Logue v. Fenning

29 App. D.C. 519, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5479
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 7, 1907
DocketNo. 1734
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 29 App. D.C. 519 (Logue v. Fenning) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Logue v. Fenning, 29 App. D.C. 519, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5479 (D.C. 1907).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Shepard

delivered the opinion of the Court:

1. The first question in this case relates to the validity of the lunacy proceeding terminating March 24, 1898, with the order of the court confirming the verdict of the jury returned with the writ, and declaring the appellant to be a lunatic. The proceeding seems to have been in substantial conformity with the practice obtaining in Maryland when that state ceded the present territory of the District to the United States, and which had, to that time, remained unchanged by act of Congress. The objection urged is that no sufficient notice of the inquiry as to his lunacy was given to the alleged lunatic. Conceding that due process of law requires notice to, and opportunity to be heard by, the party against whom a proceeding to inquire of his lunacy has been instituted, it is sufficient to say that the record shows that notice was served upon the party charged with lunacy of a character so violent as to endanger the public peace. This notice, it is true, was given on the day of the hearing by the jury, but prior thereto. The alleged condition of the lunatic would seem to justify speedy action, and there is nothing in the record to show that he suffered any prejudice by reason of the shortness of the notice given. Such notice is sufficient, in our opinion, to sustain the validity of the verdict and order of confirmation, as against this collateral attack.

There is another and stronger reason why the order confirming the verdict should be regarded as binding upon the appellant. He was committed to the Hospital for the Insane some time after the passage of the order declaring him to be [526]*526a lunatic unfit to remain at large, and remained therein until discharged as restored to reason on December 4, 1905. During the intervening time, namely, December 5, 1904, a committee was appointed to take charge of the property of the lunatic, which consisted of a claim for arrears of a pension. It was in the matter of the administration of his property that this proceeding was begun by the appellant by a petition for a rule to his committee to show cause why he should not be required to turn over all'money in his hands to the credit of petitioner. In this petition he alleges his commitment to the Hospital for the Insane, and his subsequent discharge, and the restoration of his status as a man of sound mind. Moreover, he thereafter moved the court to amend the order made, on the appointment of the committee, authorizing the payment to the Hospital for the Insane for the maintenance of petitioner at the rate of $5 per week, so as to make said order conform to the subsequent act of Congress approved February 20, 1905. Until the filing of his last petition on April 24, 1906, to compel the committee to show cause, — as the same is entitled, — the entire proceeding is founded on the assumed validity not only of the order declaring his lunacy, but also of the order appointing the committee.

In this last petition, which in the main consists of exceptions to the auditor’s statement of the committee’s account, he also alleges the commitment to the Hospital for the Insane, but makes no attack upon the regularity of the proceeding. He. does allege, however, that when committed to the hospital he was suffering from overindulgence in alcoholic drinks, and shortly thereafter recovered therefrom, and was restored to ■his former condition of sanity and good physical health; but he alleges no attempt to procure a judicial declaration of his restored sanity until December 4, 1905, at which time the hospital authorities reported his recovery and fitness for discharge from custody. The prayers of this petition are confined to an attack upon the validity of the order appointing the committee, and to the legality and justice of his account of administration. [527]*527And it is from the order denying this petition and confirming the auditor’s report that the appeal was taken.

The appellant when discharged had his election to assail the entire proceedings in his case as null and void, in some appropriate proceeding for the recovery of his pension money; or to recognize their validity and proceed against the committee by way of attack upon his account of administration. He cannot maintain the two inconsistent positions in one proceeding. Having elected to maintain his complaint upon the assumption of the validity of the proceedings under the lunacy inquiry, he is estopped to maintain a different position, — particularly while still insisting upon a right which necessarily rests upon the other. Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 689, 39 L. ed. 578, 584, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Dutcher v. Hill, 29 Mo. 271, 77 Am. Dec. 572.

2. Another contention on behalf of the appellant is that the order appointing his committee is null and void for the want of notice of the application therefor. The record shows that when the application was filed the appellant was in the Hospital for the Insane, under the former order of commitment, and that no notice of the application was given him. There is weighty authority for the proposition that when one has been adjudged to be insane and committed to an asylum no additional notice is necessary to the appointment of a committee, unless, of course, it be required by statute. In other words, when the initial proceeding has been had upon notice, it is not required in the various incidental steps thereafter. Brigham v. Boston & A. R. Co. 102 Mass. 14, 17; Heckman v. Adams, 50 Ohio St. 305, 315, 34 N. E. 155; Swope v. Frazer, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 649, 37 S. W. 495; Oster v. Meyer, 113 Ky. 181, 186, 67 S. W. 851.

Whether the validity of the order appointing the committee could be maintained upon this ground, we consider it unnecessary to determine. The position that this order is either void or voidable is inconsistent with the ground upon which appellant’s case rests; and he is estopped to maintain a different position.in this proceeding, for the same reasons given at length [528]*528in the discussion of the contention under the first assignment of error.

3. Treating the petition for a rule to show cause — the last filed by the appellant — as embodying exceptions to the auditor’s last report and statement of account, the single question is whether it was correct to allow the account of the superintendent of the Hospital for the Insane for the maintenance of appellant at the rate of $5 per week. It will be remembered that the order of .court entered appointing the committee December 5, 1904, authorized the payment by him to the hospital authorities of the sum of $5 per week for maintenance. And this order the court refused to set aside or amend on the motion of the appellant, as hereinabove recited. This order was presumably in accordance with the rates fixed under sec. 4849, Hev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3358. However, the exception is confined to the allowance of the hospital account at the same rate from and after the passage of the act of Congress approved February 20, 1905 (33 Stat. at L. 131, chap. 593, H. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1905, p. 660). The contention is that under the express .provisions of said act and the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior authorized thereby, the amount charged appellant thereafter as a pensioner of the Hnited States could not exceed the rate of $6.66 per month. The act relied on is a substitute for the proviso embodied in the general appropriation act approved August 1, 1882 (22 Stat. at L.

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Bluebook (online)
29 App. D.C. 519, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/logue-v-fenning-dc-1907.