London v. River Rouge PD

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedOctober 23, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-10754
StatusUnknown

This text of London v. River Rouge PD (London v. River Rouge PD) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
London v. River Rouge PD, (E.D. Mich. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

RANDALL TREMAYNE LONDON, Case No. 24-cv-10754 Honorable Matthew F. Leitman Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

v.

RIVER ROUGE PD, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANTS BARTON MORRIS LAW FIRM’S AND WAYNE COUNTY’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS (ECF NOS. 15, 16) AND TO SUA SPONTE DISMISS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT RIVER ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT

I. Introduction Plaintiff Randall Tremayne London filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming various constitutional violations. ECF No. 1. The Honorable Matthew F. Leitman referred the case to the undersigned for all pretrial matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 13. Defendants Barton Morris Law Firm and Wayne County move to dismiss the action. ECF No. 15; ECF No. 16. London did not respond, so the Court ordered him to show cause by September 11, 2024, why his complaint should not be dismissed. ECF No. 23. He did not respond to the order to show cause. The Court RECOMMENDS that Barton Morris’s and Wayne County’s motions be GRANTED and that the claims against

Defendant River Rouge Police Department be sua sponte DISMISSED. II. Analysis A. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

tests a complaint’s legal sufficiency. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). The Iqbal Court explained, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint’s allegations “must do more than create

speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). In deciding whether a plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim, the

Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Id. But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and the Court has no duty to create a claim not spelled out in the pleadings,

Freightliner of Knoxville, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Vans, LLC, 484 F.3d 865, 871 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007). Pleadings filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a more liberal reading than would be afforded to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, but such complaints still must plead a plausible claim for relief.

Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2012); Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007). When a plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss, the Court should exercise caution to ensure that the moving party has met its burden

of demonstrating that it is entitled to outright dismissal. Coley v. State of Ohio Dep’t of Rehab., No. 2:16-CV-258, 2016 WL 5122559, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2016). B.

London’s complaint does not meet the pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and requires that each allegation be “simple, concise, and direct.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). The rule ensures that “the district court and defendants should not have to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud to identify the allegations really at issue.” Kensu v. Corizon, Inc., 5 F.4th 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

The complaint arises from London’s arrest when his home was searched in March 2021. ECF No. 1, PageID.5. Although London paid his bond right away, he claims that he was not released until a tether was available weeks later. Id. London also alleges that he was never given his

diabetes medication. Id. He asserts claims for police misconduct, due process violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, malicious prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct, and judicial misconduct. Id., PageID.1. But the complaint is devoid of any allegations describing the factual basis for those

claims. These barebones claims do not give defendants “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” as required under Rule 8. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 507 (2002). Nor do they offer enough factual allegations to state a plausible

claim. London wholly fails to state a claim against Barton Morris. He has not alleged whether Barton Morris represented him, let alone how they provided ineffective assistance. London also names as defendants Wayne County and the River Rouge Police Department.1 But Wayne County is not vicariously liable for

a civil rights violation based on the actions of its employees or agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). And the police department is subsumed within its municipal entity and is not properly included as a separate defendant. See Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479

F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007). Even if the Court construed London’s claim against the police department as a claim against the city of River Rouge, it would not succeed. Municipal liability arises only if the challenged conduct occurred under an “official policy” so that the municipality’s “promulgation

or adoption of the policy can be said to have ‘caused’ one of its employees to violate the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). “A plaintiff must therefore specify a governmental policy or custom from which his

injuries flowed.” Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, 517 F. App’x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2013).

1 London has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for this action due to his indigence. ECF No. 7. Although the police department has not moved to dismiss, the Court has an obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.
534 U.S. 506 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
In Re Prison Litigation Reform Act
105 F.3d 1131 (Sixth Circuit, 1997)
Jerald Thomas v. Unknown Eby
481 F.3d 434 (Sixth Circuit, 2007)
Davis v. Prison Health Services
679 F.3d 433 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Mackenzie Brown v. Cuyahoga County, Ohio
517 F. App'x 431 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Joe D'Ambrosio v. Carmen Marino
747 F.3d 378 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)
Temujin Kensu v. Corizon, Inc.
5 F.4th 646 (Sixth Circuit, 2021)

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London v. River Rouge PD, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/london-v-river-rouge-pd-mied-2024.