Lollis v. SHAW GLOBAL ENERGY SERVICES

966 So. 2d 1118, 7 La.App. 3 Cir. 395, 2007 La. App. LEXIS 1828, 2007 WL 2851075
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 3, 2007
Docket2007-395
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 966 So. 2d 1118 (Lollis v. SHAW GLOBAL ENERGY SERVICES) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Lollis v. SHAW GLOBAL ENERGY SERVICES, 966 So. 2d 1118, 7 La.App. 3 Cir. 395, 2007 La. App. LEXIS 1828, 2007 WL 2851075 (La. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

966 So.2d 1118 (2007)

Willie L. LOLLIS, Jr.
v.
SHAW GLOBAL ENERGY SERVICES.

No. 2007-395.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

October 3, 2007.

*1119 Louis M. Corne, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, Willie L. Lollis, Jr.

John J. Rabalais, Rabalais, Unlan & Lorio, Covington, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Shaw Global Energy Services.

Court composed of JIMMIE C. PETERS, GLENN B. GREMILLION, and J. DAVID PAINTER, Judges.

GREMILLION, Judge.

The defendant, Shaw Global Energy Services, appeals the decision of the workers' compensation judge finding the plaintiff, Willie Lee Lollis, Jr., disabled, entitled to indemnity benefits, and entitled to any necessary medical treatment or vocational rehabilitation services as a result of an occupational disease. We affirm.

FACTS

Lollis was employed as a paint mixer/sandblaster by Shaw at its Delcambre, Louisiana location. On November 7, 2004, while mixing Tideguard 171A Gray Resin, a spray-on epoxy cladding from Ameron Coatings, Lollis noticed a bitter taste in his mouth and then saw that he had Tideguard *1120 on his arms. He reported the incident to his supervisors after his arms became irritated. As a result of this contact, Lollis suffered headaches and developed rashes over his body. On January 14, 2005, he was diagnosed as suffering from an irritant dermatitis by Dr. Jennifer-Waguespack LaBiche, a dermatologist. Although Shaw restricted him from working in contact with Tideguard, Lollis quit work on February 13, 2005, because he claimed that the rash had spread to his eyes and affected his vision. A patch test performed by Dr. Waguespack-LaBiche revealed that Lollis was allergic to epoxy resin. Dr. William Nassetta, a specialist in occupational and environmental medicine, diagnosed him as suffering from an allergic contact dermatitis.

Lollis filed the instant disputed claim for compensation against Shaw seeking weekly indemnity benefits, medical treatment, and penalties and attorney's fees. Shaw denied all of Lollis' claims and further alleged that he forfeited his right to receive any benefits due to his fraudulent statements. Following a trial on the merits, the workers' compensation judge denied Shaw's fraud claim and held that Lollis was disabled and entitled to weekly indemnity benefits retroactive to February 13, 2005, medical expenses and treatment, vocational rehabilitation services, and future supplemental earnings benefits if appropriate. The workers' compensation judge further awarded Lollis $2000 in penalties and $7500 in attorney's fees as a result of Shaw's failure to accommodate his work restrictions and its failure to provide him with vocational rehabilitation services. This appeal was perfected by Shaw.

ISSUES

Shaw raises six assignments of error on appeal.

1. That the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis suffered a compensable accident or occupational injury.
2. That the workers' compensation judge erred in finding a causal connection between Lollis' alleged exposure to Tideguard and his alleged disability.
3. That the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis proved his disability.
4. That the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis was entitled to indemnity benefits and additional medical benefits.
5. That the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that it failed to reasonably controvert Lollis' entitlement to benefits.
6. That the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis did not forfeit his entitlement to indemnity benefits by making false statements for the purpose of receiving workers' compensation benefits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review applied to factual findings in workers' compensation matters is the manifest error standard. This standard, which is based upon the reasonableness of the factual findings in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, is well established in our jurisprudence following the seminal cases of Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989), and Stobart v. State, through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

As stated in Bruno v. Harbert International Inc., 593 So.2d 357, 361 (La. 1992):

A worker's testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof, provided two elements are satisfied: (1) *1121 no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker's version of the incident; and (2) the worker's testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc., 371 So.2d 1146 (La.1979); Malone and Johnson, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers' Compensation, § 253 (2d Ed.1980). Corroboration of the worker's testimony may be provided by the testimony of fellow workers, spouses, or friends. Malone & Johnson, supra; Nelson [v. Roadway Express, Inc., 588 So.2d 350 (La.1991)]. Corroboration may also be provided by medical evidence. West, supra.

OCCUPATIONAL INJURY

In its first three assignments of error, Shaw argues that the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis suffered an occupational injury as a result of his exposure to Tideguard and that he satisfied his burden of proof with regard to disability.

An employee suffering from an occupational disease receives the same workers' compensation benefits as an employee who has suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. La.R.S. 23:1031.1(A). An occupational disease is defined as "that disease or illness which is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such disease." La.R.S. 23:1031.1(B). However, it does not include carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis, mental illness, or heart-related or perivascular disease. Id.

In order to recover medical and compensation benefits as the result of an occupational disease, Lollis must prove that he became allergic to epoxy resins as a result of the nature of his duties as a sandblaster/painter. Dunaway v. Lakeview Reg'l Med. Ctr., 02-2313 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/6/03), 859 So.2d 131. Lollis' burden is to prove a connection between his condition and his work-related duties by a reasonable probability. Id. Proof of only a possible relationship between the two does not satisfy this burden. Id.

In order to receive temporary total disability benefits, an employee must prove that he is unable to physically engage in any employment or self-employment as a result of his work-related injury. La.R.S. 23:1221(1)(c). The employee's burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence; thus, Lollis must prove that his disability is highly probable or much more probable than not. Carrier v. Debarge's Coll. Junction, 95-18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/95), 673 So.2d 1043, writ denied, 96-0472 (La.4/8/96), 671 So.2d 337.

Lollis testified that Shaw began using Tideguard in October 2004, at the request of a customer. He stated that he mixed this coating for approximately three weeks without any problems. However, on November 7, 2004, he stated that he noticed a strong bitter taste in his mouth and that the skin on his arms was irritated.

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966 So. 2d 1118, 7 La.App. 3 Cir. 395, 2007 La. App. LEXIS 1828, 2007 WL 2851075, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lollis-v-shaw-global-energy-services-lactapp-2007.