Logisys, Inc. v. Williams

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Oklahoma
DecidedAugust 19, 2022
Docket4:20-cv-00559
StatusUnknown

This text of Logisys, Inc. v. Williams (Logisys, Inc. v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Logisys, Inc. v. Williams, (N.D. Okla. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

LOGISYS, INC. d/b/a BELTMANN ) INTEGRATED LOGISTICS INC., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 20-cv-00559-GKF-SH v. ) ) J. MIKE WILLIAMS, ) ) Defendant. ) OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Logisys, Inc. d/b/a Beltmann Integrated Logistics, Inc. (“Logisys”), asking the Court for various relief relating to the failure of Defendant J. Mike Williams (“Williams”) to respond to discovery requests. Background Logisys filed this lawsuit on November 2, 2020, asserting claims relating to monies allegedly owed it under a contract with the Cherokee Nation. (ECF No. 1.) On August 13, 2021, Defendant Williams appeared with counsel. (ECF No. 24.) However, on March 4, 2022, all of Williams’ counsel moved to withdraw (ECF No. 41), and the Court conditionally granted that withdrawal upon the appearance of substitute counsel or Williams deciding to proceed pro se (ECF No. 42). On April 13, 2022, Williams filed a Statement of Intent to Proceed Pro Se. (ECF No. 44.) Pertinent to this motion, on May 9, 2022, Logisys issued discovery requests to Williams that contained requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production of documents (the “Discovery Requests,” ECF No. 46-1). Logisys served the Discovery Requests by certified mail on Williams at the address he provided in his Statement of Intent. (ECF Nos. 46-1 & 46-2.) Williams’ responses to the requests were due on June 13, 2022. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A), 36(a)(3). According to Logisys, Williams has not responded to the discovery requests. Logisys filed this motion on July 19, 2022. (ECF No. 46.) Logisys variously asks for an order deeming the requests for admission admitted, imposing sanctions, compelling discovery, awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs for prosecuting its

motion, and finding that Williams has waived all objections to the Discovery Requests. (Id.) Williams’ response to Logisys’ motion was due on August 9, 2022, see LCvR7-1(e), but he filed no response. Pursuant to the local rules, this Court has the discretion to deem Logisys’ motion confessed. Id. The Court finds Williams has confessed his failure to respond to the Discovery Requests and will address the appropriate relief below. Analysis I. The Requests for Admission are Already Deemed Admitted As for the requests for admission, no order is required for such requests to be deemed admitted. “A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves . . . a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). It is undisputed that Williams did not serve any written answers or objections within the time allowed. As a result, the admission has already occurred, because Rule 36(a) is “self-

executing” and no motion is required. See Smith v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 662 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1229 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting FTC v. Medicor LLC, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2002)); see also Santiny Contractors, LLC v. Sayania, No. CV 19-780-SDJ, 2021 WL 641379, at *1 (M.D. La. Jan. 19, 2021) (denying motion to have facts contained in the underlying Requests for Admission deemed admitted because the failure to respond resulted in the automatic admission of the matters requested, rendering the motion moot). Instead, it will be up to Williams to move—if appropriate—to withdraw or amend his admissions under Rule 36(b) and the standard set forth by the Tenth Circuit in Raiser v. Utah County, 409 F.3d 1243, 1246 (10th Cir. 2005). See also Jiles v. Wright Med.

Tech., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 822, 851 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (“It was then [non-responding party’s] responsibility to file a motion if he wanted relief from the deemed admissions.”). II. Williams’ Objections to the Interrogatories are Waived; His Objections to the Requests for Production are Not While Logisys asks the Court to find Williams’ objections to all discovery requests be waived, the Court finds waiver is appropriate only as to the interrogatories. Rule 33 explicitly states: “Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). Here, Williams has not shown any cause for his failure to state objections in a timely manner. As such, Williams’ objections to the interrogatories are waived. The Court, however, does not find a similar waiver warranted under Rule 34, which does not contain any provision comparable to the above-quoted language. In so finding, the Court recognizes that other courts have applied the waiver rule to requests for production. See, e.g., Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 295, 303 (D. Kan. 1996); T.A. by & through Christensen v. Moore Pub. Sch., No. CIV-06-858-C, 2007 WL 9710770, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 19, 2007) (“Federal courts have interpreted Rule 34 to include the same waiver provision that is found in Rule 33(b)(4).”). Cases that find this unwritten addition to Rule 34 appear to do so based on the advisory committee’s

note to the 1970 amendments, which read—“The procedure provided in Rule 34 is essentially the same as that in Rule 33, as amended, and the discussion in the note appended to that rule is relevant to Rule 34 as well.” See Pulsecard, 168 F.R.D. at 303; T.A., 2007 WL 9710770, at *1. However, at the time this note was made, Rules 33 and 34 read differently than they do now. Rule 33 did not then provide a blanket, default waiver of objections to interrogatories. Rather, in 1970, the Committee did away with a prior

rule that provided 10 days for objections and 15 days for answers, noting that “[t]he time for objections is even shorter than for answers, and the party runs the risk that if he fails to object in time he may have waived his objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a), advisory ctte.’s note to 1970 am. (emphasis added). The 1970 amendments then combined the time for objections and answers and extended the period to 30 days. Id. There was no provision added to Rule 33 on the blanket waiver of objections. It does not appear, therefore, that the 1970 note to Rule 34 was intended to state that a party waives untimely objections to a request for production, absent good cause shown. More importantly, since 1970, the rules have been amended multiple times. In 1993, subparagraph (b)(4) was added to Rule 33 “to make clear . . . that unstated or untimely grounds for objection [to interrogatories] are ordinarily waived.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

33(b), advisory ctte.’s note to 1993 am. A similar change was not made to Rule 34 for requests for production, and there is nothing in the advisory committee’s note from that year indicating that a default waiver rule was intended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, advisory ctte.’s note to 1993 am.

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Related

Raiser v. Utah County
409 F.3d 1243 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
Smith v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co., Inc.
662 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (E.D. California, 2009)
Federal Trade Commission v. Medicor, LLC
217 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. California, 2002)
Jiles v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.
313 F. Supp. 3d 822 (S.D. Texas, 2018)
Ashford v. City of Milwaukee
304 F.R.D. 547 (E.D. Wisconsin, 2015)
Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Services, Inc.
168 F.R.D. 295 (D. Kansas, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
Logisys, Inc. v. Williams, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/logisys-inc-v-williams-oknd-2022.