Long Island R.R. Co. v. . Sherwood

98 N.E. 169, 205 N.Y. 1, 1912 N.Y. LEXIS 1185
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 19, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 98 N.E. 169 (Long Island R.R. Co. v. . Sherwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Long Island R.R. Co. v. . Sherwood, 98 N.E. 169, 205 N.Y. 1, 1912 N.Y. LEXIS 1185 (N.Y. 1912).

Opinions

Haight, J.

The Long Island Eailroad Company has instituted the proceedings in question for the purpose of condemning the real estate of the respondents and acquiring title thereto for the purpose of enabling it to construct a railroad crossing over Van Wyck avenue in the city of New York. The company is a corporation existing under the general railroad laws of this state and has heretofore constructed and operated a railroad through Long Island. Just before its road crosses Van Wyck avenue it separates into two branches; one proceeding on through the new tunnel of the Pennsylvania railroad at Thirty-fourth street and the other forking off to the south into the borough of Brooklyn. The two branches upon the western side of Van Wyck avenue are ninety feet and nine and one-half inches apart. The land, the title of which the corporation seeks to acquire, is located between the two branches on the western side of the avenue. The plans of the railroad company adopted by its board of directors call for the construction of a viaduct over Van Wyck avenue two stories in height upon steel pillars in the center of the avenue and upon the curbs and sidewalks thereof and the moving of the company’s railroad tracks upon such bridge or structure. The bridge is designed to carry thirteen tracks over Van Wyck avenue, so arranged by a double deck that the *4 tracks thereon will not cross each other at the same grade. Van Wyck avenue was crossed at grade by seven tracks, two'-’of them being Atlantic division tracks, two Montauk division tracks, two main line tracks and one, the most southerly of all, which is used for carrying empty trains to and from Elatbush avenue station. The avenue is a very heavily traveled highway and is protected at its intersection with the company’s railroad by four crossing gates and the plans, when completed, will eliminate the grade crossing and enable the company to nearly double its number of tracks across the highway.

The plans, as we have seen, involve the raising of the railroad tracks as they approach the avenue on either side in order to pass over the street. Inasmuch as some of the tracks cross over the bridge at the second story, the embankment for some of the tracks necessarily will have to be of the same height as that story. On the east of Van Wyck avenue a new transfer station has been adopted by the corporation and it, with the necessary yards, is now approaching completion. The design on the part of the company is to operate its trains from that station into the city and under the East river by electricity instead of steam. The bulk of the traffic takes place in the hours when the people are going to business and when they are returning to their homes, and during those horns trains run across Van Wyck avenue on less than five minutes headway, and some of the trains travel at a speed of sixty miles an hour. The crossing of Van Wyck avenue at grade is, therefore, very dangerous, and the company has already constructed a portion of the bridge and put the same in operation, which carries the two westbound main line tracks over the avenue.

The trial court, however, has held as a conclusion of law that the removal of the main tracks up on to the bridge proposed to be constructed operates as a change of route, and it has found as a fact that the statutory proceedings necessary to effect a change of route have not *5 been taken, and, consequently, it has found as a fact that it was not actually necessary that the company should be permitted to acquire the lands of the respondents. These findings and conclusions are duly excepted to by the railroad company, and they present the question that is to be determined upon this review.

The findings that the taking of the lands was not actually necessary for the purposes of the company apparently are based upon the determination that there was a change of route, and it may be conceded that the question of necessity could not be determined until the route is located. The fundamental question, therefore, is as to whether there is such a change of route contemplated as to require proceedings to be taken under the statute to locate the new route. Upon this question the trial court has found as facts that the railroad will traverse the same section and serve the same localities after its Jamaica improvement plans are carried out as before, and that the plans do not contemplate the removal of the company’s railroad or of any part thereof into any other section of the borough of Queens, nor do they contemplate furnishing any different locality with railroad service. It is, therefore, apparent that the only "change contemplated is the placing of the tracks now crossing the avenue at grade upon the bridge to be constructed and the embankments approaching the same with the new main tracks made necessary by the opening of the new tunnel under the East river, and that the change is made necessary in the elimination of the grade crossing. In other words, the raising of the railroad tracks so as to cross over the avenue is the purpose of the improvement, and the changing of the location of the tracks is incidental to the construction of such improvement.

I am not disposed to question the cases upon which the respondents rely as being a correct construction of the statute at the time the decisions were made. They were fully considered in the case of Erie R. R. Co. v. Steward, *6 commonly known as the Goshen Case (170 N. Y. 172). Under the statute as it then existed a railroad company, having located its route and acquired its right of way, was hound thereby, and it could not go outside and acquire other real estate, except in the cases provided for by the statute; and inasmuch as it sought to acquire lands for a cutoff for the purpose of running its freight trains through the sparsely-settled district of the village, saving about three miles in length, it was held that there was no statutory authority therefor, and, consequently, the lands could not be taken by proceedings in condemnation. But after this decision the legislature, by chapter 727 of the Laws of 1905, section 2, saw fit to amend section 7 of the Railroad Law (L. 1890, ch, 565, as amd. L. 1892, ch. 676) so as to read as follows:

“All real property, required by any railroad corporation for the purpose of its incorporation or for any purpose stated in the railroad law, shall be deemed to be required for a public use, and may be acquired by such corporation. If the corporation is unable to agree for the purchase of any such real property, or of any right, interest or easement therein, required for any such purpose, or if the owner thereof shall be incapable of selling the same, or if after diligent search and inquiry the name and residence of any such owner cannot be ascertained, it shall have the right to acquire title thereto by condemnation. Every railroad corporation shall have the power from time to time to make and use upon or in connection with any railroad either owned or operated by it, such additions, betterments and facilities as may be necessary or convenient for the better management, maintenance or operation of any such railroad, and shall have the right by pu,rchase or by condemnation, to acquire any real property required therefor, and it shall also have the right of condemnation in the folloiving additional cases:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ritchie v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
279 P. 15 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1929)
Davis v. International Railway Co.
89 Misc. 489 (New York Supreme Court, 1915)
Hearst v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
84 Misc. 606 (New York Supreme Court, 1914)
Long Island Railroad v. Sherwood
136 N.Y.S. 752 (New York Supreme Court, 1912)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
98 N.E. 169, 205 N.Y. 1, 1912 N.Y. LEXIS 1185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/long-island-rr-co-v-sherwood-ny-1912.