Long Corp. v. United States

156 Ct. Cl. 197
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 12, 1962
DocketNo. 116-59
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 156 Ct. Cl. 197 (Long Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Long Corp. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 197 (cc 1962).

Opinion

JoNes, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Long Corporation, is a South Carolina corporation which has operated as a construction contractor since 1943. It files Federal income tax returns on the basis of a fiscal year ending March 31 and uses the accrual method of accounting, except that it uses the completed contract method of accounting with respect to long-term contracts. At all relevant times, plaintiff’s stock (except for qualifying shares) was owned by L. D. Long, plaintiff’s president.

In counts I and II of its petition, plaintiff sues to recover overpayments of income tax assessed for its 1952 and 1948 fiscal years, respectively. The tax payment involved in count I was occasioned by the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue’s refusal to allow a deduction, as an ordinary and [199]*199necessary business expense or business loss, of plaintiff’s excess of construction costs over the amount it received as the contract price for construction of an apartment building for its wbolly-owned subsidiary. Count II is predicated upon plaintiff’s contention that it should be allowed to carry back 1950 fiscal year losses attributable to assets acquired from another corporation which was merged into plaintiff on August 31, 1948. Plaintiff would use the carryback to offset pre-merger earnings (fiscal year 1948) of plaintiff’s construction business. We will discuss the counts in reverse order.

count n

On August 31, 1948, Grove Realty and Investment Company, the stock of which was owned by Mr. Long, merged into plaintiff. The assets of Grove Realty (nominated “Grove Division” after the merger) consisted principally of income-producing real estate.

After the merger, in fiscal year 1950, plaintiff suffered a net operating loss. This loss was attributable to the Grove Division’s assets. Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to carry back this loss to offset profits made by its construction operations in 1948; that is, prior to the merger. This would reduce the total Federal income tax due for fiscal year 1948, and if allowed, plaintiff would be entitled to a refund of the consequent overpayment.

The defendant, in denying the availability of the claimed carryback (it should be noted that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would allow the loss to be carried over to plaintiff’s fiscal year 1952), relies primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).

We have had occasion, recently, to consider that case in Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 781 (1961). As is relevant to the case at bar, we regarded the following as the Libson Shops rationale, quoting from Wisconsin Central at page 788:

The Supreme Court required that tax attributes of a pre-merger corporation could only be utilized to the extent that one could trace that corporation as a unit in [200]*200the resulting enterprise. Even then the pre-merger corporation’s losses could be used only to offset that unit’s income or, conversely, the unit's losses could be carried bach only to offset the income of its pre-merger form. [Emphasis added.]

Although the italicized phrase above was not essential to the resolution of the issue in Wisconsin Central, we see no reason to depart from this interpretation of Lisbon Shops.

Plaintiff argues that a Treasury Regulation1 promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would allow the carryback on the facts as presented here. Plaintiff suggests that because the provision granting a net operating loss car-ryback in the 1954 Code2 is in words similar to the grant of section 122(b)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19393 (pursuant to which plaintiff asserts its present claim), the regulation mentioned above should be authoritative in construing section 122(b) (1) (A).

We cannot agree. In the 1954 Code, the Congress reexamined its carryover and carryback policy in regard to corporate reorganizations. Section 381, in particular, expresses this policy by new and specific rules. Even assuming that the 1954 Code impliedly allows a carryback on facts as the plaintiff has proved, it certainly cannot be said that this is the interpretation that must be given a provision under the 1939 Code which was completely silent on the matter.

Even though the regulation cited may renounce the rule in Libson Shops as to this particular point, it is the Lihson Shops case, not the regulation, which is applicable to plaintiff’s tax years. That case adopts a “continuing enterprise” rather than a “strict entity” approach; and this test precludes plaintiff’s use of the carryback.

Further, as we stated in Wisconsin Central, page 784, footnote 3): “No inference is to be drawn from * * * [the 1954 Code] as to whether tax attributes can be utilized by a successor corporation under pre-existing law. See Koppers Co., Inc. v. United States, 133 Ct. Cl. 22, 34 (1955).”

[201]*201COUNT I

Prior to execution of the construction contract involved herein, plaintiff had transferred certain land to The Dar-lington, Inc., then a newly organized South Carolina corporation (hereinafter called “subsidiary”), in exchange for all the common stock of the latter, except qualifying shares. One hundred shares of the subsidiary’s preferred stock were issued to the Federal Housing Administration.

The FHA issued a commitment to insure a loan of $1,357,-700 to be used to finance an apartment building on this land. A factor in determining the size of the loan was the FHA’s estimate of the building and construction, and site improvement, costs as $1,159,676.

On December 7, 1949, plaintiff as contractor, and its subsidiary, as owner, executed an FHA form entitled: “Construction Contract — ‘Lump Sum.’ ” Pursuant thereto, plaintiff agreed to construct the apartment in accordance with FHA approved plans and specifications for a lump-sum price of $1,193,682.40. The contract price included construction and site improvement costs of $1,159,676, plus the contractor’s fee of $34,006.40.

The evidence clearly indicates that this construction contract was intended to be the final agreement between the two corporations. However, Article 3 of the contract did make the lump-sum price subject to modification for “additions or deletions” agreed upon by the parties with the approval of the FHA. But, “it being understood that the [FHA] at all times has the right to require compliance with the original Drawings and Specifications.”

After the contract was entered into, another experienced and reputable contractor offered to perform the contract in its entirety. The last of several offers to plaintiff by this contractor was some $10,000 below the lump-sum price for which plaintiff had agreed to perform the same work. Relying on the cost estimate by a competent estimator in plaintiff’s employment, Mr. Long concluded that plaintiff could perform the contract and make a minimum profit of approximately 11 percent. The offer was therefore rejected.

[202]*202Unfortunately, however, a prediction is only that.

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156 Ct. Cl. 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/long-corp-v-united-states-cc-1962.