Lombardi v. Columbo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lombardi v. Columbo

259 A.D.2d 524, 684 N.Y.S.2d 896, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2199

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 8, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 259 A.D.2d 524 (Lombardi v. Columbo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lombardi v. Columbo, 259 A.D.2d 524, 684 N.Y.S.2d 896, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2199 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiff Parthia Lombardi appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), dated January 28, 1998, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action of the complaint on the ground that she had not sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action of the complaint is denied, and the second cause of action of the complaint is reinstated.

The Supreme Court improperly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action of the complaint, asserted by the pláintiff Parthia Lombardi (hereinafter the appellant) to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained. The defendants were required to establish a prima facie case [525]*525that the appellant did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Moore v Tappen, 242 AD2d 526; Healea v Andriani, 158 AD2d 587).

The defendants’ submissions included a report prepared by a physician who examined the appellant on behalf of the defendants almost two years after the underlying accident. This report indicated, inter alia, that the right lateral flexion of the appellant’s cervical spine was 19 degrees less than its left lateral flexion. This objectively measured, specifically-quantified restriction of motion raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the appellant suffered a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system” (Insurance Law § 5102 [d]; see, Cesar v Felix, 181 AD2d 852, 853; Healea v Andriani, supra; Parker v Defontaine-Stratton, 231 AD2d 412, 413; see also, Fitzpatrick v Spottiswood, 243 AD2d 676; Moore v Tappen, supra; Grullon v Chang Ok Chu, 240 AD2d 367; Wolfram v Vassilou, 239 AD2d 340; Carucci v Tzimopoulos, 238 AD2d 459). O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiff Parthia Lombardi appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Floyd, J.), dated January 28, 1998, as granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action of the complaint on the ground that she had not sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action of the complaint is denied, and the second cause of action of the complaint is reinstated.

The Supreme Court improperly granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second cause of action of the complaint, asserted by the pláintiff Parthia Lombardi (hereinafter the appellant) to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained. The defendants were required to establish a prima facie case [525]*525that the appellant did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955; Moore v Tappen, 242 AD2d 526; Healea v Andriani, 158 AD2d 587).

The defendants’ submissions included a report prepared by a physician who examined the appellant on behalf of the defendants almost two years after the underlying accident. This report indicated, inter alia, that the right lateral flexion of the appellant’s cervical spine was 19 degrees less than its left lateral flexion. This objectively measured, specifically-quantified restriction of motion raises a triable issue of fact as to whether the appellant suffered a “significant limitation of use of a body function or system” (Insurance Law § 5102 [d]; see, Cesar v Felix, 181 AD2d 852, 853; Healea v Andriani, supra; Parker v Defontaine-Stratton, 231 AD2d 412, 413; see also, Fitzpatrick v Spottiswood, 243 AD2d 676; Moore v Tappen, supra; Grullon v Chang Ok Chu, 240 AD2d 367; Wolfram v Vassilou, 239 AD2d 340; Carucci v Tzimopoulos, 238 AD2d 459). O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

259 A.D.2d 524, 684 N.Y.S.2d 896, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2199, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lombardi-v-columbo-nyappdiv-1999.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack