals from the February 17, 2017 order denying

his motion to deny recommendations of the receiver, and the January 6,

2016 order sustaining the preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer

of Appellees Douglas K. Denlinger and David Isaac Lutz. We conclude that

the averments contained in Mr. Long’s amended complaint sufficiently

alleged a cause of action for breach of contract to survive a demurrer.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Based on a review of the record, the pertinent facts can be

summarized as follows. In 1990, Appellant founded a financial planning

business, Keystone Financial Associates, LLC (“KFA”). In 2002, Mr.

Denlinger joined Appellant’s business. In 2007, KFA employed Mr. Lutz, and J-A26008-17

in 2009, the parties agreed to make Mr. Lutz a part owner of the business

through a ten-year vested stock program garnering a one percent ownership

interest per year. In 2013, the parties agreed to divide the business, with

Appellant establishing a new company, and Mr. Denlinger and Mr. Lutz

establishing a separate one. The parties negotiated an agreement for

splitting KFA into distinct entities, which they memorialized in a Statement of

Understanding (“SOU”) signed by the parties on October 30, 2013.

The SOU provided the process by which the parties would dissolve KFA

and create two separate financial planning businesses. The parties agreed

that Appellant would receive 48.5% of the value of KFA in keeping with his

ownership interest. Further, this distribution would be effectuated through a

division of KFA’s client base. Accordingly, the parties agreed to assign a

value to each client, and allocate those clients to the newly-created entities

in such a manner as to divide the company as nearly as possible to align

with the agreed-upon ownership interests. The SOU purported to provide a

value formula, which delineated base percentages and adjustments by which

the parties would evaluate client value, without further explicating the

method by which these values would be ascertained. It provided an

adjustment period during which the parties would determine, adjust, and

allocate clients in order to fulfill the purposes of the SOU.

Thereafter, the parties were unable to agree upon a distribution of the

entire client list. The parties made numerous changes to this list through

-2- J-A26008-17

2015. In February 2015, Appellant initiated an independent valuation of

KFA’s business. That independent analysis determined that the value of the

client base allocated to Appellant fell significantly short of the 48.5% agreed

upon in the SOU.

Based on the foregoing, Appellant commenced this action by filing a

complaint on April 14, 2015, alleging breach of contract and calling for the

dissolution of KFA and the appointment of a receiver to aid in that endeavor.

Appellees filed preliminary objections, and in response, Appellant filed an

amended complaint on August 20, 2015. Appellees again filed preliminary

objections, and after a hearing on the matter, the court sustained Appellees’

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to Appellant’s breach of

contract claim. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections to

Appellant’s second count seeking dissolution of the partnership, but

appointed a receiver to oversee that dissolution.

Subsequently, the receiver filed a memorandum adopting Appellees’

proposed dissolution strategy, declined to provide an independent valuation

of KFA’s business, and determined that the valuation had been fairly and

equitably negotiated. Appellant filed a motion to deny recommendations of

the receiver, which, after a hearing, the trial court rejected. The court

directed the receiver to proceed with the dissolution as set forth in the

previously filed memorandum. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and

complied with the court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement of

-3- J-A26008-17

errors complained of on appeal. The court authored its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, and this matter is now ready for our review.

Appellant raises two questions for our consideration:

I. Did the trial court commit reversible error in sustaining a demurrer on the grounds that the complaint seeks damages based on an independent valuation of the involved company?

II. Did the trial court err in approving the receiver’s report without requiring the receiver to value the partnership assets as part of the dissolution process?

Appellant’s brief at 6.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the court’s order sustaining Appellees’

preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to his claim that Appellees

breached the SOU. We are guided by the following principles:

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.

Gross v. Nova Chemicals Services, Inc., 161 A.3d 257, 261 (Pa.Super.

2017) (citation omitted). In order to sufficiently plead a count of breach of

contract, Appellant must set forth facts that establish: (1) the existence of a

contract, including its essential terms; (2) a breach of the contract; and, (3)

-4- J-A26008-17

resultant damages. McCabe v. Marywood University, 166 A.3d 1257,

1262 (Pa.Super. 2017).

In sustaining Appellees’ preliminary objections in the nature of a

demurrer, the trial court noted that the only claim at issue was whether

Appellees had breached the requirements of the SOU. In this vein, the trial

court determined that, since the terms of the agreement controlled over any

allegations levied in the complaint, the independent valuation that Appellant

relied upon to prove that Appellees owed him damages for failing to provide

him clients with a value equal to a 48.5% share of KFA was irrelevant.

Rather, the court reasoned, the valuation procedure contained within the

SOU controlled, and the agreement did not otherwise provide for an outside

valuation. As such, the court concluded that Appellant could not rely upon

an independent valuation to prove that Appellees had improperly valued

KFA’s client base. Thus, it dismissed Appellant’s claim for breach of

contract.

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Related

Gross v. Nova Chemicals Services, Inc.
161 A.3d 257 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)
McCabe, D. v. Marywood University
166 A.3d 1257 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)

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