L.M.W. v. Arizona, State of

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided February 5, 2024·No. 2:22-cv-00777·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5

9 L.M.W., individually, and as the biological No. CV-22-00777-PHX-JAT father and on behalf of L.W., a minor., Plaintiff, 11 v. 12 State of Arizona, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 16 Pending before the Court are several discovery disputes related to the Fed. R. Civ. 17 P. 30(b)(6) deposition noticed by Plaintiff to the State of Arizona. (Docs. 136, 139-146). 18 As a very brief timeline, Defendants were involved in the foster placement of Plaintiff’s 19 minor child (“the minor”). The minor was in foster care following removal by the State in 20 2015, 2018 and 2020-2021. In 2015 and 2018 the minor was placed with a paternal relative 21 (grandmother). In 2020, the minor was initially placed with a third-party foster family (for 22 about 6 weeks) and then placed with another paternal relative (aunt). During the third- 23 party foster family placement, the minor alleges he was abused. 24 Category 2 25 In category 2, Plaintiff seeks a 30(b)(6) deposition of the State as follows: “All 26 efforts taken by DCS to identify potential placements for [the minor] from January 1, 2015, 27 through January 31, 2021.” (Doc. 139 at 2). The parties do not dispute that discovery for 28 the period from November 30, 2020, to January 27, 2021, is relevant. The parties further 1 agree that they have effectively completely the 30(b)(6) deposition for the 2020-2021 time 2 period. (Id. at 4-5). 3 However, Plaintiff seeks discovery regarding the two prior dependency actions 4 involving the minor in 2015 and 2018. Defendant argues these time periods (during which 5 no abuse is alleged) are not relevant and also not proportional because of the number of 6 prior employees that would have to be located and the number of records that would have 7 to be reviewed.1 8 The Court has attempted to discern what is “really” at issue here. And while neither 9 party directly says this, the Court believes Plaintiff seeks this information because Plaintiff 10 wants to know why the familial placements used in 2015 and 2018 were not used again in 11 2020 and/or whether the relatives ultimately used in 2021 were known to Defendant in 12 2015 and/or 2018, and/or could have been known to Defendant in 2015 or 2018. 13 Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Plaintiff’s expert:

14 provided in her expert opinion that paternal aunt was identified 15 as potential placement for [the minor] to DCS in 2015. However, DCS failed to explore her as potential placement 16 during the 2020 dependency filing or case investigation despite 17 having documentation of paternal aunt’s existence as early in DCS’ records as 2015. [Plaintiff’s expert] provided the policy 18 of DCS is to conduct and document an extensive search for 19 missing parents and extended family members for [the minor]. 20 (Doc. 139 at 3–4). 21 Notably, Defendant does not dispute that whether certain state employees looked 22 for familial placements in 2020 is relevant. And here, neither party has said whether the 23 30(b)(6) deponents who testified about the 2020 placement claimed to have relied on the 24 2015 and/or 2018 records to identify other family member or to convince themselves that 25 an exhaustive search for family members had already been conducted. Further, neither 26 party has said whether the paternal aunt and uncle ultimately used in 2021 were highlighted 27 1 Defendant again complains that this discovery is not proportional given the amount of 28 time left before the close of discovery in this case, but the Court has already rejected this argument. (Doc. 139). 1 in the 2015 or 2018 records such that the 2020 workers would have been on notice of their 2 availability. All of these hypotheticals would make this testimony relevant, and to the 3 extent the 30(b)(6) topic is limited to only this minor and only alternative familial 4 placement options, the search/testimony is proportional.2 5 A requesting party that is dissatisfied with discovery responses made under the federal rules may move to compel further responses pursuant 6 to Rule 37(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). “Upon a motion to compel discovery, the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance.” Nguyen v. 7 Lotus by Johnny Dung Inc., 8:17-cv-01317-JVS-JDE, 2019 WL 3064479, at *2, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122787, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019). Finally, 8 “[t]he party who resists discovery has the burden to show discovery should not be allowed,” as well as “the burden of clarifying, explaining, and 9 supporting its objections.” Comcast of L.A., Inc. v. Top End Int'l, No. CV 03- 2213-JFW(RCx), 2003 WL 22251149, at *2, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18640, 10 at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2003) (citing Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)). 11 Glodney v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-CV-10503-GW-MAA, 2020 WL 8414988, 12 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2020). 13 Here, Plaintiff has shown relevance.3 Defendant has not sufficiently supported its 14 objections to overcome Plaintiff’s showing of relevance, and the Court finds the discovery 15 to be proportional as limited above. Thus, Defendant’s objection to category 2, as limited 16 2 To the extent Plaintiff’s category could be read as including other alternative non-familial 17 placements, such as alternative third-party foster homes, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not shown how such information would be relevant. 18 3 The Court must note that Plaintiff argues relevance by quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) 19 as stating: “One need only demonstrate that ‘the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).” Plaintiff’s 20 counsel seriously undermines his credibility by quoting a sentence from Rule 26 that was deleted almost a decade ago, and deleted because it was, in the committee’s opinion, being 21 misused. See Committee Notes on Rules – 2015 Amendments (“The former provision for discovery of relevant but inadmissible information that appears ‘reasonably calculated to 22 lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is also deleted. The phrase has been used by some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery. As the Committee Note to the 2000 23 amendments observed, use of the ‘reasonably calculated’ phrase to define the scope of discovery ‘might swallow any other limitation on the scope of discovery.’ The 2000 24 amendments sought to prevent such misuse by adding the word ‘Relevant’ at the beginning of the sentence, making clear that ‘relevant’ means within the scope of discovery as defined 25 in this subdivision . . . .’ The ‘reasonably calculated’ phrase has continued to create problems, however, and is removed by these amendments. It is replaced by the direct 26 statement that ‘Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.’ Discovery of nonprivileged information not admissible in 27 evidence remains available so long as it is otherwise within the scope of discovery.”) (emphasis added). 28 1 herein, is overruled. 2 Category 3 3 Plaintiff seeks a 30(b)(6) deposition on Defendants: “Analysis, evaluation, and/or 4 review of all DCS’ identified parents, grandparents, kinship care of [the minor’s] extended 5 family, or a person with a significant relationship with [the minor] for placement of [the 6 minor] from January 2015 through January 31, 2021.” (Doc. 140 at 2). Plaintiff argues 7 this information is relevant because:

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