Lolong v. Gonzales

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 17, 2005
Docket03-72384
StatusPublished

This text of Lolong v. Gonzales (Lolong v. Gonzales) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lolong v. Gonzales, (9th Cir. 2005).

Opinion

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARJORIE KONDA LOLONG,  Petitioner, No. 03-72384 v.  Agency No. A77-427-355 ALBERTO GONZALES,* Attorney General, OPINION Respondent.  On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted November 5, 2004—San Francisco, California

Filed March 18, 2005

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, John T. Noonan, and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Betty Binns Fletcher

*Alberto Gonzales is substituted for his predecessor, John Ashcroft, as Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

3343 LOLONG v. GONZALES 3345

COUNSEL

Hilari Allred, Law Office of Robert B. Jobe, San Francisco, California, for the petitioner-appellant.

Lyle D. Jentzer, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, for the respondent-appellee. 3346 LOLONG v. GONZALES OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Marjorie Konda Lolong seeks asylum. Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Miriam Hayward granted relief, but the Board of Immi- gration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed. We grant the petition for review because compelling evidence establishes that Lolong has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her Chinese ethnicity were she returned to Indonesia. Specifi- cally, Lolong has demonstrated that Indonesians of Chinese ethnicity are a significantly disfavored group and that she is particularly at risk because she is also a Christian and a woman.

I.

Lolong has provided a voluminous record that documents ongoing discrimination and violence against the ethnic Chi- nese minority in Indonesia. We commented in detail on the long history of ethnic Chinese-Indonesian persecution in a similar case, Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2004). In Sael, we noted that there is a “cycle of waxing and waning violence” against ethnic Chinese-Indonesians. Id. at 929. Dur- ing periods of heightened social, economic, or political unrest, anti-Chinese sentiment erupts into wide-scale, severe vio- lence, but even during periods of “relative calm,” ethnic Chinese-Indonesians suffer discrimination and harassment, as well as violent attacks. Id. at 925-26, 929. When anti-Chinese violence erupted in May 1998, over a thousand ethnic Chinese-Indonesians were killed. Id. at 925-26.

Although the Indonesian government has made some over- tures to the ethnic Chinese community, official anti-Chinese discrimination persists, and various forms of anti-Chinese vio- lence continue to occur. Numerous signs of economic, social, and political instability indicate that more severe anti-Chinese violence is likely to erupt again in the future. There is also LOLONG v. GONZALES 3347 evidence that rogue elements within the armed forces con- tinue to provide support to the nongovernmental forces that are responsible for ethnic and religious persecution.

While all ethnic Chinese who remain in Indonesia face some risk of future persecution, two sub-groups are particu- larly at risk: ethnic Chinese women and Christians. Even dur- ing periods of relative calm, ethnic Chinese women can expect to be subjected to racial and sexual harassment when- ever they leave their homes. During the 1998 riots, at least dozens, possibly hundreds, of ethnic Chinese women were systematically raped. None of the perpetrators have been prosecuted. Should anti-Chinese sentiment erupt into more severe outbreaks of violence again, women will most likely be targeted again. Meanwhile, an Islamic fundamentalist move- ment continues to gain strength in Indonesia, and inter- religious conflict has been increasing. Not surprisingly, the combination of religious intolerance and ethnic prejudice has caused violent forces to target churches and homes in ethnic Chinese communities.

Lolong left Indonesia after completing high school, because quotas limit the number of ethnic Chinese who are admitted to universities there. She was studying in the United States in May 1998, when the worst anti-Chinese rioting in Indonesia’s history occurred. After learning that one of her friends had been raped and her uncle had been severely beaten, Lolong decided to apply for asylum. In December 1998, Lolong filed a timely application. On November 16, 2000, after conducting an extensive hearing, Judge Hayward held that Lolong was eligible for asylum. She found Lolong to be fully credible and Lolong’s fear of future persecution on account of her ethnicity to be both subjectively and objectively reasonable. Subse- quently, in a divided opinion (2-1) the BIA sustained the Ser- vice’s appeal and vacated the petitioner’s application for asylum. Lolong timely petitioned for review.

We have jurisdiction over Lolong’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because the BIA issued a reasoned opinion 3348 LOLONG v. GONZALES after conducting its own review of the record, we review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence. Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999). In doing so, we accept Lolong’s testimony as true. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 652 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Where the BIA does not make an explicit adverse credibility finding, we must assume that the applicant’s factual contentions are true.”).

II.

[1] In order to be eligible for asylum, Lolong must establish that she is a refugee—a person unable or unwilling to return to Indonesia “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem- bership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 924; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The source of the persecution must be the government or forces that the govern- ment is unwilling or unable to control. Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004).

To be “well-founded,” an asylum applicant’s “fear of per- secution must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 924. “An applicant satisfies the subjective component by credibly testifying that she genu- inely fears persecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lolong satisfied this requirement with her credible testimony that she fears being hurt, raped, or killed in Indonesia.

An asylum applicant “generally satisfies the objective com- ponent in one of two ways: either by establishing that she has suffered persecution in the past or by showing that she has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id. While a well- founded fear must be objectively reasonable, it “does not require certainty of persecution or even a probability of perse- cution.” Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003). “Even a ten percent chance that the applicant will be persecuted in the future is enough to establish a well-founded LOLONG v. GONZALES 3349 fear.” Sael, 386 F.3d at 925 (quoting Knezevic v. Ashcroft,

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