Lombardi v. United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided March 13, 1995·No. 94-1865·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion



March 13, 1995
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

___________________

No. 94-1865

DOMENIC J. LOMBARDI,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

__________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

___________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

___________________

Domenic J. Lombardi on brief pro se. ___________________
Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and James H. Leavey, __________________ ________________
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for respondent.

__________________

__________________

Per Curiam. In 1992, a nine-count superseding ___________

indictment charged petitioner Domenic Lombardi with engaging

in a fraudulent scheme to collect insurance proceeds through

arson. Petitioner eventually pled guilty to six of these

offenses: three counts of mail fraud (and conspiracy to

commit same), 18 U.S.C. 1341; two counts of engaging in a

monetary transaction with criminally derived property, 18

U.S.C. 1957; and one count of using a fire to commit mail

fraud, 18 U.S.C. 844(h). At sentencing, the district court

imposed a 63-month prison term for the first five counts, to

which was added a mandatory, consecutive 60-month sentence

for the 844(h) offense. On appeal, we affirmed

petitioner's sentence in all respects. United States v. _____________

Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568 (1st Cir. 1993).1 ________

By way of the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255,

petitioner presents two new challenges to his sentence.

Specifically, he contends that the court (1) miscalculated

his criminal history category and (2) erred in sentencing him

on the basis of relevant conduct. He also advances the

derivative claim that his trial and appellate attorneys

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue these

____________________

1. Petitioner there advanced four challenges to his
sentence, arguing that the court had erred (1) in its
grouping of offenses, (2) by declining to depart downward on
the basis of his age and health, (3) by awarding only two,
rather than three, points for acceptance of responsibility,
and (4) by ordering payment of a fine and restitution. We
found each of these contentions to be without merit.

-2-

arguments. We need not decide to what extent such claims

might be forfeited, see, e.g., Lopez-Torres v. United States, ___ ____ ____________ _____________

876 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979 (1989), ____________

or might otherwise not be cognizable in a 2255 proceeding,

see, e.g., Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 771-74 (1st ___ ____ ______ _____________

Cir. 1994), inasmuch as we agree with the district court that

petitioner's contentions are manifestly without merit.

1. Criminal History Category _________________________

Petitioner's central challenge to the calculation of his

criminal history category (CHC) is based on a misreading of

the sentencing guidelines. In determining the CHC, the

district court, inter alia, awarded one point under U.S.S.G. __________

4A1.1(c) for each of the following three state court

convictions:

Attempting to obtain money under false
pretenses. Offense committed on February 8, 1974.
Petitioner sentenced on April 27, 1979, following
nolo plea, to two years probation. (Violation of
probation on June 18, 1979; continued on same
probation.)

Violation of banking law (two counts).
Offenses committed on June 28, 1976. Petitioner
sentenced on April 24, 1979, following nolo plea,
to two years probation on each count, concurrent.
(Violation of probation on June 18, 1979; sentenced
to thirty days imprisonment.)

Failure to return rental car. Offense
committed on February 23, 1977. Petitioner
sentenced on December 4, 1979, following nolo plea,
to $100 fine.

Petitioner contends that each of these offenses occurred too

long ago to be considered. Yet the guidelines provide that

-3-

"[a]ny other prior sentence that was imposed within ten years

of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is

counted." U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(e)(2). Petitioner does not

dispute that the conspiracy to which he pled guilty began in

1988, or that the substantive offenses to which he pled

guilty began in January 1989 at the latest. Accordingly, the

sentences for each of the above three convictions (which were

imposed in April and December 1979, respectively) occurred

within the applicable ten-year period. Petitioner's argument

to the contrary mistakenly relies on the date when each of

those offenses was committed, rather than on the date when

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