Lloyd v. Cochran

256 S.W. 337
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 23, 1923
DocketNo. 954. [fn*]
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 256 S.W. 337 (Lloyd v. Cochran) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lloyd v. Cochran, 256 S.W. 337 (Tex. Ct. App. 1923).

Opinion

*338 WALKER, J.

In his petition against appellant, appellee alleged: That appellant was the duly qualified and acting administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Her-maii P. Lloyd. That-on or about the 1st day of March, 1916, he and Lloyd “associated themselves together as partners for the purpose of doing a casualty insurance business in the city of Houston, Harris county, Tex. That, as such partners, plaintiff and the said Herman P. Lloyd carried on and conducted a casualty insurance business in said city until on or about the 30th day of April, 1918, when said partnership was dissolved by mutual consent. At the time of the forming of said copartnership, the plaintiff was engaged in the business of writing casualty and fire insurance and surety bonds, and on said date the said Hérman P. Lloyd was admitted by plaintiff as a partner in Said business in the casualty department only, upon the agreement and understanding between this plaintiff and the said Herman P. Lloyd that they should and would share equally the net profits made and earned in the casualty department of said insurance business. It was also understood between plaintiff and said Herman F. Lloyd, as a part of such partnership agreement, that said Herman P. Lloyd should have what they termed a ‘drawing account’ of $200 per month — that is; he was entitled under their agreement to draw the sum of $200 a month from the earnings of said business, the amount so drawn by him to be charged against his share of such earnings.” That “there were net profits earned and collected in the casualty deparement of'said business the sum of $6,747.57.” That during the life of the partnership Lloyd withdrew, on his drawing account, $5,000, and appropriated other accounts, to the amount of $152,000. That the share of said Lloyd in the net profits of said business was the sum of $3,373.77, and appellee-sued to recover against the ad-ministratrix of Lloyd’s estate the difference between his half of the net profits and the aforesaid sum withdrawn by him. Appellee also prayed for general and special relief.. He ^attached to his petition what he represented and pleaded as an itemized statement of the business of the partnership. It appears from this statement that appellee charged the partnership with $1,560 for postage, office rent, clerical force, and rent excess. This item is not explained by pleading. It is not charged that the items were agreed to by Herman F. Lloyd, nor that it was a part of the partnership contract that he should pay one-half of that sum, nor that the items were just and reasonable, yet in the itemized statement Lloyd is charged with one-half of this sum. Again, appellee charges the partnership with certain uncollected accounts, amounting to the sum of about $1,-324.34. No explanation is made by appellee in his petition of these items, nor of the present status thereof, nor of the solvency of the claims, nor why they were charged against the account of Herman F. Lloyd.

Appellant answered by general demurrer and general-denial. During the pendency of the suit, on motion of appdllee, the trial court appointed an auditor, who-, under order of the court, examined the books and accounts of the partnership, and made a report showing a balance due by Herman F. Lloyd to ap-pellee in the sum of $1,426.42. This report was duly excepted to by appellant, and, in addition to offering this auditor’s report in evidence, appellee offered the testimony of one of his attorneys, to the effect that this claim against Lloyd was lodged with him for suit prior to Lloyd’s death, and also the testimony of , his bookkeeper, J. P. Demerit, who testified:

“I knew Herman F. Lloyd in his lifetime. I worked for Mr. Cochran at the time Mr. Lloyd was connected with him. Mr. Lloyd came into the firm in the early part of 1916, I think— somewhere along there. The name of the firm was Cochran Insurance Agency. I do not know of any written contract between Mr. Cochran and Mr. Lloyd. There was ah agree-menL.be tween Mr. Cochran and Herman F. Lloyd in their partnership matters. I will have to answer your question as to what was that agreement in .this way: That I was not present when Mr. Cochran and Mr. Lloyd entered into that agreement. Mr. Lloyd talked to me with reference to that contract. Mr. Lloyd told me that he had entered into a contract with Mr. Cochran to handle the casualty end of his insurance business; that they had entered into a partnership arrangement. * * * There has never been an accounting between them in reference to the partnership business and dissolution that I know of. * * * Mr. Lloyd said that he had entered into this partnership with Mr. Cochran to handle the casualty end of the business and that it was to be operated on this basis: That they would divide the profits derived from that business on a fifty-fifty basis, after paying all operating expenses. He said that he had a drawing account of $200 a month, that was to be charged to his account. I have made out a statement to Mr. Lloyd. Mr. Lloyd wanted to know what the casualty department had been doing up to that time, and we got up a statement of commissions and. expenses, to show what money had been made by .the department during the first six monhs of its operation. Up to the time of this six months, my books were kept altogether with the firm’s regular accounts. They were never segregated. JC don’t recall anything that Mr. Lloyd said at that time with reference to this statement that I got up. After that time I opened a separate ledger for the casualty end of the business, simply for my own convenience, but the balance of the details were handled in the same way that they had been theretofore; there was no separate bank account. The accounts receivable and the accounts payable were segregated from the fire end1 of it from that time on. * * *. I was in Mr. Cochran’s employ at the time the dissolution was made. • * * I remember when Mr. Lloyd died. * * * Before his death, I, as bookkeeper *339 for that partnership and Mr. Cochran, presented him with an account as to what he owed. That is the same account that I presented to him prior to his death. I went over it with him. He did not deny it. I was acting for Mr. Cochran at that time. This account was made out by me from my books, and was presented to him prior to his death, and he did not deny it. He requested me to get up that account for him. * * * As soon as the statement was completed, I showed it to hiip, and there was only one objection that he raised to the statement at all, and that was with reference to some expense matters. I can’t recall from this the different itms of expense which he objected to, but there were some items in the expense that we charged to the casualty department that he stated he thought should not have been charged to that department. I do not know how much they were — how much they amounted to. .* * * I kept all these books; that is, with reference to the entire insurance business. The insurance business of Mr. Cochran at that time consisted of fire insurance business largely and principally. * * * It was just before the partnership was dissolved that I presented him this account, and right after that he went in business for himself. * * * At the time Mr. Lloyd went in there, the Cochran Insurance Agency was not doing a casualty business. * * * I do not mean to say that I kept a separate and distinct account, so as to show the exact cost of running the casualty business.

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256 S.W. 337, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lloyd-v-cochran-texapp-1923.