IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-2107 Filed May 22, 2024
LOGAN JEFFREY SHOEMAKER, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Patrick A. McElyea,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Debra S. De Jong, Orange City, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ. 2
GREER, Judge.
“Did I hit him? Did I hit the officer?” After asking about the results of his
collision of a stolen garbage truck with a police cruiser, Logan Shoemaker was
brought to trial and convicted of multiple charges, including attempted murder of a
police officer. Now in postconviction-relief (PCR) proceedings, Shoemaker raises
several challenges to the denial of his PCR application based on ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel. Following our de novo review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Shoemaker went on a “multiple-day spree of criminal activity in September
2017.” State v. Shoemaker, No. 18-1382, 2019 WL 5067177, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 9, 2019). This activity included repeatedly calling and texting a woman named
Katie, refusing to leave her home, using “a truck he stole as a battering ram,
purposefully crashing into vehicles parked near Katie’s home,” fighting Katie and
beating her up, using “an instrument to break windows out of vehicles,” fleeing in
the stolen truck—a red Dodge Ram—and crashing “into the back of a stopped
garbage truck,” threatening its driver with a gun and threatening to shoot him if he
did not exit the vehicle, continuing “to flee in the garbage truck,” and finally crashing
the garbage truck into Police Chief Terry Behning’s service vehicle, seriously
injuring Chief Behning. Id. at *1–2.
In October, the State charged Shoemaker via trial information with thirteen
counts based on his activities the previous month.1 In June 2018, Shoemaker pled
1 The charges were attempted murder in violation of Iowa Code section 707.11(1)
(2017); serious injury by vehicle in violation of section 707.6A(4); eluding or attempting to elude while participating in a felony or resulting in bodily injury in violation of section 321.279(3); willful injury causing serious injury in violation of 3
guilty to eight of the charges,2 proceeding to trial on only five (which related to
actions after Shoemaker took the garbage truck): attempted murder, serious injury
by vehicle, eluding or attempting to elude while participating in a felony or resulting
in bodily injury, willful injury resulting in serious injury, and first-degree robbery.
After Shoemaker moved in limine, the parties agreed prior to trial that the State
could offer limited evidence of Katie’s interactions with Shoemaker in September
2017 and law enforcement could testify to their observations.
The case came to jury trial the same month. During voir dire—either in a
written pre-trial questionnaire or during in-person questioning—four jurors that
were eventually seated on the jury admitted to prior knowledge of the case or of
Chief Behning. L.S. stated that she had heard of the case through television and
radio coverage the morning of voir dire. When asked if anything she heard or saw
would make it difficult for her to be fair and impartial, she said “I don’t think so . . . .
I mean, it was on the news, but that was it.” When asked if she could reach a
verdict based just on the evidence presented during trial, she responded, “Well, I
would hope so.” M.D. had seen news and social media coverage about Chief
Behning and fundraisers for him. In response to being asked if there was “anything
section 708.4(1); first-degree robbery in violation of sections 711.1(1) and 711.2; two counts of second-degree theft in violation of section 714.2(2); stalking with a dangerous weapon in violation of section 708.11(b)(2); three counts of second- degree criminal mischief in violation of section 716.4(1); assault while displaying a dangerous weapon in violation of section 708.2(3); and fourth-degree criminal mischief in violation of section 716.6(1)(a)(1). 2 Shoemaker pled guilty to two counts of second-degree theft, stalking with a
dangerous weapon, three counts of second-degree criminal mischief, assault while displaying a dangerous weapon, and fourth-degree criminal mischief. He filed written guilty pleas to assault while displaying a dangerous weapon and fourth- degree criminal mischief; the others were handled in person at the final pretrial conference. 4
about the things that you read or saw that would make it difficult for you to be fair
and impartial in this case” she answered, “I don’t think so.” She also agreed that
she could reach a verdict based just on the evidence she heard in the courtroom
and would follow the law as the judge instructed her. M.N. saw news coverage of
the events while he was in school. He was asked if he would be willing to wait to
make a decision until all of the evidence was in and he was instructed on the law,
he answered, “Yes.” He also agreed that he had not made up his mind solidly yet.
Lastly, C.G. answered that she had seen Chief Behning and his injury in person.
However, she agreed that seeing him would have no impact on her ability to be a
fair and impartial juror. Trial counsel did not move for a change of venue.
At trial, during his opening statement, trial counsel said, “Shoemaker did a
lot of bad, horrible things in September of 2017. He did steal multiple cars. He
rammed cars into other cars to damage them because he was upset. . . . He did
all of those things and more, many of which are crimes.” He added that Shoemaker
“was strung out on methamphetamine that day.” And he told the jury that
Shoemaker both completely destroyed the truck that he drove first and totaled the
garbage truck that he drove second. Then he asked the jury to return a verdict of
guilty on the charges of serious injury by vehicle and eluding or attempting to elude
while participating in a felony or resulting in bodily injury and to return a verdict of
guilty on the lesser-included second-degree robbery charge. However, he insisted
that Shoemaker was “not guilty of attempted murder. He was not trying to hit Chief
Behning. He is not guilty of willful injury because he wasn’t trying to hurt Chief 5
Behning.” The State introduced video evidence of almost all the events through
either dashboard camera, body camera, or rear-facing camera footage.3
After the State rested its case, Shoemaker moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the charges of attempted murder; willful injury resulting in serious
injury; and first-degree robbery, which the court denied. Shoemaker testified and
admitted that he stole two pickup trucks, rammed multiple cars, smashed out car
windows, and stalked Katie. He added that he had been using methamphetamine
that week and that methamphetamine impaired his thinking and made him “think
on impulse . . . without thinking of the outcome.” While he also admitted that he
was driving at least one hundred miles per hour, “totaled out” the red Dodge Ram,
and threatened to shoot the driver of the garbage truck if he did not get out, he
insisted that he did not have a gun and was not intending to kill Chief Behning. At
the close of the evidence, Shoemaker again moved for a judgment of acquittal on
the same counts, and the court denied the motion. In closing arguments,
Shoemaker insisted that he did not know Chief Behning was next to the police
vehicle before he collided with it. But he did not contest the serious-injury-by-
vehicle or eluding charges, instead admitting to them. He also admitted that he
“specifically intended to commit a theft.”
The jury found Shoemaker guilty of four of the counts: attempted murder,
eluding or attempting to elude while participating in a felony or resulting in bodily
injury, willful injury resulting in serious injury, and first-degree robbery; they
3 State’s Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 9, 10A, and 11A captured Shoemaker’s actions from the
time he was at Katie’s home damaging vehicles through fleeing in the garbage truck and eventually speaking with officers after hitting Chief Behning’s vehicle. Defendant’s exhibits A, B, and C show substantially the same. 6
acquitted Shoemaker of serious injury by vehicle. The jury also found that Chief
Behning was a peace officer, and thus the sentencing requirements of Iowa Code
section 707.11(5) applied.4 In total, the court sentenced Shoemaker to a total term
of imprisonment not to exceed fifty-eight years. Our court affirmed the convictions
for attempted murder, willful injury causing serious injury, and first-degree robbery
on direct appeal. Shoemaker, 2019 WL 5067177, at *5 Shoemaker applied for
further review, our supreme court denied the application, and procedendo issued
in December 2019.
Shoemaker filed this PCR application in February 2020, alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. The PCR court held a hearing in September 2022. At
the hearing, Shoemaker’s trial counsel testified that he “didn’t file a motion [for
change of venue] because I didn’t think it would be successful.” He opined “we
were able to get a fair and impartial jury.” He submitted exhibits of eleven news
articles—seven published nine months before and four published after trial began.
As to the other strategic decisions involved in the case, trial counsel detailed
specific reasons addressing Shoemaker’s complaints about his representation.
First, he believed that evidence of Shoemaker’s prior theft conviction was
admissible, so he did not challenge its admission. Trial counsel explained that he
did not challenge the admission of evidence related to the charges for which
Shoemaker pled guilty because they “were ultimately related. It was essentially
one long incident.” He further said that they were “all one large transaction.” He
4 “If the fact finder determines the attempt to commit murder was against a peace
officer . . . , the person shall serve one hundred percent of the term of confinement imposed and shall be denied parole, work release, or other early release.” Iowa Code § 707.11(5)(c). 7
explained that he argued at trial that Shoemaker was guilty of third-degree robbery
and asked the jury to find him guilty of that crime because “intent to criminally
deprive with respect to a stolen vehicle to escape from police can be the basis or
can be found from the way they’re operating the vehicle.” He did not move for a
judgment of acquittal or request a jury instruction defining theft as opposed to
operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent for the same reason. Lastly, trial
counsel testified that he did not rely on the intoxication defense or find an expert
to testify on its applicability because it “wouldn’t be applicable. . . . It was very
apparent from factual circumstances of the case that [Shoemaker] was able to form
specific intent for a bunch of things. He was making conscious choices.”
The PCR court denied the application in December, finding that trial
counsel’s strategy during trial was largely “centered on limiting the witnesses the
State presented and narrowing the jury’s focus to intent rather than the egregious
conduct by Shoemaker.” In reviewing trial counsel’s strategy, the PCR court
concluded that “[t]he record during the trial and the record made during the PCR
trial do not provide sufficient evidence that [trial counsel] should have moved for a
change of venue based on pretrial publicity.” Then, the PCR court found that it
was not a breach of duty to fail to prevent the jury from hearing evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts because that evidence was most likely admissible as it
was inextricably linked with other admissible evidence and also likely admissible
as evidence of intent. The PCR court also found that it was a reasonable trial
strategy to admit to theft “hoping the jury might take [Shoemaker] at [his] word and
bypass any greater offense presuming [he has] accepted responsibility for [his]
actions.” Lastly, the PCR court determined that it would have been inconsistent to 8
argue the defense of intoxication as to the charges that Shoemaker pled not guilty
to but not for the charges for which he pled guilty and that the evidence did not
support submission of a diminished responsibility defense. Shoemaker appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims de novo. Sothman
v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021); Hernandez Ruiz v. State, 912 N.W.2d
435, 439 (Iowa 2018) (“[W]e do so . . . because such claims are constitutional in
nature.”).
III. Analysis.
Shoemaker alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in four respects (1)
failing to move for a change of venue; (2) failing to limit evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts; (3) admitting to theft, failing to move for judgment of acquittal on
the first-degree-robbery count, and failing to submit jury instructions on theft versus
operating vehicle without owner’s consent; and (4) failing to present a defense of
diminished capacity and intoxication.
“[T]o succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, a PCR applicant must
establish that counsel breached a duty and prejudice resulted, and the claim fails
if either element is lacking.” Lusk v. State, No. 18-1125, 2019 WL 1953461, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. May 1, 2019) (citing Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866 (Iowa
2012)); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “Both elements must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d
134, 142 (Iowa 2001).
Regarding the performance prong, we presume that counsel acted
competently; that presumption is overcome if we find counsel’s performance falls 9
below the normal range of competency. Krogmann v. State, 914 N.W.2d 293, 306
(Iowa 2018). In looking at the normal range of competency, “claims of ineffective
assistance involving tactical or strategic decisions of counsel must be examined in
light of all the circumstances to ascertain whether the actions were a product of
tactics or inattention to the responsibilities of an attorney guaranteed a defendant
under the Sixth Amendment.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143. “[S]trategic decisions
made after ‘thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options
are virtually unchallengeable,’ [but] strategic decisions made after a ‘less than
complete investigation’ must be based on reasonable professional judgments
which support the particular level of investigation conducted.” Id. (citation omitted).
“[W]e require more than a showing that trial strategy backfired or that another
attorney would have prepared and tried the case somewhat differently.” Taylor v.
State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984).
Regarding the prejudice prong, “an applicant must meet ‘the burden of
showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different
absent the errors.’” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143–44 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 696). In other words, the applicant must show “the reasonable probability of a
different verdict, or that the fact finder would have possessed reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 144. This showing must be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Bowman v. State, 710 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted).
A. Change of Venue.
First, Shoemaker argues that the publicity of this case was so extensive and
inflammatory that prejudice to him must be presumed or there was actual prejudice 10
on the part of the jury.5 When “such degree of prejudice exists in the county in
which the trial is to be had that there is a substantial likelihood a fair and impartial
trial cannot be preserved with a jury selected from that county,” the court must
either order that trial be transferred to or that the jury be impaneled in and
transferred from another county. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(10)(b) (2018). A party may
establish this level of prejudice by demonstrating that either “(1) publicity attending
the trial that is so pervasive and inflammatory that prejudice must be presumed, or
(2) actual prejudice on the part of the jury.” State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d 857, 860
(Iowa 1990).
In looking at the publicity, we examine “the nature, tone, and accuracy of
the articles; their timing in relation to the trial; and the impact of the publicity on the
jurors as revealed through voir dire.” Id. At the same time, “mere exposure to
news accounts will not create a presumption of prejudice.” Id. at 861. In Siemer,
where none of the publicity indicated that the defendant was guilty and “[t]he press
reports consisted largely of facts which were ultimately introduced at trial,” our
supreme court concluded prejudice could not be presumed. Id. Similarly, when
there was no evidence of actual prejudice resulting from media coverage, we have
found that trial counsel breached no duty and was not ineffective for failing to move
for a change of venue. See Borushaski v. State, No. 01-1683, 2003 WL 183284,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003).
5 Shoemaker also raised a concern that venue should have been changed because Chief Behning’s dad was the bailiff supervisor for the Scott County Courthouse at the time of trial, but in the jury selection interviews we find no basis to address this concern and so we do not address it. 11
Here, Shoemaker has failed to demonstrate the level of prejudice in the jury
that would have made a change of venue necessary; thus, counsel did not breach
an essential duty in failing to raise the issue. See State v. Tompkins, 859 N.W.2d
631, 637 (Iowa 2015) (“[W]here a claimant alleges counsel’s failure to pursue a
particular course breached an essential duty, there is no such duty when the
suggested course would have been meritless.”) During voir dire, the trial court
heard from several jurors about their knowledge of the facts and of potential
witnesses and did release some with possible preconceived bias. As to those
identified by Shoemaker here, those jurors agreed that they would listen to the
evidence as it came in, would be impartial, and would follow the law as instructed
by the judge. Although C.G. had seen Chief Behning’s injury in person, evidence
of his injury was admitted at trial in both video and photographs; thus, she would
have had the same awareness of the extent of his injuries at the end of the trial
even without her prior knowledge. And the news coverage contained facts that
were both introduced at trial and, in part, admitted to by Shoemaker; the coverage
was also from nine months prior to trial or after the jury was already empaneled.
Thus, trial counsel did not breach an essential duty by not moving for a change of
venue, which ends our analysis on this claim.
B. Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
Next, Shoemaker asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to testimony about the crimes to which Shoemaker had already pled guilty
specifically counts involving his theft of the red Dodge Ram Shoemaker was driving
until he stole the garbage truck, damage he inflicted on other property, and his
actions towards Katie. Trial counsel moved in limine to exclude much of this 12
evidence. But trial counsel and the prosecutor entered into an agreement about
what could be discussed. Part of Shoemaker’s criminal spree occurred on
September 24 and then ended on September 25. So, trial counsel believed most
of the testimony and evidence developed at trial was likely admissible under the
inextricably-linked doctrine, as “other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence that is
inextricably intertwined with the crime charged is not extrinsic evidence but, rather,
intrinsic evidence that is inseparable from the crime charged.” State v. Nelson,
791 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Iowa 2010). That inextricably-linked evidence is admissible
“based on a special relationship between this evidence and the charged crime”
and because it provides the jury with context for the charged crime and is not
subject to the prohibition of such evidence in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b). Id.
at 420–21. Put another way, Iowa courts may “allow such evidence to complete
the story of what happened when the other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence is so
closely related in time and place and so intimately connected to the crime charged
that it forms a continuous transaction.” Id.; see also State v. Harrington,
No. 11-0646, 2013 WL 1749911, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding
evidence from a few hours earlier than the charged crimes was admissible
because it “formed a continuous transaction”).
As the State argued in its brief, “[s]evering any discussion of the prior counts
would have required the State to present an eye-opening tale—that on
September 25 after simply observing Shoemaker’s vehicle, Davenport police
disregarded their policy of non-pursuit to chase Shoemaker at high speeds for an
undisclosed reason.” Evidence of Shoemaker’s ramming the stolen Dodge Ram
into vehicles along with his threats towards Katie provided the jury with context for 13
why law enforcement was pursuing him and why his ramming the garbage truck
into the service vehicle was not an accident. Trial counsel limited testimony
knowing the other evidence of Shoemaker’s actions was most likely admissible
and he would have had limited success in objecting to it. “Counsel is not required
to make meritless objections.” Kirkland v. State, No. 16-0642, 2017 WL 4049321,
at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017).
And under trial counsel’s strategy, some of the otherwise admissible
evidence was not presented to the jury pursuant to agreement with the State to
minimize the full extent of Shoemaker’s crime spree. The PCR court saw this
same tension and the benefit of trial counsel’s strategy:
[Trial counsel] and Shoemaker were between a rock and a hard place when it came to the State’s case. Either they contest all the charges and allow the State to present their case in its entirety, or they plead guilty to some offenses and attempt to limit the State’s presentation through agreement. If [trial counsel] and Shoemaker had chosen to contest all of the charges, their defense centered on intent would have likely been lost on the jury as they listened to Shoemaker’s crime spree. That said, by employing the strategy that they did, and acknowledging wrongdoing, there was hope that the jury’s focus could turn to the issue of intent and mitigate some of the damage. Simply because this tactic did not succeed does not make it a poor strategy given the facts of this case.
Thus, Shoemaker has failed to demonstrate the breach of duty necessary for
ineffective assistance on this claim.
C. Theft Admission.
As the PCR court noted, Shoemaker and his trial counsel made a strategic
decision to admit to third-degree robbery at trial “to direct the jury to a lesser-
included offense” under the charge of first-degree robbery. That meant
Shoemaker admitted he committed a theft of the garbage truck. But Shoemaker 14
now claims that his trial counsel should not have counseled him to admit to a theft.
Instead, he argues trial counsel should have both moved for a judgment of acquittal
on the robbery charge and submitted jury instructions on theft and on operating
vehicle without owner’s consent. Shoemaker maintains the State could not show
he took the garbage truck with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
vehicle, urging he simply took it without the owner’s consent, an offense separate
and distinct from a theft.
As for the duty to move for judgment of acquittal to challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence before the district court submits a criminal case to the jury, to do
so here would have been unsuccessful. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(8)(a); State v.
Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2010). First, the evidence of a theft with intent
to deprive the owner of the vehicle was overwhelming. Shoemaker drove
erratically, avoided spike strips by driving off of the road, and—as the investigator
testified—made no evasive maneuvers before slamming into the police vehicle.
The reckless operation of a get-away vehicle can satisfy the intent element of theft.
In State v. Miller, under similar facts, we found substantial evidence to
support a charge of theft rather than operating a vehicle without owner’s consent.
No. 16-2110, 2018 WL 1099580, at *6–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018) (requiring
an examination of the record for facts and circumstances supporting the inference
that the defendant intended to permanently deprive the owners of the trucks).
Compare Iowa Code § 714.1(1) (theft), with id. § 714.7 (operating vehicle without
owner’s consent). We so held because Miller had committed other crimes prior to
stealing the vehicle, “took [the] vehicle in the owner’s physical presence and
against his obvious wishes,” and “fled on foot and seized a second getaway 15
vehicle” after crashing the first. Miller, 2018 WL 1099580, at *5. And, ultimately,
because Miller “disposed of the [vehicle] in a manner that made it unlikely [its]
owner[] would recover [it] with any remaining economic value” we concluded that
a jury could have found that he had intent to permanently deprive the owner of the
vehicle. Id. at *7. Thus, the trial court would not have granted a judgment on
acquittal under these facts. Intent to commit a theft is also part of a robbery charge.
See Iowa Code § 711.1(1). Because trial counsel was unlikely to succeed on a
motion for judgment of acquittal on the robbery charge as there was evidence of
intent to commit a theft, it was not deficient performance to fail to do so.
Similarly, admitting to elements of lesser charges to limit the likelihood that
the jury would find a defendant guilty of the original charges and to build credibility
with the jury is a legitimate trial strategy. See, e.g., Pettes v. State, 418 N.W.2d
53, 56 (Iowa 1988); Brown v. State, No. 14-1646, 2016 WL 351459, at *4–5, *9–
10 (finding no breach of duty despite counsel stating that the defendant was guilty
during opening statements and a bad man and guilty of a couple of crimes during
closing statements because doing so was a trial strategy that fell within normal
competency). Trial counsel explained that as part of the trial strategy developed
with Shoemaker, Shoemaker agreed to plead guilty to the theft of the garbage truck
to bolster Shoemaker’s credibility. The goal was for Shoemaker to gain credibility
so that the jury would give more credence to his assertion he had no intent to
attempt to cause a death or serious injury. This is a strategy that falls within the
normal range of competency. See Krogmann, 914 N.W.2d at 306. Under these
facts, we find this strategy to be reasonable. See Brown, 2016 WL 351459, at *9–
10. There was no breach of duty of trial counsel on this theory. 16
Finally, regarding Shoemaker’s robbery charge and his claim involving jury
instructions, trial counsel was not required to submit jury instructions for theft as it
is not a lesser-included charge of robbery. See McCullough v. State, No. 12-1028,
2013 WL 5760582, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2013) (“Theft is not a lesser-
included offense of robbery, since theft requires an element of taking, an element
not needed to constitute robbery.”). The same is true for an instruction on
operating vehicle without owner’s consent. Id. (“[W]hile operating without the
owner’s consent is a lesser-included offense of theft, it is not a lesser-included
offense of robbery. . . . A theft instruction was not given to the jury. Consequently,
[the defendant] was not entitled to a[n] operating without owner’s consent
instruction.”). Therefore, we find Shoemaker failed to establish trial counsel
breached a duty; this claim fails.
D. Intoxication Defense.
Lastly, Shoemaker asserts that his trial counsel should have investigated a
defense of diminished responsibility or intoxication which, in his opinion, would
have required hiring an expert.. See Iowa Code § 701.5 (defining the intoxication
defense); State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 1981) (defining the
diminished responsibility defense as “where an accused, because of a limited
capacity to think, is unable to form a necessary criminal intent”). And at the PCR
trial, Shoemaker called a witness, Dr. James O’Donnell, a pharmacology and
toxicology expert. But O’Donnell only read Shoemaker’s testimony from the trial,
never interviewed him, and did not view the video evidence of the events, so he
did not have a basis to dispute trial counsel’s opinion of the specific intent
Shoemaker exhibited during the video footage. O’Donnell conceded that 17
Shoemaker’s actions evidenced his specific intent to steal the vehicles and try and
escape, albeit with the goal of seeking more methamphetamine. And to that point,
O’Donnell was unable to dispute trial counsel’s observations of Shoemaker’s
intentional conduct revealed in the law enforcement videos. Thus, Shoemaker
failed to demonstrate how an earlier investigation by a different expert might have
led to the submission of either of these defenses at trial.
Even so, to prevail under an intoxication defense, a defendant must
demonstrate that they were “incapable of formulating or possessing the specific
intent to commit the crime.” State v. Guerrero Cordero, 861 N.W.2d 253, 261 (Iowa
2015), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699,
708 (Iowa 2016). “[D]iminished responsibility may be offered as a defense where
an accused, because of a limited capacity to think, is unable to form a necessary
criminal intent.” Collins, 305 N.W.2d at 436. They are not defenses to general
intent crimes. Guerrero Cordero, 861 N.W.2d at 259. “[I]ntent required by the
statute ‘may be inferred from the defendant’s actions and circumstances of the
transaction . . . .’” State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2006) (quoting 21
Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 128, at 214-15 (1998)). Shoemaker’s trial counsel was
not required to assert meritless defenses. See State v. Brothern, 832 N.W.2d 187,
192 (Iowa 2013); Powell v. State, No. 18-0542, 2019 WL 2524264, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. June 19, 2019). The PCR court noted that trial counsel explored these
defenses with Shoemaker, but counsel felt the evidence of Shoemaker’s intent
precluded their use. Recognizing Shoemaker’s judgment might have been
impaired, trial counsel explained why he did not pursue the intoxication defense: 18
The intoxication defense wouldn’t be applicable. Intoxication is only a defense if it prevents someone from being capable of forming a specific intent to commit a crime. It was very apparent from factual circumstances of the case that Mr. Shoemaker was able to form specific intent for a bunch of things. He was making conscious choices.
At trial, video evidence supported Shoemaker’s ability to complete his crime spree,
even maneuvering the large garbage truck around vehicles and spike strips.
Likewise, Shoemaker admitted to having the intent to commit a theft and the intent
to elude law enforcement. Furthermore, threatening the garbage truck driver and
driving the garbage truck towards Chief Behning without applying its brakes also
demonstrated specific intent to cause harm. See Shoemaker, 2019 WL 5067177
at *3; see also Troupe v. State, No. 15-0678, 2016 WL 1681728, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. Apr. 27, 2016) (finding testimony at trial did not support intoxication defense
given the intent that could be inferred from defendant’s actions). Finding no legal
justification for the assertion of either diminished responsibility or intoxication
defenses, Shoemaker’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to try to assert
those at trial.
IV. Conclusion.
Shoemaker did not meet his burden to prove a breach of duty and prejudice.
Because we find that trial counsel was not required to bring meritless motions for
a change of venue or judgment of acquittal, object to evidence that was inextricably
linked with other admissible evidence, or to jury instructions not supported by
caselaw, we affirm the PCR court’s denial of these ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claims.