RENDERED: JULY 10, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-1269-MR
LONDON CITY COUNCIL; ANTHONY ORTEGA; DONNA GAIL WILSON HOUSE; JAMES BAKER; JUDD WEAVER; JUSTIN YOUNG; KELLY SMITH GREENE; MAYOR TRACIE HANDLEY; AND THE CITY OF LONDON, KENTUCKY APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE DAVID WILLIAMS, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-CI-00864
RANDALL WEDDLE APPELLEE
OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
CALDWELL, JUDGE: This appeal challenges the Laurel Circuit Court’s
overturning the London City Council’s removal of Randall Weddle (“Weddle”) as
mayor and the court’s reinstatement of Weddle to office. For the reasons set forth
herein, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand with directions to immediately vacate Weddle’s reinstatement and to enter an order affirming the
London City Council’s removal of Weddle from office.
FACTS
Weddle was elected Mayor of London, Kentucky in November 2022.
In early July 2025, Weddle presided over a regular meeting of the
London City Council (“the city council”). During this meeting, Chris Robinson
(“Robinson”) of the City of London Tourism and Convention Commission (“the
tourism commission”) spoke to the city council about efforts to rebuild structures
at the local fairgrounds following a recent tornado.
Robinson indicated some insurance claims were still pending and
mentioned plans to take out a loan for five million dollars for rebuilding the
fairgrounds. He also stated that the mayor would sign loan documents because city
property would be affected. Council members asked some questions about the
loan, including asking if loan documents were available for review. Robinson
replied he did not have the documents with him. Robinson’s presentation ended
without any motion being made or vote taken by the city council.
The day after this early July city council meeting, Weddle signed
documents to mortgage city property, including the Levi Jackson Wilderness Road
Park (“the park”), to secure a loan of five million dollars. These documents
included a Loan Agreement between the tourism commission as borrower, the City
-2- of London as mortgagor, and a bank as the lender. The Loan Agreement provided
for the tourism commission to borrow five million dollars and to make payments
on the loan for approximately thirty years. The Loan Agreement also stated the
loan would be secured by a mortgage on city property including the park. Weddle
also signed the mortgage on city property along with an assignment of rents and
leases on such property. (Weddle did not sign the promissory note, however,
which was executed by representatives of the bank and the tourism commission.)
In August 2025, the city council issued resolutions charging Weddle
with misconduct. (The charges issued were civil in nature and did not initiate
criminal prosecution.)
A public hearing on the misconduct charges occurred on September 5,
2025. At the end of this hearing, the city council voted unanimously to remove
Weddle from office on three bases, including Weddle’s execution of the loan
documents and mortgage on city property without first obtaining city council
approval.1
On September 11, 2025, Weddle filed an appeal from his removal
with the circuit court. He named as opposing parties the City of London, the city
council, acting mayor Tracie Handley (“Handley”), and individual city council
1 The city council also unanimously voted to remove Weddle on two other bases related to alleged failures to timely publish ordinances and to timely fill Ethics Board vacancies.
-3- members (collectively, “the London parties”). Weddle also filed a motion for an
expedited briefing schedule and for a temporary injunction.
On September 17, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the
motion for a temporary injunction. On September 24, 2025, the court entered an
order granting the motion for an expedited briefing schedule and denying the
motion for a temporary injunction.
Also, on September 24, 2025, the London parties filed a partial
motion to dismiss and an answer. These filings asserted, inter alia, that Handley
and the City of London were not properly served notice of the action and/or were
not properly served with process because they were served by the acting chief of
police instead of the sheriff.
On September 29, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing on
Weddle’s appeal. On this same date, the court also entered a terse written order
concluding that the city council failed to present sufficient grounds for removing
Weddle from office and immediately reinstating Weddle as mayor.2
2 The order entered September 29, 2025, also stated that any objections to service of process had been waived by the London parties’ making a general appearance. Because we reverse the circuit court’s overturning Weddle’s removal on the merits, we decline to address the alternative argument that Weddle’s circuit court challenge to his removal should have been dismissed based on lack of proper service of process. Moreover, we note our Supreme Court concluded that there was substantial compliance with statutory requirements for serving notice and rejected the argument about lack of proper service of process in its Opinion and Order Denying Interlocutory Relief. London City Council v. Weddle, No. 2025-SC-0462-I, 2025 WL 3768494, at *4 (Ky. Dec. 18, 2025) (unpublished).
-4- The London parties (hereinafter “Appellants”) filed a timely appeal
from the circuit court’s overturning Weddle’s removal and reinstatement of him to
office. Further facts will be provided as necessary in our analysis.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in determining the city council
failed to present sufficient grounds for Weddle’s removal. So, Appellants
essentially challenge the circuit court’s resolution of questions of law including the
sufficiency of the stated grounds for removal in light of applicable legal authority.
Thus, since purely or primarily legal issues are involved, we review the circuit
court’s conclusion that sufficient grounds for Weddle’s removal did not exist de
novo—meaning without deference. See, e.g., Seeger v. Lanham, 542 S.W.3d 286,
290 (Ky. 2018) (questions of law, such as statutory interpretation, are reviewed de
novo); Wheeler v. City of Pioneer Village, 723 S.W.3d 764, 771 (Ky. 2025)
(statutory interpretation is a question of law to be reviewed de novo).3
3 See also generally Arnett v. City of Stanton, No. 2007-CA-000266-MR, 2008 WL 4091014, at *3 (Ky. App. Sep. 5, 2008) (unpublished) (appeal from circuit court order affirming city council’s decision to remove mayor, and stating the issues raised by the mayor—alleged lack of due process and the city council’s allegedly acting from improper political motives and failing to comply with Open Meetings laws—were questions of law subject to de novo standard of review).
This unpublished opinion is not binding authority pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 40(D) and RAP 41(A), but we may consider it as persuasive authority. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company v. Badall, 707 S.W.3d 10, 17 n.4 (Ky. App. 2025).
-5- Next, we turn our attention to the requirements for removal of an
elected city officer.
KRS4 83A.040(9)5 addresses, in situations such as the one at hand,
removals of elected city officials for alleged misconduct, incapacity, or willful
neglect of duties. KRS 83A.040(9) states:
Except in cities of the first class,[6] any elected officer, in case of misconduct, incapacity, or willful neglect in the performance of the duties of his or her office, may be removed from office by a unanimous vote of the members of the legislative body exclusive of any member to be removed, who shall not vote in the deliberation of his or her removal. No elected officer shall be removed without having been given the right to a full public hearing. The officer, if removed, shall have the right to appeal to the Circuit Court of the county and the appeal shall be on the record. No officer so removed
For future reference, we remind the parties’ attorneys of RAP 41(A)(4)’s requirement that, when citing unpublished opinions for our consideration, one must clearly state that such unpublished opinions are not binding authority. 4 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 5 Another subsection of KRS 83A.040 was amended in 2026; however, subsection 9 of KRS 83A.040 was not amended. All references to KRS 83A.040 in this Opinion are to the version of this statute in effect at the time of the 2025 removal proceedings and appeal to the circuit court.
Weddle argued to the circuit court that KRS 83A.040 was unconstitutional. The circuit court’s written order did not explicitly reach whether KRS 83A.040 was unconstitutional, although the judge orally stated at the hearing that he believed the statute was constitutional. In sum, the circuit court did not rule that KRS 83A.040 was unconstitutional. Moreover, Weddle did not file a cross-appeal to challenge KRS 83A.040’s constitutionality so we need not address any issues about the constitutionality of this statute. 6 No one disputes that London is not a city of the first class as defined by Kentucky law.
-6- shall be eligible to fill the office vacated before the expiration of the term to which originally elected.
Appellants contend Weddle was properly removed for misconduct or
willful neglect. They argue Weddle’s signing the mortgage pledging city property
as collateral and other loan-related documents without prior city council approval
violates various statutory or constitutional provisions. See, e.g., KRS
91A.030(13); KRS 91A.390(7); KY. CONST.7 § 157b. Appellants also contend that
precedent indicates the term misconduct should be broadly construed to include
violations of the law and financial irregularities. See generally Jenkins v. Keith,
285 Ky. 240, 147 S.W.2d 397 (1941); State Bd. for Elementary and Secondary
Educ. v. Ball, 847 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1993); Rawlings v. City of Newport, 275 Ky.
183, 121 S.W.2d 10 (1938).8 Thus, Appellants assert the circuit court erred in
overturning Weddle’s removal for lack of sufficient grounds.9
7 Constitution of Kentucky. 8 See also generally Arnett, 2008 WL 4091014, at *2-4 (although focusing on proof of sexual harassment in upholding removal of mayor especially since contract-related issues arose in mayor’s prior administration, noting indications of “financial irregularities” including mayor’s approving payments to contractors which were not authorized by the city council, and mayor’s paying a contractor who had not been awarded a contract by the city council). 9 Long-standing precedent generally indicates that when a court reviews a city officer’s removal for misconduct, the removal must not be arbitrary or capricious, but instead must be supported by substantial evidence and legally sufficient cause to be upheld in court. See generally Rawlings, 121 S.W.2d at 15-16 (1938). No one has specifically disputed that this principle should apply here despite Rawlings being distinguishable from this case in certain respects.
Rawlings involved the removal of a city manager (not a mayor) pursuant to a then- applicable “City Manager Act” which called for public removal hearings, but which did not
-7- In contrast to Appellants, Weddle argues the circuit court was correct
in concluding there were not sufficient grounds for his removal. He asserts he did
not engage in misconduct or willful neglect by executing documents at the tourism
commission’s request after “presenting the issue” to the city council. (Appellee
brief, page 10.)
The city council charged Weddle with misconduct for signing loan
documents, including a mortgage on city property, without first obtaining the city
council’s approval. The city council emphasizes on appeal that no motion was
made, and no vote was taken following Robinson’s discussion of loan and
mortgage-related matters at the July 7, 2025, meeting. Weddle asserts, however,
that he was fully transparent about the loan transaction. He also suggests the city
council effectively approved the loan transaction and mortgage by not raising
objections after Robinson’s discussion of the loan.10
explicitly provide for an appeal in court. Id. at 13-15. Moreover, in conformity with this City Manager Act, Rawlings had not been elected in a citywide election but was instead “elected” by the mayor and two of the four members of the board of commissioners. Id. at 12-13. Compare KRS 83A.040(9) (applying to the removal of any elected city officer except in cities of the first class, providing for public removal hearings, and explicitly providing a right to appeal from removal before the circuit court). 10 In Arnett, 2008 WL 4091014, this Court affirmed the mayor’s removal based on other grounds without squarely addressing whether unauthorized contractual transactions which occurred during the mayor’s prior administration would have been sufficient grounds for removal. See id. at *4-5. However, the lower court in Arnett seemingly rejected any contention that discussing an issue before the city council without anyone raising an objection amounts to obtaining the city council’s approval. After all, the lower court upheld the mayor’s removal (which was based partly on the mayor’s paying a contractor who had not been awarded a contract by the city
-8- Weddle stresses the tourism commission asked him to sign the
mortgage because mortgaged property (including the park) is owned by the city.
He also points to email correspondence in the record in which Weddle asked
Robinson (executive director of the tourism commission) to appear before the city
council and to explain the project in detail. Having reviewed such correspondence
in the record, Weddle’s request for Robinson to appear at the meeting was in
response to an email from Robinson stating the bank believed the city council’s
approval was required. Weddle responded to this email about the bank’s believing
the city council’s approval was required by stating he approved and would put the
matter on the agenda at the July 7, 2025, meeting.
Having reviewed the recording of the city council meeting held on
July 7 of 2025, Robinson did speak briefly about the loan and said that the mayor
would need to sign documents because city property was affected. However, as
previously noted, a city council member asked whether the loan documents were
available for review, and Robinson said he had not brought the documents with
him. (The Appellants emphasize the mortgage and loan documents were not
provided to them in their initial brief.) Moreover, we note there was no mention
during Robinson’s presentation to the city council at the July 7 meeting that the
council) despite a city council member’s testimony admitting the issue was discussed with the council without objection. See id. at *1-2.
-9- closing on the loan was scheduled for the next day—July 8, 2025 (when the loan
documents were executed). Therefore, since they did not have the opportunity to
view the loan documents and were not told the closing was set for the following
day, perhaps the city council members did not perceive that Weddle was fully
transparent or offered full disclosure about the loan at the July 7 meeting.
In any event, whether full disclosure was provided or not, the city
council did not vote to approve the mortgage/loan transaction.
City Council Did Not Vote to Approve the Mortgage/Loan Transaction
Weddle emphasizes attorneys for both the city council and the City
of London were present at the July 7 meeting and that the bank prepared the
documents about the loan. He suggests the attorneys assented to the deal, although
he does not dispute that no motion was made, or vote taken by the city council.
Weddle also contends that if the city council wanted to express disagreement, they
should have voiced an objection or called for a vote. He suggests the city council
acted unfairly by simply waiting until after he signed the documents to charge him
with misconduct and seek to remove him.
Notwithstanding Weddle’s contentions, we reject any assertion that
the loan transaction was approved by the city council. The minutes of the July 7,
2025, regular city council meeting clearly state that no motion was made, and no
vote was taken following Robinson’s presentation to the city council. (Moreover,
-10- this statement about no motion being made and no vote being taken is accurate
based on our viewing of the meeting recording.) So, the city council did not
approve the loan or mortgage because no vote was taken as reflected by the
minutes. See Louisville Civil Service Bd. v. Blair, 711 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Ky. 1986)
(“[B]oth the City and the Civil Service Board speak only through their authorized
records. Such records contemplate only duly authorized and adopted resolutions
and ordinances respectively.”). See also Snowden v. City of Wilmore, 412 S.W.3d
195, 208 (Ky. App. 2013):
A city council acts only through its formal records which “constitute the only legal evidence of all that was done and that nothing more was done.” Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. General Distillers Corp. of Kentucky, 257 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Ky. 1953). Thus, it cannot be bound by an implied promise.
Moreover, Weddle’s perception that the attorneys present assented to
the deal is irrelevant. See Snowden, 412 S.W.3d at 209 (“Regardless of Snowden’s
inferences or beliefs, Gullette’s words, as City Attorney, could not bind the City to
take particular action[.]”).
In short, the city council did not approve the mortgage/loan
transaction before Weddle signed the documents at issue on July 8, 2025. Now we
address the parties’ arguments about whether the city council’s approval was
required by law before Weddle signed the documents. We conclude it was.
-11- City Council Approval Was Required by Law Before Weddle Could Properly Execute Loan and Mortgage Documents Binding the City
Appellants assert that a debt was created by Weddle’s executing the
loan agreement and the mortgage placed on city property to secure the loan. They
argue to the extent that such a debt is authorized by Kentucky law, it would be as a
bond of the city which must be enacted by ordinance to permit such a debt. See
KRS 66.011; KRS 66.101.
Appellants also suggest that incurring debt is an inherently legislative
function. By analogy, they point out that incurring debt for the Commonwealth is
a legislative matter under the Constitution of Kentucky. See KY. CONST. § 49
(“The General Assembly may contract debts to meet casual deficits or failures in
the revenue . . . .”).
In the mayor-city council form of municipal government (as in
London), the mayor is the executive authority, and the city council is the legislative
authority. KRS 83A.130(3), (11). The mayor’s responsibilities include enforcing
all applicable statutes, KRS 83A.130(3), and executing bonds, notes, contracts and
other written obligations of the city. KRS 83A.130(8).
The city council has the right to investigate city government activities.
KRS 83A.130(13). It is also charged with providing, by ordinance, “for sufficient
revenue to operate city government and shall appropriate the funds of the city in a
-12- budget which shall provide for the orderly management of city resources.” KRS
83A.130(12).
KRS 83A.130 does not explicitly state that incurring municipal debt is
a legislative/city council function in the same forthright manner as KY. CONST. §
49 does regarding the General Assembly. Nonetheless, construing the various
subsections of KRS 83A.130 together, the mayor cannot properly execute notes,
bonds, or contracts on the city’s behalf without first obtaining the city council’s
approval. See Snowden, 412 S.W.3d at 206 (noting mayor signs city’s notes,
bonds, contracts and other written obligations under KRS 83A.130(8) and further
stating: “While executive authority is vested in the mayor, KRS 83A.130(3), he
does not act alone. Legislative power is vested in a council, KRS 83A.130(11),
which adopts ordinances the mayor may sign into law or veto subject to council
override. KRS 83A.130(6).”). Terms of a contract to which the city is a party
must be approved by a majority of the city council before the contract is signed by
the mayor and becomes effective. Snowden, 412 S.W.3d at 207.
Moreover, Weddle’s actions in signing the mortgage and loan
documents affected city resources, including the park. See KRS 83A.130(12)
(“The council shall by ordinance provide for sufficient revenue to operate city
government and shall appropriate the funds of the city in a budget which shall
provide for the orderly management of city resources.”).
-13- In fact, Appellants assert that Weddle’s signing the mortgage and
associated loan documents without obtaining the city council’s prior approval
violated the law because the city council made no appropriations to authorize or
fund the mortgage/loan transaction. See KRS 91A.030(1), (13). Appellants also
suggest the mortgage/loan transaction was illegal because it could potentially cause
a budgetary shortfall. See KY. CONST. § 157b; Taylor v. Carter, 333 S.W.3d 437,
441-43 (Ky. App. 2010). (They also argue the long-term nature of the loan is
especially problematic since Kentucky statutes generally permit only short-term
debts to be incurred by cities, and even then, only as authorized by legislation. See
KRS 65.7701, KRS 65.7703; KRS 65.7709.) Appellants also point out the
Tourism Commission was not authorized by law to take out the note without the
city council’s approval pursuant to KRS 91A.390(7)-(8).
Weddle, on the other hand, argues that the city council’s approval
was not specifically required by state law. He contends Appellants fail to cite any
authority which specifically required that he obtain the city council’s approval
before he executed the documents at issue.
Weddle asserts he did not bind the city to pay any amount of money
because the tourism commission agreed to make the loan payments, although he
admits the mortgage was secured by city property. See KRS 91A.030(13) (“No
city agency, or member, director, officer, or employee of a city agency, may bind
-14- the city in any way to any extent beyond the amount of money at that time
appropriated for the purpose of the agency.”).
Weddle also points out the tourism commission is a special purpose
government entity with separate policy-making authority and independent
authority to generate public funds, and which may receive and expend public
funds. See KRS 65A.010(9).11 See also generally KRS 91A.390(2)-(3); KRS
91A.400(3) (restaurant and room tax revenues to be placed in a separate account
from other tax revenues and portions of restaurant and room tax revenues can be
used to acquire, construct and maintain tourism facilities upon the advice and
consent of local tourism commission).
However, local tourism commissions are established by local
governing bodies, receive funding from such local governing bodies, and must be
included in the local governing bodies’ annual budgets. KRS 91A.390(1)(a)-(b)
Moreover, the tourism commission was obligated by statute to obtain the city
council’s approval to borrow money. See KRS 91A.390(7) (tourism commission
11 Other subsections of KRS 65A.010 were recently amended; however, KRS 65A.010(9) was not amended. In any event, we refer to the version of KRS 65A.010 in effect at the time of the 2025 removal proceedings and the appeal in circuit court.
-15- may borrow money, “with the approval of the tax levying body” subject to certain
stated conditions).12
In addition to contending that the tourism commission (not the city)
was responsible for making loan payments, Weddle asserts that, despite the
mortgaging of city property, it is unlikely that the city would incur any liability
from the loan/mortgage transaction. For example, he argues it is unlikely the city
would lose the park in the event the tourism commission defaults on its payment
obligation13 because of a clause in the park’s deed of conveyance to the city
providing that the property will revert to the Commonwealth if the property is no
longer used as a public park.
However, even if the tourism commission makes all loan payments
and even if it is unlikely that the city would ever lose the park in foreclosure, we
agree with Appellants that the mortgage/loan transaction was still a debt impacting
the city for which the city council’s approval was required before execution of the
mortgage and associated loan documents.
12 Local governing bodies, such as the city council here, may adopt legislation imposing taxes on transient rooms and on restaurants to fund tourism commission operations. See generally KRS 91A.390; KRS 91A.400. 13 The tourism commission would perhaps derive funds from room and/or restaurant taxes to make payments on the loan. See KRS 91A.390; KRS 91A.400. Such room and restaurant taxes must be passed by local government bodies, however, and tourism commissions must submit requests for funds to such local government bodies. See KRS 91A.390(1).
-16- Perhaps the taking out of a loan to be paid out of a special fund or
separate revenues14 might not always be considered a city debt subject to
constitutional concerns—especially if there is no mortgage or lien other than one
on the revenue/income generated for making loan payments. See City of Bowling
Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839, 295 S.W. 1004, 1008-09 (1927) (holding loan to
build/expand waterworks not a constitutionally prohibited debt to city where
payments were to be made from waterworks revenues and there was mortgage/lien
on income from waterworks to secure the loan).
Here, however, there was not simply a lien on revenues from the
property for which funds were sought for improvement (the fairgrounds)—instead,
the transaction at issue involved mortgaging separate valuable real property owned
by the city (the park).15
City property, including the park, was pledged as collateral to secure a
loan for five million dollars to refurbish the fairgrounds. This clearly imposed a
risk that valuable city property could be forfeited, or that the city might incur
14 In his presentation to the city council, Robinson indicated that the tourism commission would use restaurant tax revenues to pay off the loan and that insurance proceeds would be used to pay some of the costs of rebuilding the fairgrounds. 15 The 2019 deed conveying the park to the city states the park consists of several hundred acres of land with various improvements, with a collective fair-market value of thirteen million dollars at that time.
-17- expenses in defending against such forfeiture,16 if the tourism commission
defaulted on its payment obligation. The mortgaging of city property which did
not directly benefit from the loan (the park) is a debt impacting the city,17 and we
conclude the city council’s prior approval was required by Kentucky law.
We reject Weddle’s assertion that there was simply a disagreement
about whether the city council’s approval was necessary—an insufficient basis for
removal in his estimation.18 Kentucky law clearly required the city council’s
approval before Weddle executed the mortgage and loan agreement.
16 As Appellants point out, precedent indicates that reversionary clauses may not always be enforced in the event of foreclosure. See generally Murray Hospital Ass’n v. Mason, 306 Ky. 248, 206 S.W.2d 936 (1947); Coomes v. Frey, 141 Ky. 740, 133 S.W. 758 (1911). 17 See Kirby, 295 S.W. at 1007, discussing the reasoning of out-of-state precedent:
the mortgagee was given the right to foreclose its mortgage against property belonging to the city, and because of that fact it was held that the city might be compelled to pay the debt by surrendering property which belonged to it, and for that reason it was the debt of the city, as much so as if there might have been a remedy by compelling the city to pay the debt with money collected by taxation. Indeed there could be no great difference. In one case the city would be compelled to pay with its property and in the other it would be compelled to pay with the money obtained through taxation. If the property which would have to be used to pay the debt had previously been obtained by taxation, it would be a payment of the debt by the municipality. Such an indebtedness is an indebtedness of the municipality within the meaning of constitutional provisions prohibiting indebtedness beyond a certain sum. 18 Weddle asserts government officials are afforded protection “for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.” Appellee brief, page 18 n.82 (quoting Rowan Cnty. v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006)). However, Sloas did not involve proceedings to remove an elected city official from office for alleged misconduct or willful neglect. Instead, Sloas concerned whether individual county officials could be held individually liable on tort claims or must be afforded qualified official immunity. See id. at 473-76.
-18- In sum, Weddle signed the mortgage and loan documents without
obtaining the city council’s prior approval as required by Kentucky law.
Next, we address the parties’ arguments about whether Weddle’s
execution of the documents without the required approval of the city council was
sufficient to support a finding of misconduct or willful neglect pursuant to KRS
83A.040(9). We conclude it was.
Weddle’s Signing the Mortgage and Loan Documents Without Obtaining Prior City Council Approval was Sufficient to Support the Finding of Misconduct or Willful Neglect
Appellants point out that Weddle admitted in his testimony that:
“generally, when signing any documents with the banks, we have to have minutes
of the meeting or resolution. I had neither in my hand, but I proceeded on at that
point.” (Transcript of 9/5/2025 public meeting, page 91.)
Appellants contend Weddle knew approval was required but declined
to ask for a vote because he feared the city council would oppose the loan
transaction. They also point out that the loan agreement, mortgage, and
assignment of rents and leases19 signed by Weddle all contained warranties and/or
representations about the transaction being duly authorized. (The loan agreement
19 Despite any statements to the contrary in Appellants’ briefs, the promissory note was not signed by Weddle. The tourism commission and the bank were the sole listed parties to the promissory note. The promissory note did contain a representation that the tourism commission (and/or its representative signing the note) had the right and authority to enter into the note.
-19- also contained representations that the loan agreement and mortgage were duly
authorized by all necessary action and will not violate the law. Moreover, the
assignment of rents and leases also contained representations that all necessary
governmental approval had been obtained and that the assignment would not
violate the law.)
Appellants assert Weddle engaged in misconduct by committing fraud
against the bank as well as violating statutes in executing the documents without
obtaining the city council’s approval of the mortgage/loan transaction.
They admit the term misconduct is not defined in KRS 83A.040, but
argue precedent indicates this term should be construed broadly to include
violations of statute and financial irregularities. See generally Jenkins, 285 Ky.
240; Ball, 847 S.W.2d 743; Rawlings, 275 Ky. 183.
On the other hand, Weddle submits that perhaps the mortgage/loan
transaction was void due to his failure to obtain city council approval before
signing the documents. See generally Snowden, 412 S.W.3d at 206-07. But he
argues that his executing documents in a void transaction does not harm the city
and should not be considered misconduct or willful neglect on his part.
However, as Appellants point out, longstanding precedent holds that
misconduct relating to financial irregularities may be properly found to support
-20- removal of government officers despite any lack of actual financial harm to a
municipality. Jenkins, 147 S.W.2d at 398.
Even if perhaps some minor violations of statutes or minor departures
from best financial management practices might not always amount to sufficient
misconduct or willful neglect to support removal, Weddle’s undisputably
executing documents mortgaging city property to secure a long-term multi-million-
dollar loan without obtaining city council approval beforehand supports the city
council’s finding of misconduct or willful neglect. This unauthorized action
created a risk that valuable city property, enjoyed by the citizens of London and the
general public, would be forfeited or that significant taxpayer-funded resources
must be utilized to defend against any such forfeiture for a period of approximately
thirty years. This was not a de minimis failure to observe procedural niceties nor
an insignificant commitment of city resources.
The circuit court erred in determining there were no sufficient grounds
to remove the mayor from office and therefore erred in overturning the removal
and reinstating Weddle.
Moreover, Weddle’s execution of the mortgage, assignment, and loan
document without obtaining prior city council approval was, by itself, sufficient
grounds for removal for misconduct and/or willful neglect. Thus, we decline to
discuss or opine upon the other bases for removal found by the city council.
-21- Further arguments raised by the parties in their appellate briefs have been
determined to lack merit or relevancy to our resolution of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the circuit court’s judgment,
VACATE Weddle’s reinstatement, and REMAND with directions to enter an order
affirming the city council’s removal of Weddle from office.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Christopher Wiest Carmine G. Iaccarino Theodore Roberts Lexington, Kentucky Covington, Kentucky
-22-