London Wallace v. City of Fresno

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 16, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-01199·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 LONDON WALLACE, Case No. 1:19-cv-01199-AWI-SAB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER RE STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER

13 v.

(ECF No. 34)

14 CITY OF FRESNO, et al.,

15 Defendants. 16 17 STIPULATION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER 18

19 1. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT. 20 1.1. Defendants’ Contentions. 21 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 22 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace

23 officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records 24 for the following reasons.

25 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 26 privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 27 that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective

28 procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d

1 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. 2 LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law 3 applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state 4 privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in 5 applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 6 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have 7 constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police 8 personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040- 9 1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel 10 file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their 11 families/associates.

12 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 13 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official

14 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney- 15 client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel 16 files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer 17 personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision- 18 making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or

19 rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to 20 evaluative/ analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports,

21 evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports 22 prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering 23 legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. 24 United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 25 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D.

26 Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. 27 Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United

28 States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further

1 contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 2 entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 3 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 4 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and 5 related legitimate law enforcement investigations/ interests; and a chilling of open 6 and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that

7 can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial 8 measures that may be required.

9 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same 10 rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary

11 to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 12 compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 13 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V.

14 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 15 such, production of confidential records in the case can and will likely substantially

16 impair defendant public entity’s interests in candid self-critical analysis, frank 17 internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from witnesses, preserving the 18 safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace officers and peace officers’

19 families and associates, protecting the privacy officers of peace officers, and 20 preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally undermined by

21 publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as can and often 22 does result in litigation.

23 1.2. Plaintiffs do not agree with and do not stipulate to Defendants’ 24 contentions herein above, and nothing in this Stipulation or its associated Order

25 shall resolve the parties’ disagreement, or bind them, concerning the legal

26 statements and claimed privileges set forth above. However, plaintiffs agree that 27 there is Good Cause for a Protective Order consistent with the terms and provisions

28 of this Stipulation so as to preserve the respective interests of the parties without

1 the need to further burden the Court with such issues.

2 1.3. The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need 3 for protection as to any medical or psychotherapeutic records and autopsy

4 photographs, because of the privacy interests at stake therein. Because of these 5 sensitive interests, a Court Order should address these documents rather than a 6 private agreement between the parties.

7 1.4. The parties therefore stipulate that there is Good Cause for, and 8 hereby jointly request that the honorable Court issue/enter, a Protective Order re

9 confidential documents consistent with the terms and provisions of this Stipulation. 10 However, the entry of a Protective Order by the Court pursuant to this Stipulation 11 shall not be construed as any ruling by the Court on the aforementioned legal 12 statements or privilege claims in this section (§ 1), nor shall this section be 13 construed as part of any such Court Order.

14 A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS.

15 Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve 16 production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special 17 protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than 18 prosecuting or defending this litigation would be warranted. Accordingly, the 19 parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulation 20 and an associated Order.

21 The parties acknowledge that this Stipulation and associated Order does not 22 confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the 23 protection it affords extends only to the specified information or items that are 24 entitled, under the applicable legal principles, to treatment as confidential.

25 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth below, that this Stipulation and 26 Order creates no entitlement to file confidential information under seal, except to 27 the extent specified herein; Eastern District Local Rules 141, 141.1, 143, and 251

1 set(s) forth the procedures that must be followed and reflects the standards that will 2 be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal.

3 Nothing in this Stipulation or associated Order shall be construed so as to 4 require or mandate that any Party disclose or produce privileged information or

5 records that could be designated as Confidential Documents/Protected Material 6 hereunder.

7 2. STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE CONFIDENTIAL 8 RECORDS 9 A. DEFINITIONS.

10

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