Logical Communications, Inc. v. Morgan Management Corp.

496 A.2d 239, 4 Conn. App. 669, 1985 Conn. App. LEXIS 1088
CourtConnecticut Appellate Court
DecidedAugust 13, 1985
Docket2524
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 496 A.2d 239 (Logical Communications, Inc. v. Morgan Management Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Appellate Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Logical Communications, Inc. v. Morgan Management Corp., 496 A.2d 239, 4 Conn. App. 669, 1985 Conn. App. LEXIS 1088 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover deposits paid to secure the leasing of an office in a building managed by the defendants.1 The plaintiff was unable to take possession of the premises due to the defendants’ failure to make the agreed upon repairs by the date the lease was to begin. The plaintiff immediately notified the defendants that it would not take possession at a later date and requested a return of its payments. When the defendants refused to refund the money the plaintiff initiated this action in small claims court.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 572, the defendants removed the case to the regular docket of the Superior Court by alleging, in an affidavit, that there was a bona fide defense to the plaintiff’s claim for damages.

[670]*670The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff plus double costs pursuant to General Statutes § 52-245. The defendants raise the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the court’s comments and rulings showed sufficient prejudice to require the judge’s disqualification pursuant to General Statutes § 51-39 and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Conduct; (2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that no lease existed; (3) whether the defendants’ breach of the covenant to repair justified the plaintiff’s rescinding the lease; and (4) whether double costs were properly assessed. We find no error.

The defendants claim that they were denied a fair trial by an impartial court due to the trial judge’s comment that the defense proffered was a “sham,” prior to the defendants’ presentation of their case in full. The question of judicial bias was not raised after the comments were made, and the defendants did not move to disqualify the judge at any time. Such action “can be construed as the functional equivalent of ‘consent in open court’ to [the judge’s] presiding over the trial.” Timm v. Timm, 195 Conn. 202, 205, 487 A.2d 191 (1985). A litigant must raise the question of disqualification in a timely and appropriate manner; Pavel v. Pavel, 4 Conn. App. 575, 576 n.2, 495 A.2d 1113 (1985); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App. 76, 78, 492 A.2d 516 (1985); Szypula v. Szypula, 2 Conn. App. 650, 654, 482 A.2d 85 (1984); or the claim will be deemed to have been waived. Verissimo v. Verissimo, 3 Conn. App. 222, 224, 486 A.2d 1134 (1985). Parties cannot be allowed “ ‘to anticipate a favorable decision, reserving a right to impeach it or set it aside if it happens to be against them, for a cause which was well known to them before or during a trial.’ ” Timm v. Timm, supra, 205. Since the defendants therefore waived the claim of judicial bias, we need not consider the merits of that claim.2 Id.

[671]*671The defendants argue that the trial court erred by declining to find that a lease existed. At oral argument in this court, however, the defendants specifically abandoned their counterclaim. That is the only pleading in the case alleging a lease. Thus, we do not consider this claim of error.

The trial court was clearly disturbed by the fact that the affidavit submitted for transference of the case from the small claims docket to the regular docket raised a defense that was explicitly contradicted by the defendants’ answer and the allegations made in their counterclaim. Under such circumstances, it was proper for the court to consider awarding double costs to the plaintiff under General Statutes § 52-245.3 The award of such costs is in the sound discretion of the trial court. The court did not abuse its discretion by doubling the costs under the facts presented in this case.

There is no error.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Strom v. Curtiss, No. Cv 00 0092123 S (Nov. 8, 2002)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 14189 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2002)
In Re Rayshawn P., (Jan. 29, 2001)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 1645 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2001)
Rubin v. Rubin, No. Fa85-064742s (Feb. 18, 1996)
1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 1331-GGG (Connecticut Superior Court, 1996)
Tatro v. Tatro
587 A.2d 154 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1991)
DeMatteo v. DeMatteo
575 A.2d 243 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1990)
Lo Sacco v. Young
564 A.2d 610 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1989)
Barca v. Barca
546 A.2d 887 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1988)
Postemski v. Landon
518 A.2d 674 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
496 A.2d 239, 4 Conn. App. 669, 1985 Conn. App. LEXIS 1088, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/logical-communications-inc-v-morgan-management-corp-connappct-1985.