Loftin v. Smith

126 F.2d 514, 29 C.C.P.A. 921, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 63, 1942 CCPA LEXIS 37
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMarch 23, 1942
DocketNo. 4584
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 126 F.2d 514 (Loftin v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Loftin v. Smith, 126 F.2d 514, 29 C.C.P.A. 921, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 63, 1942 CCPA LEXIS 37 (ccpa 1942).

Opinion

Bland, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal in a United States Patent Office interference proceeding.

The interference was declared on claims 1 and 3 to 11, inclusive, of Tubb’s patent 1,977,536, issued October 16, 1934, upon an application filed November 25; 1932, said claims in said Tubbs patent having been copied in an application of Smith which was filed January 31, 1933. Loftin is Tubbs’ assignee and appeared pro se in this court.

The Examiner of Interferences awarded priority of all the counts in issue, 1 to 10, inclusive, to the junior party Smith, and upon appeal to the Board of Appeals his decision was affirmed. From the decision of the board, appellant has here appealed.

The invention involved may be fairly well understood from a reading of the counts. The Examiner of Interferences described -it as follows:

[922]*922This intereference reflates to a modulation system including an electron discharge device having at least five electrodes, i. e., a cathode, three grids and an anode. The inner grid has impressed upon it a negative bias and an alternating current, the intermediate grid has impressed upon it a positive potential and the outer grid has impressed upon it an alternating current and a negative bias of such magnitude that the grid can not swing positive even at the peak of the positive portion of the cycle of the impressed alternating current thus substantially no electrons are drawn from the electron stream and fidelity of modulation is thereby enhanced. The system is used particularly in superheterodyne radio receivers in which the alternating current'signal is impressed on one grid and the alternating current from a local oscillator is impressed on another grid to produce an intermediate frequency in the plate circuit. * * *

Count 1 is illustrative of the subject matter of all the counts and follows:

1. In an electrical system the combination of a continuous electron discharge path comprising an electron emitting cathode and a positively energized anode, a plurality of negatively energized electrodes spaced between said cathode and anode and electro-statically isolated from each other by an electrode interposed therebetween, a plurality of sources of oscillations, and means for impressing different ones of said oscillations upon different ones of said negatively energized electrodes, the negative energizing of a one of said electrodes between said interposed electrode and said anode being so proportioned that substantially no current is thereby drawn from said electron discharge path during operation, whereby fidelity of operation is enhanced.

Both parties took testimony. The party Smith was an employee of the RCA Victor Company and worked under one Loughren. Smith was directed to carry out certain experiments in developing a detector oscillator after Smith had discovered that a pentode tube could be successfully operated with a negative potential on the outer grid. Hollands, an employee of the RCA Manufacturing Company, Radiotron Division, testified to the testing of the tubes prepared by Smith.

The Examiner of Interferences and the Board of Appeals gave Smith a date for reduction to practice of the involved invention “by December 29, 1981.” Smith claims an earlier date, but in view of our conclusion that Tubbs is entitled to no earlier date, it is not necessary to consider the activities of Smith prior to December 29,1931.

The said reduction to practice date of Smith is challenged by Tubbs, chiefly in that he contends that Smith is not the real inventor and that others working with him are entitled to the credit. Both tribunals below correctly held that this contention was untenable. The courts have frequently said that in an interference proceeding of this character it avails nothing for one of the contestants to. contend that the other party is not the real inventor, and that the [923]*923invention was made by 'a third party. Raymond et al. v. Wickersham, 27 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1079, 110 F. (2d) 863, and authorities therein cited.

The Examiner of Interferences rendered his first decision awarding priority to Smith on February 23, 1938. Appellant appealed to the'board, and the board rendered its decision affirming that of the examiner on August- 4, 1939. Although all the facts are not found in the record, it appears that Tubbs, after the board’s first decision, successfully petitioned the commissioner to direct that the case be remanded to the examiner for the purpose, of introducing additional evidence ■ relevant to priority. The deposition of one Gerald J. Kelley was then introduced-. The Examiner of Interferences held in a second decision, July 23, 1940, that the additional evidence did not change the situation from that which existed at the time the Board of Appeals affirmed his prior decision, and he again awarded priority of invention in the counts to Smith. Upon appeal to the board, it, in its second decision, February 10, 1941, came to the conclusion that “there is nothing in the new evidence submitted by Tubbs to disturb this holding” (referring to its prior holding).

We have examined the Smith record with care and find that he is entitled to a date for reduction to practice of the invention involved at least as early as that found by the tribunals below, December 29, 1931. The evidence is discussed in the concurring decisions of the tribunals below, and it will serve no useful purpose to repeat the same facts and conclusions here.

We will proceed to consider the contentions and proof of Tubbs. Tubbs claims to have- afforded proof that he introduced the invention into this country in 1930. He claims to have made the invention in Denmark in April 1928, and disclosed it by letter and accompanying ■ diagrams (Exhibit 4) to his friend, Emil W. Dinga, in this country,, and that said Exhibit 4 is evidence of such disclosure. As evidence of disclosure, Tubbs also relies on Exhibit 1, which is a page from his notebook.

We have examined these exhibits and agree with the tribunals below that they do not afford evidence of a disclosure of the invention of the counts to Dinga. There is some discrepancy between the dates of disclosure alleged by Tubbs and those testified to by Dinga. Tubbs disclosed the invention to Loftin in 1932, and Tubbs here argues that he made the same disclosure to Dinga on the earlier date. The record does not sustain this contention. However, assuming that Tubbs is entitled to the earlier date contended for, for conception and disclosure of the invention of the involved counts, [924]*924we agree with the findings of the tribunals below that there is no diligence shown, which can be accepted here on the part of Tubbs, at the critical time during 1931 when Smith entered the field.

Tubbs alleged in his preliminary statement the following:

That the invention was introduced into the United States by deponent at tbe time of bis arrival therein at New York, state of New York, sometime during the first half of the month of August in the year 1930; that deponent made a drawing and accompanying brief description in a notebook of deponent’s on or about April 11, 1932, in the city of New York, and state of New York, and, at the same time, disclosed the invention to one Emil W. Dinga in the city of New York, state of New York; that at about the same time deponent begem actively exercising reasonable diligence

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Related

Loftin v. RCA Mfg. Co.
53 F. Supp. 519 (D. Delaware, 1943)

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Bluebook (online)
126 F.2d 514, 29 C.C.P.A. 921, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 63, 1942 CCPA LEXIS 37, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/loftin-v-smith-ccpa-1942.