Logan v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: March 31, 2000
• Docket: 98-3839
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 8 Logan v. United States No. 98-3839 Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0115P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0115p.06 the source may not be from an unrelated proceeding. Here, the district court explicitly noted that the source of such evidence was from a related trial over which it had presided. That decision was quite correctly affirmed on direct appeal. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS III. CONCLUSION FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the

; judgment of the district court.

 KEITH R. LOGAN,  Petitioner-Appellant,   No. 98-3839 v.  > UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  Respondent-Appellee.  1 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. No. 94-01057—Sandra S. Beckwith, District Judge. Submitted: March 8, 2000 Decided and Filed: March 31, 2000 Before: WELLFORD, SILER, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Keith E. Golden, GOLDEN & MEIZLISH, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Salvador A. Dominguez, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

1 2 Logan v. United States No. 98-3839 No. 98-3839 Logan v. United States 7

_________________ of a sentence enhancement to rely on testimony given under oath at a separate, but related, trial.” OPINION _________________ A district court is indeed permitted to rely on testimony presented at a related proceeding, so long as there are RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Keith Logan pled sufficient indicia of reliability. See United States v. Morales, guilty in 1992 to participating in a drug conspiracy. On direct 994 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ervin, appeal, Logan challenged the district court’s decision to 931 F.2d 1440, 1441-42 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. enhance his offense level for possession of a firearm. In Smith, 929 F.2d 1453, 1458-59 (10th Cir. 1991); United support of the enhancement, the district court made findings States v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d 363, 364-66 (9th Cir. 1990); of fact based upon testimony presented during the trial of but see United States v. Jackson, 990 F.2d 251, 254 (6th Cir. Logan’s co-conspirators. In 1994, a panel of this court 1993) (declaring in an unsupported statement, not essential to affirmed Logan’s sentence, ruling that the firearm its holding, that “[t]o sentence a defendant based on facts enhancement was proper. established at someone else’s trial . . . violates due process”). Logan later filed a motion to modify his sentence pursuant In Jackson, a panel of this court remanded the defendant’s to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that a subsequent case, United case for resentencing because it was “uncertain of how the States v. McMeen, 49 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1995), changed the district court made its factual findings . . . .” Jackson, 990 law regarding factual findings at sentencing, and that this F.2d at 253. For the purposes of determining the quantity of change established that the district court had erred when it drugs sold by the defendant, the district court had divided the applied the firearm enhancement. The district court denied amount of cash seized in connection with his operation by the Logan’s motion. For the reasons set forth below, we amount the defendant charged for his drugs, a figure referred AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. to as the “drug unit value.” See id. at 253-54. This court remanded because “[t]he record does not indicate how the I. BACKGROUND district court determined the drug unit value . . . .” Id. at 254. The concurring opinion asserted that because a district court In 1992, Logan pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to “has plenty of opportunity to acquire information on [drug possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 unit values] throughout its consideration of its docket,” it U.S.C. § 846. Prior to Logan’s sentencing hearing, the same should not be necessary “to take evidence in every case on the district judge assigned to Logan’s case presided over the trial street value of cocaine within its jurisdiction.” Id. at 255 of his co-conspirators. During those proceedings, the district (Boggs, J., concurring). In response, the majority wrote that judge heard testimony that described the nature and extent of “[t]o sentence a defendant based on facts established at the conspiracy, including evidence that implicated Logan. someone else’s trial . . . violates due process.” Id. at 254. Among those testifying was Vaughn Bass, one of the co- conspirators. When viewed in context, it is evident that Jackson does not alter the general rule that a district court is indeed permitted On December 21, 1992, the district court held Logan’s to rely on evidence from a related proceeding, so long as there sentencing hearing. Paragraph sixty of Logan’s presentence are sufficient indicia of reliability. Jackson simply report contained facts suggesting that he had possessed or had emphasizes that a district court must be clear as to the source access to a firearm in relation to his drug trafficking activities. of the evidence on which it bases its factual finding, and that Specifically, it noted that Bass had observed cocaine and a 6 Logan v. United States No. 98-3839 No. 98-3839 Logan v. United States 3

admitted in the case unless the probation officer takes the handgun in Logan’s apartment in November of 1991. Based stand and offers testimony which may be upon this information, the probation officer proposed a two- cross-examined. point increase in Logan’s offense level pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. At Id. The court also wrote that “[w]hen a contested sentencing the sentencing hearing, Logan objected to the enhancement, enhancement factor appears in the probation report and is not contending that he “never used a gun in anything.” The proved by the government at the hearing, the court must district court overruled his objection. In support of its insure that the factor is otherwise proved by reliable evidence decision, the district court made the following factual finding: before using it to increase the sentence.” Id. I am satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that As previously noted, Logan asserts that he is entitled to Mr. Logan did possess a firearm in connection with the challenge his firearm enhancement for a second time, through offense, and that is based on statements of Mr. Bass and a § 2255 motion, because McMeen allegedly signaled an the agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & intervening change in the law. Logan, however, has failed to Firearms, and I find that Mr. Bass’s testimony was persuade us that McMeen constitutes such a change, as credible, and certainly more credible at this point than opposed to simply another application of existing law. Given Mr. Logan’s denial. that the McMeen court did not engage in any analysis that would suggest that it intended its holding to alter the Logan appealed, asserting that the district court improperly prevailing law with regard to sentencing procedures, we do enhanced his sentence for use of a firearm and violated not believe that its ruling constituted an “intervening change.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a) by relying on outside information at sentencing without giving him This is especially true in light of the fact that Logan has not adequate notice. Finding these allegations of error cited any pre-McMeen case allowing a district court to rely on “meritless,” a prior panel of this court wrote as follows: unsupported conclusions in a presentence report to justify an enhancement. Cf. Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, First, the court determined that the testimony by Alcohol, 1243 (5th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging an intervening change Tobacco, and Firearm (“ATF”) agents and Logan’s co- in the law where two Supreme Court opinions “condemn[ed] conspirators were [sic] more credible than Logan’s what this court had allowed” prior to those rulings). testimony, and therefore, held a preponderance of the evidence established [that] Logan possessed a firearm. We further conclude that even if McMeen had effectuated The court’s credibility determination was not clearly an intervening change in the law, Logan would still not be erroneous, and therefore, the enhancement was proper. entitled to relief. Citing McMeen, Logan contends that in his Second, Rule 32(a) requires [that] the court give a case “the Government simply relied upon the [presentence] defendant access to the presentence report. Here, Logan report itself to meet its burden.” This argument, however, is had access to the presentence report which clearly gave belied by the record of the sentencing hearing. Although the notice [that] the court planned to rely on the testimony of presentence report was the starting point for its analysis, the ATF agents and Logan’s co-conspirators during district court made explicit factual findings based on evidence sentencing. already presented to the court in the trial of Logan’s co- conspirators. In the opinion and order denying Logan’s United States v. Logan, No. 92-4365, 1994 WL 112864, at *2 § 2255 motion, the district court quite correctly noted that n.1 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 1994) (citations omitted). “McMeen does not suggest . . . that it is improper for purposes 4 Logan v. United States No. 98-3839 No. 98-3839 Logan v. United States 5

On June 10, 1996, Logan filed a motion pursuant to 28 B. This court’s decision in McMeen does not require that U.S.C. § 2255, requesting that the district court modify and Logan be resentenced correct his sentence. He argued that this court’s subsequent decision in United States v. McMeen, 49 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. Even if a legal issue is determined against a defendant on 1995) (holding that the district court erred by relying on an direct appeal, the defendant may nonetheless “secur[e] relief unsupported conclusion in a presentence report as a basis for under § 2255 on the basis of an intervening change in law.” finding that sufficient evidence existed to support an Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974). In support enhancement), established that the district court did not have of his § 2255 motion, Logan argues that this court’s decision a proper basis for applying the enhancement. In an opinion in United States v. McMeen, 49 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1995), and order dated September 30, 1997, the district court denied constitutes “new precedent” demonstrating that the Logan relief, ruling that McMeen was not applicable to his conclusion reached in response to Logan’s firearm situation: enhancement challenge on direct appeal was “incorrect.” McMeen does not suggest, and the Court is not In McMeen, the defendant pled guilty to making a false persuaded, that it is improper for purposes of a sentence statement on a credit card application in violation of 18 enhancement to rely on testimony given under oath at a U.S.C. § 1014. At sentencing, the district court increased the separate, but related, trial. . . . Although petitioner was offense level by two points for “more than minimal planning” not present at this trial, the Court is satisfied that pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2). In support of its decision, testimony given under oath is readily identifiable and the district court relied on an addendum to the presentence sufficiently reliable to satisfy “basic fairness.” report stating that the defendant participated in a larger credit card scheme in Florida. Neither the addendum nor the In this appeal, Logan argues that (1) McMeen constitutes an presentence report, however, cited any evidence linking the intervening change in the law that permits him to again attack defendant to the Florida scheme. The defendant denied such the firearm enhancement through a § 2255 motion, even participation. though a prior panel of this court determined the issue against him on direct appeal, and (2) the holding of McMeen On appeal, this court reversed and remanded for establishes that the district court erred. resentencing because “[t]he information concerning the larger offense in Florida d[id] not have sufficient ‘indicia of II. ANALYSIS reliability’ . . . to prove the defendant’s involvement, and may not be used as the basis of an enhanced sentence.” McMeen, A. Standard of review 49 F.3d at 226 (quoting United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). In reaching this conclusion, “In reviewing the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, this the court stated as follows: Court applies a de novo standard of review of the legal issues and will uphold the factual findings of the district court unless The mere conclusion of the probation report is an they are clearly erroneous.” Hilliard v. United States, 157 insufficient basis for a finding that the evidence before F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Gall v. United States, 21 the sentencing judge supports the proposition of fact F.3d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1994)). asserted therein. Basic fairness requires that the evidence be identified and its reliability demonstrated. In a contested case, the position of the probation officer on a material matter should not be treated as evidence