Lombardi v. United States
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
March 13, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 94-1865
DOMENIC J. LOMBARDI,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
__________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
___________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________
___________________
Domenic J. Lombardi on brief pro se. ___________________
Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and James H. Leavey, __________________ ________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for respondent.
__________________
__________________
Per Curiam. In 1992, a nine-count superseding ___________
indictment charged petitioner Domenic Lombardi with engaging
in a fraudulent scheme to collect insurance proceeds through
arson. Petitioner eventually pled guilty to six of these
offenses: three counts of mail fraud (and conspiracy to
commit same), 18 U.S.C. 1341; two counts of engaging in a
monetary transaction with criminally derived property, 18
U.S.C. 1957; and one count of using a fire to commit mail
fraud, 18 U.S.C. 844(h). At sentencing, the district court
imposed a 63-month prison term for the first five counts, to
which was added a mandatory, consecutive 60-month sentence
for the 844(h) offense. On appeal, we affirmed
petitioner's sentence in all respects. United States v. _____________
Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568 (1st Cir. 1993).1 ________
By way of the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255,
petitioner presents two new challenges to his sentence.
Specifically, he contends that the court (1) miscalculated
his criminal history category and (2) erred in sentencing him
on the basis of relevant conduct. He also advances the
derivative claim that his trial and appellate attorneys
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue these
____________________
1. Petitioner there advanced four challenges to his
sentence, arguing that the court had erred (1) in its
grouping of offenses, (2) by declining to depart downward on
the basis of his age and health, (3) by awarding only two,
rather than three, points for acceptance of responsibility,
and (4) by ordering payment of a fine and restitution. We
found each of these contentions to be without merit.
-2-
arguments. We need not decide to what extent such claims
might be forfeited, see, e.g., Lopez-Torres v. United States, ___ ____ ____________ _____________
876 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979 (1989), ____________
or might otherwise not be cognizable in a 2255 proceeding,
see, e.g., Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 771-74 (1st ___ ____ ______ _____________
Cir. 1994), inasmuch as we agree with the district court that
petitioner's contentions are manifestly without merit.
1. Criminal History Category _________________________
Petitioner's central challenge to the calculation of his
criminal history category (CHC) is based on a misreading of
the sentencing guidelines. In determining the CHC, the
district court, inter alia, awarded one point under U.S.S.G. __________
4A1.1(c) for each of the following three state court
convictions:
Attempting to obtain money under false
pretenses. Offense committed on February 8, 1974.
Petitioner sentenced on April 27, 1979, following
nolo plea, to two years probation. (Violation of
probation on June 18, 1979; continued on same
probation.)
Violation of banking law (two counts).
Offenses committed on June 28, 1976. Petitioner
sentenced on April 24, 1979, following nolo plea,
to two years probation on each count, concurrent.
(Violation of probation on June 18, 1979; sentenced
to thirty days imprisonment.)
Failure to return rental car. Offense
committed on February 23, 1977. Petitioner
sentenced on December 4, 1979, following nolo plea,
to $100 fine.
Petitioner contends that each of these offenses occurred too
long ago to be considered. Yet the guidelines provide that
-3-
"[a]ny other prior sentence that was imposed within ten years
of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is
counted." U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(e)(2). Petitioner does not
dispute that the conspiracy to which he pled guilty began in
1988, or that the substantive offenses to which he pled
guilty began in January 1989 at the latest. Accordingly, the
sentences for each of the above three convictions (which were
imposed in April and December 1979, respectively) occurred
within the applicable ten-year period. Petitioner's argument
to the contrary mistakenly relies on the date when each of
those offenses was committed, rather than on the date when
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