Locker v. ICAO

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0772
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0772 Locker v ICAO 09-04-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0772 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 3350-2025

Jamil Locker,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN* Román, C.J., and Graham*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 4, 2025

Jamil Locker, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this unemployment compensation benefits case, claimant,

Jamil Locker, appeals a determination that he was not eligible for

benefits. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Locker filed for unemployment compensation benefits after

separating from his employer. In December 2024, a deputy for the

Division of Unemployment Insurance determined that Locker was

not eligible for benefits under section 8-73-107(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2025.

That section provides that individuals are eligible to receive benefits

only if they are able to work and available for all suitable work.

¶3 Locker requested a hearing, asserting that he was unable to

work because he was injured on the job. At the hearing, Locker

testified that he reported a hernia and right hip strain to his

employer on August 10, 2024, and, consequently, was unable to

continue working. He described his position as a traffic control

supervisor responsible for blocking off streets, putting up signs, and

setting up cones. He filed a worker’s compensation claim, but

testified that the claim was denied. (The record does not indicate

whether Locker appealed that denial.)

1 ¶4 The hearing officer asked Locker whether he had gotten any

better since August, or done any work with any employer, and

Locker replied, “No.” Locker testified that he could only do “light

duty” work and that nobody wanted to hire “somebody who can

only do light duty.” When asked if he had sought work in other

fields, Locker responded that he had “put in an application last

week” for a phlebotomist position, because he had a phlebotomy

background.

¶5 The hearing officer affirmed the deputy’s determination and

disallowed benefits. Locker appealed to the Industrial Claim

Appeals Office (the Panel), which affirmed. The Panel noted that

Locker’s only argument was that he had been “searching for work in

the fields that [were] close to” his pay grade, and that he was going

to “start looking for work that is under my pay grade since I have

certain work restrictions.” The Panel determined that Locker had

“made no argument explaining why the hearing officer erred.”

II. Standard of Review

¶6 We are bound by the hearing officer’s and the Panel’s findings

of fact that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 CO

2 78, ¶ 17, 396 P.3d 1114, 1118. As relevant here, we may set aside

a Panel’s determination only if the findings of fact do not support

the decision or the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. See

§ 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d), C.R.S. 2025.

III. Analysis

¶7 Locker, representing himself on appeal, asserts that the Panel

“did not look at his case in totality.” He notes that he wanted to

continue working with his employer, but was unable to do so, and

that he has “made strides in looking for work in other fields.” After

reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the hearing officer and

the Panel correctly applied the applicable statute and regulations.

¶8 A worker is eligible to receive unemployment compensation

benefits only if the worker is able to work and is available for “all

work deemed suitable pursuant to the provisions of section

8-73-108, [C.R.S. 2025].” § 8-73-107(1)(c)(I). Section

8-73-108(1)(a) provides that “each eligible individual who is

unemployed through no fault of his own shall be entitled to receive

a full award of benefits.” (Emphasis added.) See also McClaflin v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 126 P.3d 288, 290 (Colo. App. 2005)

3 (holding that a claimant failed to establish eligibility for benefits

because she did not actively seek work).

¶9 Additionally, under the applicable regulations, a claimant

must be “physically and mentally capable of performing the usual

duties of his or her customary occupation or the usual duties of

other suitable work for which he or she is reasonably qualified.”

Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 2.8.2, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. The

burden of establishing the ability to work is on the claimant. Id.

Claimants shall be considered “available for work” only if they are

ready and willing to accept suitable work without any restrictions,

either self-imposed or created by other circumstances, that prevent

accepting suitable work. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp. Reg. 2.8.3, 7 Code

Colo. Regs. 1101-2. A determination of a claimant’s availability for

work “must be made within the context of the factual situation

presented by each case.” Hoskins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.,

2014 COA 47, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 356, 357 (internal quotation omitted).

¶ 10 At the hearing, Locker tried to introduce an email from his

employer in October 2024 that he was terminated because he was

“not cleared for work.” The hearing officer told him to “keep that

email for a job separation adjudication if needed, but it is not

4 needed for this limited hearing on eligibility,” and “if you haven’t

already heard from the Division on the separation itself, then you

may need to tell them that information.”

¶ 11 The applicable statutory scheme makes a distinction between

entitlement issues and eligibility issues. Debalco Enter., Inc. v.

Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 32 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2001).

Entitlement issues involve the reason for a claimant’s separation

from employment with a particular employer. Id. Eligibility issues

involve other prerequisites to the receipt of unemployment

compensation benefits and are governed by different statutory

provisions, including whether a claimant is able to work and

actively seeking employment. Id. Because entitlement and

eligibility issues are different and are determined in separate

proceedings, the issues should not be intermingled. Id.

¶ 12 Our review is limited to the decisions of the hearing officer and

the Panel concerning whether Locker satisfied the “able and

available” eligibility requirements of section 8-73-107. We discern

no error in the determination that Locker was not able or available

for work due to an ongoing medical condition. Both the hearing

officer and the Panel acknowledged that Locker had applied for

5 work in a different field, but found “insufficient persuasive

evidence” that Locker had “skills in other industries.”

¶ 13 The hearing officer and the Panel were required to apply the

plain language of the statute and applicable regulations. See Dep’t

of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 25, 441 P.3d 1012,

1018 (when a regulation’s language is clear and unambiguous, it

must be applied as written). Because we ultimately find that the

Panel’s affirmance of the hearing officer’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence and not erroneous, we must affirm the Panel’s

decision. (The record does not indicate whether Locker was

subsequently not limited to light work and, therefore, might have

been eligible for unemployment compensation benefits for a later

period.)

IV. Disposition

¶ 14 The Panel’s order is affirmed.

CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.