MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COBB, District Judge.
THE FACTS
Plaintiff International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2286 (the Union) and Defendant Gulf States Utilities Compa[778]*778ny (the Company) have filed cross motions for summary judgment. This lawsuit is before the court because the parties cannot agree on the meaning of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (Agreement). The conduct giving rise to this lawsuit first occurred sometime in 1985 and continues to the present time at the Company’s River Bend Nuclear Plant in St. Francisville, Louisiana. The Union asserts that the Company breached the Agreement by doing two things: first, assigning the lead Radiation Protection Technician, a Union employee, the task of doling out daily work assignments to other technicians; and second, assigning that same lead Radiation Technician the task of acting as gatekeeper to “very high radiation areas” in the nuclear plant. (Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 3)
The Union claims that Radiation Technicians may be required to perform only the tasks that are spelled-out in the “Job Qualification” sheets (referred to by the parties as the “Bluebook” and incorporated into the Agreement by Article X thereof) for such employees and that the Agreement was broken when the Company required the lead Radiation Technician to do a job not spelled-out in that sheet. The Union further claims that the gatekeeping task is supervisory, i.e. non-union.
The Company counters with two arguments: first, that Article II of the Agreement, entitled “Management Rights”, vests the Company with broad discretion concerning work assignments; and second, that the “Job Qualifications” contained in the Bluebook are not job descriptions. That is, the Company asserts that the “Job Qualification” sheets contain only the minimum of tasks which an employee may be called upon to perform; that the words of the “Bluebook” are not meant as outer limits on what a Union employee may be asked to do at the nuclear plant.
The parties have not arbitrated this dispute because their Agreement does not allow arbitration of this issue.1
The parties have, however, exhausted the grievance process outlined in the Agreement. The grievance process resulted in a decision by the Company that its actions were a valid exercise of management’s rights. Now the parties have entrusted this court with the task of interpreting their Agreement. To aid the reader, the remaining pertinent and illustrative provisions of the Agreement and the Bluebook are reproduced in the margin.2
[779]*779THE LAW
This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Personal jurisdiction and venue are not contested. This court notes that venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c). Summary judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Collective bargaining agreements should be interpreted based on their plain and literal meaning so as to avoid interference with the private bargain. N.L.R.B. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 345, 353 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081, 103 S.Ct. 1768, 76 L.Ed.2d 342 (1983). When interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, a court should first look to the explicit language of the document for clear manifestations of intent. International Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 1002, 79 L.Ed.2d 234 (1984).3 First, the court finds the language used in the management rights clause of the Agreement (Article II) extremely clear and unambiguous (note court’s emphasis therein) and that the Agreement contains, in Article XVI, an express “integration” or “merger” clause. The management rights clause endows the Company with broad and sweeping authority to assign Union workers as it sees “necessary or expedient.” According to the same article of the Agreement, the discretion of the Company can only be limited or modified by “specific [780]*780written terms or provisions of [the] Agreement.”
Second, the court finds that the “Blue-book” or “Job Qualifications” are not modifications of or limitations on the broad and sweeping authority of the Company to assign workers. The language in the Blue-book is also clear and unambiguous. Nowhere in the Bluebook provisions filed with this court does there appear any language that would support the Union’s position that the “Job Qualifications” are actually “job descriptions.” For instance, the provisions are entitled “Qualifications” and the word “qualifications” is used throughout. Nowhere in the Agreement do the words “job” and “description” appear together. The words that do appear together include: “must meet the following general qualifications”; “be willing ... to help”; “have the formal or informal education”; “must be able to perform”; “be capable of”; etc. In short, these words express the minimum, and not outer limits on what Union employees of the job category at issue can be expected to perform.
Thus, when the Company chose to assign a Union employee to perform the gatekeep-ing tasks outlined above, it was acting fully within the express and unambiguous parameters of the Agreement. No contract has been broken here.
The Union has cited to the court three published Labor Arbitration decisions. The court finds these materials unpersuasive for the following reasons. First, according to the Agreement, arbitration cannot be employed to settle this dispute. So, why should this court be persuaded by the decisions of arbitrators in other, unrelated disputes? Second, as a matter of law, labor arbitration decisions are not binding precedent on a United States District Court, although they may serve as reliable indicators of the state of the common law of industrial relations. See Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 709 F.2d at 918 n. 2; N.L.R.B. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 688 F.2d at 352 n. 8. Finally, and most significantly, the decisions cited by the Union are simply not on point.
Allied Plant Maintenance, 88 LA 963 (1987) involved a collective bargaining agreement wherein a particular class of workers was endowed with “overall responsibility” for performing their particular type of tasks. Such limiting language does not appear in the Agreement or Bluebook in the instant matter. Some language in Allied Plant Maintenance is, however, instructive.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
COBB, District Judge.
THE FACTS
Plaintiff International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2286 (the Union) and Defendant Gulf States Utilities Compa[778]*778ny (the Company) have filed cross motions for summary judgment. This lawsuit is before the court because the parties cannot agree on the meaning of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (Agreement). The conduct giving rise to this lawsuit first occurred sometime in 1985 and continues to the present time at the Company’s River Bend Nuclear Plant in St. Francisville, Louisiana. The Union asserts that the Company breached the Agreement by doing two things: first, assigning the lead Radiation Protection Technician, a Union employee, the task of doling out daily work assignments to other technicians; and second, assigning that same lead Radiation Technician the task of acting as gatekeeper to “very high radiation areas” in the nuclear plant. (Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 3)
The Union claims that Radiation Technicians may be required to perform only the tasks that are spelled-out in the “Job Qualification” sheets (referred to by the parties as the “Bluebook” and incorporated into the Agreement by Article X thereof) for such employees and that the Agreement was broken when the Company required the lead Radiation Technician to do a job not spelled-out in that sheet. The Union further claims that the gatekeeping task is supervisory, i.e. non-union.
The Company counters with two arguments: first, that Article II of the Agreement, entitled “Management Rights”, vests the Company with broad discretion concerning work assignments; and second, that the “Job Qualifications” contained in the Bluebook are not job descriptions. That is, the Company asserts that the “Job Qualification” sheets contain only the minimum of tasks which an employee may be called upon to perform; that the words of the “Bluebook” are not meant as outer limits on what a Union employee may be asked to do at the nuclear plant.
The parties have not arbitrated this dispute because their Agreement does not allow arbitration of this issue.1
The parties have, however, exhausted the grievance process outlined in the Agreement. The grievance process resulted in a decision by the Company that its actions were a valid exercise of management’s rights. Now the parties have entrusted this court with the task of interpreting their Agreement. To aid the reader, the remaining pertinent and illustrative provisions of the Agreement and the Bluebook are reproduced in the margin.2
[779]*779THE LAW
This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Personal jurisdiction and venue are not contested. This court notes that venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c). Summary judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Collective bargaining agreements should be interpreted based on their plain and literal meaning so as to avoid interference with the private bargain. N.L.R.B. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 345, 353 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081, 103 S.Ct. 1768, 76 L.Ed.2d 342 (1983). When interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, a court should first look to the explicit language of the document for clear manifestations of intent. International Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 1002, 79 L.Ed.2d 234 (1984).3 First, the court finds the language used in the management rights clause of the Agreement (Article II) extremely clear and unambiguous (note court’s emphasis therein) and that the Agreement contains, in Article XVI, an express “integration” or “merger” clause. The management rights clause endows the Company with broad and sweeping authority to assign Union workers as it sees “necessary or expedient.” According to the same article of the Agreement, the discretion of the Company can only be limited or modified by “specific [780]*780written terms or provisions of [the] Agreement.”
Second, the court finds that the “Blue-book” or “Job Qualifications” are not modifications of or limitations on the broad and sweeping authority of the Company to assign workers. The language in the Blue-book is also clear and unambiguous. Nowhere in the Bluebook provisions filed with this court does there appear any language that would support the Union’s position that the “Job Qualifications” are actually “job descriptions.” For instance, the provisions are entitled “Qualifications” and the word “qualifications” is used throughout. Nowhere in the Agreement do the words “job” and “description” appear together. The words that do appear together include: “must meet the following general qualifications”; “be willing ... to help”; “have the formal or informal education”; “must be able to perform”; “be capable of”; etc. In short, these words express the minimum, and not outer limits on what Union employees of the job category at issue can be expected to perform.
Thus, when the Company chose to assign a Union employee to perform the gatekeep-ing tasks outlined above, it was acting fully within the express and unambiguous parameters of the Agreement. No contract has been broken here.
The Union has cited to the court three published Labor Arbitration decisions. The court finds these materials unpersuasive for the following reasons. First, according to the Agreement, arbitration cannot be employed to settle this dispute. So, why should this court be persuaded by the decisions of arbitrators in other, unrelated disputes? Second, as a matter of law, labor arbitration decisions are not binding precedent on a United States District Court, although they may serve as reliable indicators of the state of the common law of industrial relations. See Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 709 F.2d at 918 n. 2; N.L.R.B. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 688 F.2d at 352 n. 8. Finally, and most significantly, the decisions cited by the Union are simply not on point.
Allied Plant Maintenance, 88 LA 963 (1987) involved a collective bargaining agreement wherein a particular class of workers was endowed with “overall responsibility” for performing their particular type of tasks. Such limiting language does not appear in the Agreement or Bluebook in the instant matter. Some language in Allied Plant Maintenance is, however, instructive. Therein, the arbitrator quotes one of his colleagues as stating: “[a]n arbitrator cannot ignore clear-cut contractual language”, nor may he “legislate new language, since to do so would usurp the role of the labor organization and the employer.” In this sense the court is cast as an arbitrator and refuses to ignore clear-cut language and refuses to usurp the role of the parties to this dispute when they negotiated the agreement now before this court.
Amax Coal Co., 82 LA 846, the second arbitration case cited by the Union, is similarly off the mark. That case involved a collective bargaining agreement with work classification clauses far more burdensome on the employer than the Agreement at issue herein. The arbitrator’s decision in that case is therefore unpersuasive to this court.
The last arbitration case cited by the Union is United States Steel Corp., 82 LA 910 (1984). The arbitrator sided with the union in that case. It seems the Union is citing cases about apples to support a case about oranges. The facts are simply too different for the case to be helpful to the Union’s position. In United States Steel Corp. all parties agreed that the collective bargaining agreement contained “job descriptions.” (emphasis added) And the language of the job descriptions in that case was very restrictive, imposing affirmative obligations on the employer, unlike the open-ended wording of the job classifications agreed to by the Union and the Company in this case.
The court notes, however, that after undertaking its own research into the interesting world of arbitration decisions it has uncovered many decisions which buttress the Company’s and this court’s position today. See, e.g. Western Fuels, 1988 BNA [781]*781Unp. LA LEXIS 5055 and Assoc. Electric Cooperative, 84 LA 1020 (1984). The court declines to analyze factually these decisions. Perhaps too much has already been written. This is a clear-cut dispute concerning clear-cut contract language.
Finally, the Company has also moved for recovery of costs and attorney’s fees. The L.M.R.A. does not expressly allow for awards of costs or attorney’s fees. And, the general rule in the United States of America is that each party bears his own costs and attorney’s fees, absent a statutory grant. General Tel. Co. v. I.B.E.W., Local 89, 554 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir.1977). Since the court does not believe that either litigant pursued its claim in bad faith, a sanction in the form of an award of costs or attorney’s fees is unwarranted. Id.
In summary, no breach of the collective bargaining agreement having occurred as a matter of law, Defendant Gulf States Utilities Company’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and Plaintiff I.B.E.W., Local 2286’s cross motion for summary judgment, including its motion for a permanent injunction, is hereby DENIED. Each party is to bear its own costs and attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.