IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION SHELIA A. LOGAN, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-00163-N ) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Shelia A. Logan brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.1 Upon due consideration of the parties’ briefs (Docs. 13, 16) and those portions of the certified transcript of the administrative record (Doc. 12) relevant to the issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision is due to be AFFIRMED.2 I. Procedural Background Logan protectively filed the subject SSI application with the Social Security
1 “Title XVI of the [Social Security] Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 (1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)).
2 With the consent of the parties, the Court has designated the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment in this civil action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 73. (See Docs. 10, 11). Administration (“SSA”) on November 16, 2017. After it was initially denied, Logan requested, and on August 26, 2020, received, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) with the SSA’s Office of Hearings Operations. On September 30,
2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Logan’s application, finding that she was not considered disabled under the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled to benefits. (See Doc. 12, PageID.65-82). The Commissioner’s decision on Logan’s application became final when the Appeals Council for the SSA’s Office of Appellate Operations denied her request for review of the ALJ’s unfavorable decision on March 8, 2021. (Id., PageID.57-61).3 Logan subsequently brought this action under § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (“The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner’s final determinations under section 405 of this title.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the
amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”);
3 The ALJ first issued an unfavorable decision on Logan’s application on July 3, 2019. (See Doc. 12, PageID.192-209). However, on April 21, 2020, the Appeals Council issued an order vacating that decision and remanding the case, with instructions, for further proceedings and a new ALJ decision. (See id., PageID.210- 213). That second decision, by the same ALJ, constitutes the Commissioner’s final decision subject to review in this action. Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.”).
II. Standards of Review “In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. [293], [301], 135 S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial- evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency’s factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence … is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., [Richardson v.] Perales, 402 U.S. [389,] 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420[, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971)] (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard). Biestek v. Berryhill, -- U.S. --, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019). In reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings, a court “ ‘may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].’ ” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). “ ‘Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]’s factual findings, [the Court] must
affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). See also Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A preponderance of the evidence is not required. In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, we give great deference to the ALJ’s factfindings.” (citation omitted)). Put another way, “[u]nder the substantial evidence standard, we cannot look
at the evidence presented to [an administrative agency] to determine if interpretations of the evidence other than that made by the [agency] are possible. Rather, we review the evidence that was presented to determine if the findings made by the [agency] were unreasonable. To that end, [judicial] inquiry is highly deferential and we consider only whether there is substantial evidence for the findings made by the [agency], not whether there is substantial evidence for some
other finding that could have been, but was not, made. That is, even if the evidence could support multiple conclusions, we must affirm the agency’s decision unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1029 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations and quotation omitted).4
4 See also Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (“The court need not determine whether it would have reached a different result based upon the record” because “[e]ven if we find that the evidence preponderates “Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [A court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts.”).5
against the [Commissioner]'s decision, we must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.”); Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (under the substantial evidence standard, “we do not reverse the [Commissioner] even if this court, sitting as a finder of fact, would have reached a contrary result…”); Hunter, 808 F.3d at 822 (“In light of our deferential review, there is no inconsistency in finding that two successive ALJ decisions are supported by substantial evidence even when those decisions reach opposing conclusions. Faced with the same record, different ALJs could disagree with one another based on their respective credibility determinations and how each weighs the evidence. Both decisions could nonetheless be supported by evidence that reasonable minds would accept as adequate.”); Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Substantial evidence may even exist contrary to the findings of the ALJ, and we may have taken a different view of it as a factfinder. Yet, if there is substantially supportive evidence, the findings cannot be overturned.”); Werner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“The question is not, as Werner suggests, whether ALJ could have reasonably credited his testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.” (footnote omitted)); Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on reh'g (Aug. 9, 2001) (“If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.”).
5 However, the “burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 173 L.Ed.2d 532 (2009). See also Scharlow v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981) (per curiam) (“It is the claimant who bears the weighty burden of establishing the existence of a disability within the meaning of the Act, and therefore the appellant has the burden of showing that the Secretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” (citation omitted)); Sims v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 706 F. App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Under a substantial evidence standard of review, [the claimant] must do more than point to evidence in the record that supports her position; she must show the absence of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion.”). “[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record,” Chavez v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas proceedings), and “ ‘[t]here is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based on the materials before it…’ ” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (ellipsis added). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, whose review of Social Security appeals “is the same as that of the district court[,]” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), generally deems waived claims of error not fairly raised in the district court. See Stewart v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 115, 115-16 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general principle, [the court of appeals] will not address an argument that has not been raised in the district court…Because Stewart did not present any of his assertions in the district court, we decline to consider them on appeal.” (applying rule in appeal of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)); Crawford v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (same); Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 651 F. App’x 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (same); Cooley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 671 F. App’x 767, 769 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“As a general rule, we do not consider arguments that have not been fairly presented to a respective agency or to the district court. See Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating as waived a challenge to the administrative law judge’s reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert that was ‘not raise[d] . . . before the administrative agency or the district court’).”); In re Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., Maternity Leave Practices & Flight Attendant Weight Program Litig., 905 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a party hopes to preserve a claim, argument, theory, or defense for appeal, she must first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on it.”); Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying In re Pan American World Airways in Social Security appeal); Sorter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 773 F. App’x 1070, 1073 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Sorter has abandoned on appeal the issue of whether the ALJ adequately considered her testimony regarding the side effects of her pain medication because her initial brief simply mentions the issue without providing any supporting argument. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278–79 The “substantial evidence” “standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in
reviewing claims.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that ‘(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....’ 42 U.S.C.A. s 405(g) … As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established
that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary’s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing
(11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that ‘simply stating that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue’).”); Figuera v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 819 F. App’x 870, 871 n.1 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“Figuera also argues the ALJ failed to properly assess her credibility … However, Figuera did not adequately raise this issue in her brief before the district court. She raised the issue only summarily, without any citations to the record or authority. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that a party ‘abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority’). As a result, we do not address the sufficiency of the ALJ’s credibility finding.”); Turner v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, No. 21-13590, 2022 WL 842188, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“An appellant forfeits an argument by ‘mak[ing] only passing references to it or rais[ing] it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.’ Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). In her briefing, Turner states that the Appeals Council failed to request her records or obtain a consultative evaluation. But she cites no authorities or makes any other argument tending to establish that it had a duty to do so. She has therefore failed to adequately develop this argument, and it is forfeited.”). claims.” (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court “conduct[s] ‘an exacting examination’ of these factors.” Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “
‘The [Commissioner]’s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.’ ” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). In sum, courts “review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference and the Commissioner’s legal conclusions with close scrutiny.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245
F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2004).”). Moreover, an ALJ’s decision
must “state with at least some measure of clarity the grounds for [the] decision.” Owens, 748 F.2d at 1516; Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. A court cannot “affirm simply because some rationale might have supported the [Commissioner]’ conclusion[,]” as “[s]uch an approach would not advance the ends of reasoned decision making.” Owens, 748 F.2d at 1516. Rather, “an agency’s order must be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself.” Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397, 94 S. Ct. 2315, 41 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1974) (quotation omitted). See also Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The ALJ’s decision must stand or fall with the reasons set forth in the ALJ’s decision, as
adopted by the Appeals Council.”); Nance v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 781 F. App’x 912, 921 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished)6 (“Agency actions … must be upheld on the same bases articulated in the agency's order.” (citing Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. at 397, and Newton, 209 F.3d at 455)). Relevant here, eligibility for SSI requires a showing that the claimant is “disabled[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1)-(2), meaning the claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment ... which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Social Security Regulations outline a five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
6 In this circuit, “[u]npublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2. See also Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive authority.”). Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)- (v); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237-39).7 “These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate
both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In determining whether the claimant has satisfied this initial burden, the examiner must consider four factors: (1) objective medical facts or clinical findings; (2) the diagnoses of examining physicians; (3) evidence of pain; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history.” Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). “These factors must be considered both singly and in combination. Presence or absence of a single factor is not, in itself, conclusive.” Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted). If, in Steps One through Four of the five-step evaluation, a claimant proves that he or she has a qualifying disability and cannot do his or her past relevant work, it then becomes the Commissioner’s burden, at Step Five, to prove that the
claimant is capable—given his or her age, education, and work history—of engaging in another kind of substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999); Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir. 1985). Although the “claimant bears the burden of demonstrating the inability to return to [his or] her past relevant work, the
7 The Court will hereinafter use “Step One,” “Step Two,” etc. when referencing individual steps of this five-step sequential evaluation. Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“It is well-established that the
ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” (citations omitted)). “This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole.” Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).
If a court determines that the Commissioner reached a decision “by focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record[, i]n such circumstances [the court] cannot properly find that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is not enough to discover a piece of evidence which supports that decision, but to disregard other contrary evidence.” McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, “ ‘there is no rigid
requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, so long as the ALJ’s decision ... is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that the ALJ considered [the claimant's] medical condition as a whole.’ ” Mitchell v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quotation and brackets omitted)). When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, a court “review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision[,]” Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278, and the Court “will look only to the evidence
actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998). But “when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. III. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision At Step One, the ALJ determined that Logan had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since November 16, 2017, her SSI application date.8 (Doc. 12, PageID.70). At Step Two,9 the ALJ determined that Logan had the following severe impairments: history of coronary artery disease status post stenting, cardiovascular disease, history of heart failure with recovered ejection fracture, hypertension,
8 “For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled and has an SSI application on file.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211
9 “The severity regulation increases the efficiency and reliability of the evaluation process by identifying at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are so slight that it is unlikely they would be found to be disabled even if their age, education, and experience were taken into account.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153. See also Schink v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1265 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (Step Two “is a ‘threshold inquiry’ and ‘allows only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be rejected.’ ” (quoting McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986)). “[A]n ‘impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience.’ A claimant’s burden to establish a severe impairment at step two is only ‘mild.’ ” Schink, 935 F.3d at 1265 (citation omitted) (quoting McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1031). history of syncopal spells, mild emphysema, lung nodules, tobacco use disorder, thyroid disorder, and hypertension. (Doc. 12, PageID.70-73). At Step Three,10 the ALJ found that Logan did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or equaled the severity of a specified impairment in Appendix 1 of the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Doc. 12, PageID.73). At Step Four,11 the ALJ determined that Logan had the residual functional
10 Step Three “identif[ies] those claimants whose medical impairments are so severe that it is likely they would be found disabled regardless of their vocational background.” Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153. See also Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997) (“If the claimant’s condition meets or equals the level of severity of a listed impairment, the claimant at this point is conclusively presumed to be disabled based on his or her medical condition.”).
11 At Step Four, the ALJ must assess: (1) the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (2) the claimant's ability to return to her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). As for the claimant’s RFC, the regulations define RFC as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). Moreover, the ALJ will “assess and make a finding about [the claimant's] residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). Furthermore, the RFC determination is used both to determine whether the claimant: (1) can return to her past relevant work under the fourth step; and (2) can adjust to other work under the fifth step…20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
If the claimant can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ will conclude that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (f). If the claimant cannot return to her past relevant work, the ALJ moves on to step five.
In determining whether [a claimant] can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ must determine the claimant's RFC using all relevant medical and other evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). That is, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is limited to a particular capacity (RFC) “to perform a range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)[,]”12 subject to the following limitations: “[Logan] can lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently[;] can stand/walk for 6 hours
and sit for 6 hours per eight-hour workday, with customary breaks[;] can occasionally climb ramps and stairs[;] can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds[;] must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat or cold, wetness, humidity, caustic chemical fumes or gases[; and] cannot work at unprotected heights.” (Doc.
work level. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Once the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines that the claimant cannot return to her prior relevant work, the ALJ moves on to the fifth, and final, step.
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39 (footnote omitted). “[A]n ALJ's RFC assessment is an administrative finding based on all the relevant evidence, including both medical and nonmedical evidence.” Pupo v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 17 F.4th 1054, 1065 (11th Cir. 2021).
12 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of different types of employment in the national economy, the Commissioner classifies jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy. These terms are all defined in the regulations … Each classification … has its own set of criteria.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239 n.4. The criteria for “light” work are as follows:
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). 12, PageID.73-77). Based on the RFC, and after considering the testimony of a vocational expert,13 the ALJ found that Logan was capable of performing past relevant work as a counter clerk/parts clerk. (Doc. 12, PageID.77-78). Thus, the ALJ
found that Logan was not “disabled” under the Social Security Act from the application date through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id., PageID.78). IV. Analysis Logan argues several reasons why the ALJ reversibly erred at Step Four in finding that she can perform her past relevant work. None have merit. Logan’s claim that the ALJ “provided no specific findings or analysis regarding the physical and mental demands of this work, as required by SSR 82-62”
(Doc. 13, PageID.557), is simply false. Here, the ALJ expressly (1) formulated an RFC for Logan; (2) found, based on the testimony of a vocational expert, that Logan’s past work was properly classified as the “counter clerk/parts clerk” position described in section 279.357-062 of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, see https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/PUBLIC/DOT/REFERENCES/DOT02D; 1991 WL 672550,14 and that the physical and mental demands of that position were “light;
13 “A vocational expert is an expert on the kinds of jobs an individual can perform based on his or her capacity and impairments. When the ALJ uses a vocational expert, the ALJ will pose hypothetical question(s) to the vocational expert to establish whether someone with the limitations that the ALJ has previously determined that the claimant has will be able to secure employment in the national economy.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240.
14 “The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) descriptions can be relied upon--for jobs that are listed in the DOT -- to define the job as it is usually performed in the national economy.” See SSR 82-61, 1975-1982 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 836, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (1982). skilled; svp5” (Doc. 12, PageID.78); and (3) after “comparing [Logan]’s residual functional capacity with the physical and mental demands of this work, f[ou]nd[] that [Logan] is able to perform it as generally performed.” (Id.). Logan does not
explain what more she believes is required under SSR 82-62. See Social Security Ruling 82-62, 1975-1982 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 809, 1982 WL 31386, at *4 (1982) (“In finding that an individual has the capacity to perform a past relevant job, the determination or decision must contain among the findings the following specific findings of fact: 1. A finding of fact as to the individual's RFC[;] 2. A finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past job/occupation[; and] 3. A finding of fact that the individual's RFC would permit a return to his or her past job or
occupation.”).15 Logan makes much of the fact that her past relevant work “only dealt with one type of product (professional HVAC supplies)[,]” that her “past relevant work experience [was] only in this one field/industry[,]” and that she performed the job at the medium level.” (Doc. 13, PageID.557). However, a claimant can be found capable of past relevant work when the claimant can meet the demands of that work “either
as the claimant actually performed it or as generally performed in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(2) (emphasis added). The ALJ acknowledged that Logan “actually performed” her past work at the “medium” level, but nevertheless
15 Logan conclusory argues that the ALJ “failed to address the skill level of the job (SVP 5) vis a vis the claimant’s limitations secondary to her cardiovascular disease with hypertension, history of syncopal spells, and mild emphysema.” (Doc. 13, PageID.557). However, the ALJ presumably accounted for such limitations in formulating the RFC, and Logan offers no substantive argument why the RFC was erroneous, or why it does not support an ability to perform at SVP 5. determined that she could perform her past work “as generally performed.” (Doc. 12, PageID.78). Thus, the ALJ’s finding of not disable at Step Four was justified regardless of whether Logan could do her past work as she actually performed it.
See SSR 82-61, 1975-1982 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 836, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (1982) (“It is understood that some individual jobs may require somewhat more or less exertion than the DOT description. []A former job performed in by the claimant may have involved functional demands and job duties significantly in excess of those generally required for the job by other employers throughout the national economy … [I]f the claimant cannot perform the excessive functional demands and/or job duties actually required in the former job but can perform the functional demands and job
duties as generally required by employers throughout the economy, the claimant should be found to be ‘not disabled.’ ”). Finally, Logan argues that the ALJ failed to adequately consider whether her past work was a “composite job.” As the Commissioner has recognized, “composite jobs have significant elements of two or more occupations and, as such, have no counterpart in the DOT.” Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 743 F. App'x 951, 954 (11th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished); SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2; SSA POMS DI 25005.020(B). 16 Past relevant work “may be a composite job if it takes
16 “The Social Security Administration’s POMS is the publicly available operating instructions for processing Social Security claims. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385, 123 S. Ct. 1017, 154 L. Ed.2d 972 (2003). While the ‘administrative interpretations’ contained within the POMS ‘are not products of formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect.’ Id.; see Stroup v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (‘While the POMS does not have the force of law, it can be persuasive.’).” Smith v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 743 F. multiple DOT occupations to locate the main duties of the [past relevant work] as described by the claimant.” POMS DI 25005.020(B). When past relevant work is considered a “composite job,” the ALJ may not apply the “as generally performed in
the national economy” prong at Step Four, and must instead determine if the claimant “can perform all parts of the job” as the claimant performed it. Id. Accord Smith, 743 F. App'x at 954 (“When the claimant’s previous work qualifies as a composite job, the ALJ must consider the particular facts of the individual case to consider whether the claimant can perform his previous work as actually performed. See SSR 82-61 at *2.”). Generally, it is the claimant’s burden to show that past relevant work was a “composite job.” See Smith, 743 F. App'x at 954 (“[T]o
establish that his position was a composite job, Smith had to prove that hanging rent notices was one of the ‘main duties’ of his position with the property management company. POMS DI 25005.020; see SSR 82-61 (requiring that a composite job has ‘significant elements of two or more occupations’). Although Smith bore the burden of proof on this issue, he introduced no evidence about how much time he spent hanging rent notices or otherwise establishing that this duty
was a significant element of the job. Furthermore, Smith has not identified what other occupation listed in the DOT he contends that he was performing when he hung the rent notices. See POMS DI 25005.020.”). Logan points out that the vocational expert who testified at the ALJ hearing before the first unfavorable decision classified her past work as a “parts clerk” as
App'x 951, 954 n.* (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished). that position is described in DOT 222.367-042, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/PUBLIC/DOT/REFERENCES/DOT02B; 1991 WL 672085, a “heavy semiskilled job.” (Doc. 12, PageID.203). She claims that the ALJ
should have evaluated whether her past work was a composite of that position and the “counter clerk/parts clerk” position described at DOT 279.357-062. However, the ALJ’s decision stated: The undersigned notes that the vocational expert at the claimant’s prior hearing classified the claimant’s past work under a different DOT number. However, vocational expert Barry Murphy explained that he looked carefully at the classification given at the first hearing and felt that the above DOT number more accurately reflects the claimant’s detailed description of the work that she performed … The testimony of the vocational expert is found to be reasonable and reliable, and is accepted pursuant to Social Security Ruling 00-04p. He testified that he based his testimony on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles as supplemented by his professional education, training, research and experience placing individuals in the field. (Doc. 12, PageID.78). It is thus reasonably clear that the ALJ, at least implicitly, found that Logan’s past work was not a composite of those two positions, and Logan has failed to show how substantial evidence does not support that determination. Cf. SSR 82- 61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (situations involving composite jobs “will be evaluated according to the particular facts of each individual case”). As the undersigned has previously observed, “[t]o allow past relevant work to be classified as a ‘composite job’ based on any difference between the DOT’s description and a claimant’s actual description of his duties would effectively swallow the rule that a claimant is not disabled if he can perform past relevant work as that work is ‘generally performed in the national economy[,]’ even if he can no longer perform it as he actually performed it.” Bitowf v. Saul, No. CV 1:19-00845-N, 2021 WL 1183794, at *12 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2021).17
No reversible error having been shown, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s final decision denying Logan’s application for benefits is due to be AFFIRMED. V. Conclusion & Order In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner’s final decision denying Logan’s November 16, 2017 SSI application is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
A final judgment consistent with this order shall issue separately under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. DONE and ORDERED this the 29th day of September 2022. /s/ Katherine P. Nelson KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
17 Moreover, Logan has not shown that her past work involved “significant elements” of the “parts clerk” position described in DOT 222.367-042. Logan’s only stated reason that her past work should have been considered a “composite job” is that she actually performed the work at a medium exertional level, but the “[p]hysical demand requirements [for DOT 222.367-042] are in excess of those for Medium Work.” DOT 222.367-042, 1991 WL 672085 (emphasis added).