Lobello v. Lobello

2025 IL App (1st) 232412-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: 1-23-2412
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 232412-U Order filed: March 20, 2025

FIRST DISTRICT FOURTH DIVISION

No. 1-23-2412

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

VICTOR LOBELLO, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 22 M1 109179 ) DOMENICO LOBELLO, ) Honorable ) Maire Aileen Dempsey, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Lyle concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of defendant on his counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.

¶2 Plaintiff, Victor Lobello, filed a complaint for breach of contract against his brother,

defendant Domenico Lobello. Plaintiff alleged that he entered into a contract to purchase

defendant’s Honda Accord and that plaintiff made all the required payments under the contract.

Defendant allegedly breached the contract by refusing to give plaintiff title to the vehicle.

Defendant filed four counterclaims. In the first counterclaim, defendant alleged that he loaned

plaintiff $5,000 to help him pay off a car loan on a Ford Focus, with the agreement that plaintiff

would pay him back after selling the vehicle. Plaintiff subsequently sold the Ford Focus but No. 1-23-2412

breached his agreement with defendant by failing to pay back the car loan. In the second

counterclaim, defendant sought repayment of the car loan under a theory of unjust enrichment. In

the third counterclaim, defendant alleged that he made a $7,000 loan to plaintiff in April or May

2020 to make home repairs with the agreement that plaintiff would repay him in three years.

Plaintiff breached the agreement by failing to repay him. In the fourth counterclaim, defendant

sought repayment of the home repair loan under a theory of unjust enrichment.

¶3 The cause proceeded to a bench trial, after which the court entered judgment in plaintiff’s

favor on his complaint for breach of contract and ordered defendant to provide plaintiff with the

title to the Honda Accord within 10 days. The court also entered judgment for defendant on his

counterclaims in the amount of $5,295. Plaintiff appeals the $5,295 judgment rendered against him

on defendant’s counterclaims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶4 There is no transcript of the bench trial, but we granted plaintiff’s motion to file an agreed

statement of facts pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). According

to the agreed statement of facts, plaintiff testified that in 2018 he and his wife, Cynthia, agreed to

buy defendant’s Honda Accord for $11,000. Also in 2018, defendant loaned plaintiff $6,100 to

pay off a car loan on a Ford Focus.

¶5 Plaintiff identified Exhibit 3 as a handwritten ledger drafted by defendant on an

unidentified date showing that plaintiff owed defendant $17,100 for both the Honda Accord and

the car loan for the Ford Focus, as well as an additional $775 for unidentified home costs, $380

for new tires for the Ford Focus, and $102 for a City of Chicago sticker for the Honda. Exhibit 3

reflected that plaintiff made various payments to defendant in October and November 2018

reducing the amount owed to $17,045. Exhibit 5 is a handwritten ledger reflecting that plaintiff

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made four $200 payments to defendant from December 2018 to February 2019, further reducing

the total amount owed as of February 7, 2019, to $16,245.

¶6 Plaintiff identified Exhibit 7 as a ledger drafted by plaintiff on an unidentified date showing

that he made $1,800 in total payments to defendant from February 18, 2019, to July 14, 2019,

reducing the total owed to $14,445.

¶7 Plaintiff identified Exhibit 1 as the only written agreement between the parties. Exhibit 1

was dated July 14, 2019, and stated that as of that date plaintiff owed defendant $10,950, to be

repaid by making $200 payments twice per month. In the event the monthly payment was more

than five days late, defendant had the option of terminating the agreement, in which case “the

Honda Accord is to be returned” to defendant within 10 days.

¶8 Plaintiff testified to his understanding that Exhibit 1 memorialized multiple different

agreements, specifically, the agreement to purchase the Honda Accord and the agreement to repay

defendant for the car loan for the Ford Focus, as well as agreements to repay defendant for various

miscellaneous items including $775 in home costs, $300 for tires, and $102 for a City sticker for

the Honda. According to plaintiff, Exhibit 1 shows that the total amount plaintiff owed defendant

as of July 14, 2019, for both the sale of the Honda Accord and the Ford Focus loan and the other

miscellaneous items was $10,950. Plaintiff testified that he subsequently sold the Ford Focus to a

third party for $4,500 but that he did not give any of those proceeds to defendant to repay him for

the loan.

¶9 Plaintiff testified that he later paid defendant the $10,950 he owed on both the purchase of

the Honda and the car loan for the Ford Focus and the other miscellaneous items. Plaintiff

identified Exhibit 6 as a handwritten ledger showing that he made the final two payments in the

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amounts of $3,375 and $3,337.50, leaving a balance of $0. Plaintiff identified defendant’s initials

(dated 5/16/2020) next to the words “Pd. Full.”

¶ 10 Defendant testified that he initialed “Pd. Full” on the last entry on Exhibit 6, but that

plaintiff still owed him $300 or $600 more for the Ford Focus loan.

¶ 11 Defendant further testified that he loaned plaintiff $7,000 in April or May 2020 for home

repairs. The loan allegedly was made through an intra-bank transfer, but defendant had no

documentation from the bank showing that such a transfer was made. Plaintiff testified that he

never borrowed $7,000 from defendant for home repairs.

¶ 12 During cross-examination, defendant asked plaintiff about Exhibit 2, a written ledger

indicating that defendant made a loan of $1,960 to plaintiff for window installation in December

2018. Plaintiff testified that he never signed Exhibit 2.

¶ 13 On June 28, 2023, the circuit court entered an order finding that Exhibit 1 (the July 14,

2019, written agreement) memorialized defendant’s sale of the Honda Accord to plaintiff and that

as of July 14, 2019, plaintiff owed defendant $10,950 on the vehicle. The court further found that

plaintiff subsequently made the $10,950 payment to defendant and was entitled to the title to the

Honda Accord. Therefore, the court entered judgment for plaintiff on his breach of contract action

and ordered defendant to provide plaintiff with title to the Honda Accord within 10 days.

¶ 14 The court then addressed defendant’s counterclaims. As to the first and second

counterclaims seeking recovery for the car loan for the Ford Focus, the court noted that plaintiff

admitted receiving the loan from defendant and that plaintiff subsequently sold the Ford Focus to

a third party for $4,500 but kept the proceeds for himself. The court ruled that plaintiff must pay

the $4,500 to defendant to reimburse him for the loan.

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¶ 15 As to the third and fourth counterclaims seeking recovery for a $7,000 home repair loan

made in April or May 2020, the court found that there were no bank statements showing that such

a loan was made. However, the court noted that “[t]he ledgers submitted do reflect loans for

windows and home repairs, and the court finds that, despite their testimony to the contrary,

[plaintiff] accepted loans for home repairs.” The court determined that defendant was entitled to

repayment of $795 for the home repair loans. Adding the $795 for the home repair loans to the

$4,500 due for the car loan for the Ford Focus, the court entered judgment in favor of defendant

on his counterclaims in the amount of $5,295.

¶ 16 Plaintiff filed a posttrial motion to vacate the June 28, 2023, order awarding defendant

$5,295 on his counterclaims, which the circuit court denied. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on

December 18, 2023. On August 21, 2024, defendant’s former counsel filed a motion to spread

record of death, informing the court that defendant died on July 10, 2023. No argument is made

on appeal that defendant’s causes of action as set forth in his counterclaims abated upon his death.

See Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 43 Ill. 2d 239, 242 (1969) (“there is no abatement

upon the death of a party if the litigation has progressed to a point at which the merits of [the

party’s] allegations have been affirmatively determined”).

¶ 17 On February 26, 2025, we entered an order taking this case for consideration on plaintiff’s

brief only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133

(1976) (the reviewing court may decide a case on the appellant’s brief alone “if the record is simple

and the claimed errors are such that the court can easily decide them without the aid of an

appellee’s brief”).

¶ 18 First, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Exhibit 1, the July 14, 2019,

written agreement, only memorialized plaintiff’s purchase of the Honda Accord for $10,950.

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Plaintiff contends that the agreement actually memorialized the monies plaintiff owed to defendant

not only for the Honda Accord, but also for the car loan for the Ford Focus and certain

miscellaneous items, meaning that once plaintiff paid defendant the $10,950, he owed defendant

no further monies. Therefore, the court should have entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor on all of

defendant’s counterclaims. In support, plaintiff notes that Exhibit 1 states that the sales price of

the Honda Accord originally was $11,000, but it elsewhere states that the amount owed as of the

date of the agreement was $10,950. Plaintiff contends that the fact that the agreement contains two

different monetary amounts—$10,950 and $11,000—renders it ambiguous, requiring the circuit

court to look at parol evidence showing that the agreement reflected the total amount of money

owed for both the Honda Accord and for the car loan for the Ford Focus and the miscellaneous

items.

¶ 19 When interpreting a contract, our primary goal is to effectuate the parties’ intent. Village

of Arlington Heights v. Anderson, 2011 IL App (1st) 110748, ¶ 22. Where the contractual terms

are unambiguous, we ascertain the parties’ intent from the express language of the contract, as a

matter of law. Meyer v. Marilyn Miglin, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 882, 888 (1995). If the contractual

terms are ambiguous, parol evidence may be considered to determine the parties’ intent. Id.

Contractual language is not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree as to its interpretation.

Id. Disagreement as to interpretation must be reasonable, and we will not endeavor to find an

ambiguity where none exists. Id. We review de novo the issue of contract ambiguity. Id.

¶ 20 The written agreement at issue here, Exhibit 1, unambiguously references only the sale of

the Honda Accord by defendant to plaintiff and never references the car loan for the Ford Focus

or any other monies allegedly owed to defendant. The two different monetary amounts referenced

in Exhibit 1 merely reflect that the original sales price of the Honda Accord was $11,000, and that

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as of the date of the agreement, plaintiff had paid $50 and now owed the remaining $10,950 on the

Honda. As such, the circuit court correctly concluded that plaintiff’s subsequent payment of the

$10,950 only satisfied the amount he owed defendant for the Honda Accord and did not satisfy the

amounts at issue in defendant’s counterclaims for the car loan for the Ford Focus and the home

repair loans.

¶ 21 Next, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in determining that he failed to repay

defendant for the $5,000 car loan for the Ford Focus and awarding defendant the $4,500 plaintiff

received from the sale of the Ford Focus as repayment for that loan. Plaintiff argues that defendant

admitted at trial that plaintiff only owed him between $300 and $600 for the car loan and therefore

that we should reduce the $4,500 award to $600.

¶ 22 The record is insufficient to support plaintiff’s argument. As discussed, no transcript was

provided to us of the court proceedings; instead, we allowed plaintiff to file an agreed statement

of facts. In pertinent part, the agreed statement of facts states only that “[Defendant] testified that

[plaintiff] owed [defendant] $300 or $600 more for the Focus.” This statement is susceptible to

different meanings; it could mean, as plaintiff argues, that he paid defendant the entire amount due

for the car loan on the Ford Focus except for $300 to $600. However, it could also mean that

plaintiff owes defendant $300 to $600 in addition to owing him the $4,500 received from the sale

of the vehicle. Such an interpretation is plausible given the other evidence in the record.

Specifically, in his counterclaim, defendant argues that he paid off plaintiff’s bank loan for the

Ford Focus in the amount of $5,000, with the agreement that plaintiff would pay defendant back

when he sold the vehicle. Defendant alleged that plaintiff sold the vehicle during 2020 for $4,500

but failed to pay any of those proceeds to him, “nor did [plaintiff] pay back any of the $5,000 lent

to him by [defendant] for the Ford Focus.” At trial, plaintiff admitted to the agreement that he

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would sell the Ford Focus after receiving the car loan from defendant, and he further admitted to

selling the Ford Focus for $4,500 to a third party and failing to remit the sales proceeds to

defendant. On this record, we cannot say that the court’s $4,500 award to defendant for repayment

of the car loan was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See King v. Find-A-Way Shipping,

LLC, 2020 IL App (1st) 191307, ¶ 28 (where an award of damages is made after a bench trial, our

standard of review is whether the court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence).

¶ 23 Next, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by awarding defendant $795 as repayment

for the home repair loans, where defendant never pleaded such a claim. Plaintiff cites Tison & Hall

Concrete Products Co. v. A.E. Asher, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 34, 37 (1967) and Finn v. Project

Resource Solutions, LLC, 2024 IL App (1st) 221016, ¶¶ 43-45, which hold that a judgment must

conform to the pleadings. Finn elaborated:

“ ‘It is a fundamental rule, with no exceptions, that a party must recover, if at all, on and

according to the case he has made for himself by his pleadings. He cannot make one case

by his averments, and have judgment on another and different ground, even though the

latter is established by the proof.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ¶ 43 (quoting

Broberg v. Mann, 66 Ill. App. 2d 134, 137-38 (1965)).

¶ 24 Plaintiff contends that defendant’s counterclaims failed to plead a cause of action for the

recovery of the home repair loans, and as such the circuit court erred by awarding defendant

judgment on that ground.

¶ 25 We disagree. Counts III and IV of defendant’s counterclaims pleaded recovery (based on

breach of contract and unjust enrichment) for a home repair loan defendant made to plaintiff in

April or May 2020 in the amount of $7,000, which plaintiff allegedly never repaid. The circuit

court determined from the evidence at trial that defendant failed to produce any bank statements

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showing home repair loans, but that plaintiff did produce ledgers showing loans for home repairs.

The court expressly found from the ledgers that plaintiff “accepted loans for home repair” and

awarded him $795 under counts III and IV. Thus, this is not a case where defendant pleaded one

cause of action in his counterclaims and received judgment on the basis of a different cause of

action, which would constitute reversible error. Id. Rather, defendant pleaded claims for breach of

contract and unjust enrichment arising out of plaintiff’s alleged failure to repay a home repair loan,

and the court awarded defendant judgment in his favor based on those pleadings and the evidence

(the ledgers) admitted at trial. We find no reversible error.

¶ 26 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

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