Lohmann v. United States

Court of Claims

Lohmann v. United States

229 Ct. Cl. 622, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 579, 1981 WL 22079

CourtUnited States Court of Claims

DecidedNovember 20, 1981

DocketNo. 429-81C

StatusPublished

This text of 229 Ct. Cl. 622 (Lohmann v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lohmann v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 622, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 579, 1981 WL 22079 (cc 1981).

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Opinion

per curiam:

The plaintiff seeks damages for his dismissal from employment by Grumman Corporation. He asserts that his discharge violated the Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (Supp. III 1979), because he was not given 30 days’ notice or a reasonable time to answer the grounds for dismissal. The defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim within the jurisdiction of this court, because the plaintiff was not an employee of the United States. We grant the motion.

The Veterans’ Preference Act applies only to employees of the Executive branch of the United States or of the District of Columbia. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2102, 7511(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). By his own admission, the plaintiff was not an employee of either entity but of a private employer, Grumman Corporation. Although the plaintiffs duties with Grumman may have involved work that Grumman did for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, that would not have made the plaintiff a "'de facto’ preference eligible employer,” as he contends. Only persons appointed to federal positions are federal employees. Costner v. United States, ante at 87, 665 F.2d 1016 (1981); Baker v. United [623]*623States, 222 Ct. Cl. 263, 614 F.2d 263 (1980). The plaintiff was not so appointed, and he is not entitled to the protections the Veterans’ Preference Act gives to federal employees.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the petition is dismissed.

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per curiam:

The plaintiff seeks damages for his dismissal from employment by Grumman Corporation. He asserts that his discharge violated the Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (Supp. III 1979), because he was not given 30 days’ notice or a reasonable time to answer the grounds for dismissal. The defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim within the jurisdiction of this court, because the plaintiff was not an employee of the United States. We grant the motion.

The Veterans’ Preference Act applies only to employees of the Executive branch of the United States or of the District of Columbia. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2102, 7511(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). By his own admission, the plaintiff was not an employee of either entity but of a private employer, Grumman Corporation. Although the plaintiffs duties with Grumman may have involved work that Grumman did for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, that would not have made the plaintiff a "'de facto’ preference eligible employer,” as he contends. Only persons appointed to federal positions are federal employees. Costner v. United States, ante at 87, 665 F.2d 1016 (1981); Baker v. United [623]*623States, 222 Ct. Cl. 263, 614 F.2d 263 (1980). The plaintiff was not so appointed, and he is not entitled to the protections the Veterans’ Preference Act gives to federal employees.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the petition is dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

229 Ct. Cl. 622, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 579, 1981 WL 22079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lohmann-v-united-states-cc-1981.

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