Lloyd v. Scott

29 U.S. 205, 7 L. Ed. 833, 4 Pet. 205, 1830 U.S. LEXIS 476
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 27, 1830
StatusPublished
Cited by90 cases

This text of 29 U.S. 205 (Lloyd v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. 205, 7 L. Ed. 833, 4 Pet. 205, 1830 U.S. LEXIS 476 (1830).

Opinion

Mr Justice M’Lean

delivered thp opinion of the Court.

This is an action of replevin, brought to replevy certain goods and chattels which the defendant, as bailiff of WiHiam. S. Moore, had taken upon a distress for rent claimed to be due upon certain houses and lots in Alexandria, owned and possessed by the plaintiff- The sum for which the distress was made is five hundred dollars.

The declaration is in the Usual form, and the damages are laid at one thousand dollars. The defendant filed his cognizance, in which he acknowledges the taking of the goods specified in the declaration; and states that a certain Jonathan Scholfield, being seised in fee of four brick tenements, and a lot of ground in tbe town of Alexandria, by his indenture, dated the 11th of June 1814, in consideration of five thousand dollars, granted, bargained and sold to William. S. Moore one certain annuity or yearly rent of five hundred dollars, to be issuing out of and charged upon the said houses and ground, and paid to the said Moore, his heirs and assigns, by equal half yearly payments of two hundred and fifty dollars, on the. 10th of December, and on the 10th of June, in each year, for ever thereafter; to have and to hold the said annuity or rent charged and payable as aforesaid, to the said William S. Moore, his heirs and assigns forever. It also states, that the said Scholfield, for himself and his heirs and assigns, did, by the said indenture, among other things, *222 covenant well and truly to pay to the said Moore, his heirs and assigns, the said annual rent of five hundred dollars, by equal half yearly payments for ever. And if the rent should not be paid as it become due, it should be lawful for the said Moore, his heirs and assigns to make distress for it. That Moore was .seised of the rent on the 11th of December 3814, and has since remained seised thereof

The-cognizance further states, that on the 29th of October 1816, the said Jonathan Scholfield, by his deed of bargain and sale, conveyed to Lloyd the plaintiff, for ever, certain tenements and lots of ground in the town of Alexandria, whereof the said four brick tenements and lot of ground were parcel, and subject, to the rent charge stated. That Lloyd has been seised ever since and possessed of the same; and that on the 10th of June 1824, two hundred and fifty dollars, a part of the rent;/was due, and on the 10th of December following, two hundred and fifty dollars, the balance of the annual rent, was due and unpaid; for which sums the defendant, as bailiff, levied a. distress.

The cognizance is concluded by praying,a judgment for one thousand dollars, being double the amount of the rent in arrear.

. Moore covehants in the deed, that if Scholfield, his heirs or assigns, shall at any time after the expiration of five years from the date of the deed, pay to the said Moore, his heirs or assigns, the sum of five thousand dollars, together with all arrears of rent, and a rateable dividend of the rent, for the time which shall have elapsed between the half year day then next preceding and the day on which such payment ,sjljáll. be made; .he, the said Moore, his heirs and assigns, will execute and deliver, any deeds or instruments which may be necessary for releasing and extinguishing the rent or annuity hereby created; which, on such payment-being made, shall for ever after cease to be payable.”

Scholfield covenanted for himself, his heirs and assigns, that he would keep the buildings in repair; have them fully insured against fire; and would assign- the policies of insurance to such trustee as Moore, his heirs or assigns, might appoint, that the money may be applied to the rebuilding of *223 the houses destroyed by fire, or repairing any damage which they 'might suffer.

To this cognizance the plaintiff filed a special demurrer; .which in the argument he abandoned, and relies upon the special pleas of usury. To each of the four pleas the defendant demurs specially, and assigns for causes of demurrer,

. 1. That the said pleas do not set forth with any reasonable certainty, the pretended contract which is alleged to have been usurious, and do not show an usurious contract.

2. That they do not state the time the said pretended loan was made.

3. That they do not state the amount of interest reserved or intended to be reserved, on the said pretended contract.

4. That they do not set forth any loan or forbearance of any debt;

5. That they neither admit nor deny the sale and conveyance of the premises charged with the annuity or rent to have been made by Scholfield to the plaintiff below.

Upon these demurrers the circuit court rendered'judgment for one thousand dollars, the double rent claimed in the cognizance.

The plaintiff here prays a reversal of this judgment.

1. Because the deed which forms a part of the cognizance, on its face, shows an usurious contract.

2. Because the pleas set forth, with-sufficient certainty, an usurious contract.

The statute of Virginia against usury was passed in 1793, and provides, that no person shall take, directly or indirectly, more than six dollars for the forbearance qf one hundred dollars per annuiri; and it declares, that all bonds and other instruments, for a greater amount of interest, shall be utterly void.

In support of the demurrer, it is argued,-'that the pleas are defective, &s they do not contain any allegation of facts which amount to usury; and that the decision must turn on the construction of the contract between Scholfield and Moore. And it is contended, that although usury appears upon the face of a deed, yet advantage can only be taken of it by plea. That the obligee may explain the contract, b,y *224 showing a mistake in the scrivener, or a miscalculation of the parties.

In Comyn on Usury, 201, it is laid down that in an action on a specialty, though it appear on the face of the declaration that the bond, &c. is usurious, still no advantage can be taken of this, unless, the statute be specially pleaded. 3, Salk. 291. 5, Coke’s Rep. 119. Chitty on Contracts, 240. 1 Sid. 285. 1 Saund. 295, a. The decision of this point is not necessarily involved in the case.

The requisites to form an usurious transaction are three:

1. A loan either express or implied.

2. An understanding that the money lent sháll or may. be returned,

3. That a greater rate of interest than is allowed by the statute, shall be paid.

The intent with which the act is done, is an important ingredient to constitute this offence. An ignorance of the law - will not protect a party from the penalties of usury, where it is committed; but where mere was Ho intention to evade the law, and the facts which amount to usury, whether they appear upon the face of the contract, or by other proof, can be shoton to have been the result of mistake, or accident, no penalty attaches.

At an early period in the history of English jurisprudence, usury, or as it was then called, the loaning of money at interest, was deemed a very high offence.

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Bluebook (online)
29 U.S. 205, 7 L. Ed. 833, 4 Pet. 205, 1830 U.S. LEXIS 476, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lloyd-v-scott-scotus-1830.