Lloyd v. Bourassa

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedAugust 21, 2002
DocketHANcv-01-039
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lloyd v. Bourassa (Lloyd v. Bourassa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lloyd v. Bourassa, (Me. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

HANCOCK, SS. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. 01-CV-039 LAG HB Ge Les C. GARY LLOYD Plaintiff Vv. ORDER DONALD L. GARBRECHT LAW LIBRARY TOM BOURASSA, SUGARTOAF MOUNTAIN CORP., SEP 18 2M

UNITED STATES CYCLING, INC. d/b/a NATIONAL OFF-ROAD BICYCLE ASSOCIATION, Defendants

PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 22, 1995, C. Gary Lloyd applied for membership in “USCF - NORBA - NCCA.” After filling in some identifying information on the first page of the application form, Lloyd placed his signature on the second page, under a section entitled “Acknowledgment of Risk and Release of Liability.” That section contained the following language:

Please accept this as my application for membership and a USCF, NORBA and /or NCCA license.

I acknowledge that cycling is an inherently dangerous sport in which I participate at my own risk and that the United States Cycling Federation, Inc. is a non-profit corporation formed to advance the sport of cycling, the efforts of which directly benefit me. In consideration of the agreement of the USCF to issue a license to me, hereby on behalf of myself, my heirs, assigns and personal representatives, I release and forever discharge the USCF, its employees, agents, members, sponsors, promoters and affiliates from any and all liability, claim, loss, cost or expense, and waive and promise not to sue on any such claims against any such person or organization, arising directly or indirectly from or attributable in any legal way to any negligence, action or omission to act of any such person or organization in connection with sponsorship, organization or execution of any bicycle racing or sporting event, including travel to and from such event, in which I may participate as a rider, team member or spectator. On August 11, 1995, with his NORBA membership in hand, Lloyd traveled to Kingfield, Maine to participate in a mountain biking event sponsored by the Sugarloaf Mountain Corporation known as the Widowmaker Challenge. At Kingfield, Lloyd signed the Official Entry Form, which included the following language under the heading of “Athlete’s Entry & Release Form!”:

I fully realize the dangers of participating in a bicycle race and fully assume the risks associated with such participation including, by way of example, and not limitations, the following: the dangers of collision with pedestrians, vehicles, other racers and fixed or moving objects; the dangers arising from surface hazards, equipment failure, inadequate safety equipment and weather conditions; and the possibility of serious physical and/or mental trauma or injury associated with athletic cycling competition.

I hereby waive, release and discharge for myself, my heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, assigns, and successors in interest (hereinafter collectively “successors”) any and all rights and claims which I have or which may hereafter occur to me against the sponsors of this event, the National Off-Road Bicycle Association, the promoter and any promoting organization(s), property owners, law enforcement agencies, all public entities, and special districts and.... through or by which the events will be held for any and all damages which may be sustained by me directly or indirectly in connection with, or arising out of, my participation in or association with the event, or travel to or return from the event.....

I agree, for myself and successors, that the above representations are contractually binding, and are not mere recitals, and that should I or my successors assert my claim in contravention of this agreement, I or my successors shall be liable for the expenses incurred (including legal fees) incurred by the other party or parties in defending, unless the other parties are financially adjudged liable on such claim for willful and wanton negligence.

Lloyd registered to participate in both the cross-country race and the downhill challenge. While completing a mandatory practice run on August 11, 1995, Lloyd was

involved in a collision with another participant, Tom Bourassa.

1 To avoid confusion, the “release” signed in June _ shall be referred to as the “Membership Release,” and the release signed in August shall be referred to as the “Event Release.” On August 10, 2001, Lloyd filed suit against Bourassa, Sugarloaf Mountain Corporation, and United States Cycling Federation d/b/a National Off-Road Bicycle Association, asserting negligence claims against all three. Soon thereafter, Lloyd learned that he had failed to name the appropriate corporate defendant, and filed a motion to amend the complaint. Over objection, that motion was granted, and U.S.A. Cycling, Inc. replaced United States Cycling Federation d/b/a National Off-Road Bicycle _ Association.

In their Answers, both Sugarloaf and U.S.A. Cycling responded that Lloyd’s claims were barred by the releases quoted above. In addition, both asserted Counterclaims against Lloyd for breaching the terms of the releases. Both demanded Lloyd be held liable for any expenses they incurred in defending his suit.

On January 25, 2002, Lloyd filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with

respect to Defendants’ Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses of Release and Waiver.

Summary Judgment on March 11, 2002. U.S.A. Cycling also opposed the plaintiffs motion, and filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on April 11, 2002. All of the motions requested that the court review the language of the releases and determine whether and how it affected the outcome of this suit. A hearing on all three motions was held on July 3, 2002. Any findings included below are based upon the properly submitted affidavits and statements of material fact. Specifically excluded from that category is the affidavit form Attorney Greif. DISCUSSION

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgment on the defendants’

counterclaims and on their affirmative defenses of release and waiver because “the release,2” by its terms, does not apply to U.S.A. Cycling, does not apply to the facts of this case, does not protect the defendants from their own negligence, and is unenforceable as contrary to public policy.

In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court is required to accept all of the responding party’s pleadings as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Judgment is only appropriate if the responding party can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to relief. The plaintiff has failed to meet that burden. Applicability to U.S.A. Cycling

In support of his first assertion, Lloyd argued that, because the Event Release does not mention U.S.A. Cycling, that defendant is not within the category of potentially released entities. With its response to this motion, U.S.A. Cycling filed an affidavit by Barton Enoch to establish that NORBA, a named sponsor of the Widowmaker, was the off-road division of U.S.A. Cycling, Inc. The clear language of the Entry Release covers sponsors, including U.S.A. Cycling d/b/a NORBA.

As mentioned above, Lloyd applied for membership in the United States Cycling Federation (USCF) and NORBA in June 1995. Soon thereafter, USCF merged into a new corporation, U.S.A. Cycling, Inc, that assumed all of its rights and responsibilities. By signing the Membership Release, Lloyd released U.S.A. Cycling, Inc. from responsibility for any accidents that might occur during his participation in any race events it sponsored.

Definition of Event

Lloyd has argued that the strictly construed language of the Event Release does

not cover accidents that occur during the training run. In support of this argument, he

has cited Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206 (Me.

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Related

Doyle v. Bowdoin College
403 A.2d 1206 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1979)
Hardy v. St. Clair
1999 ME 142 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Champagne v. Mid-Maine Medical Center
1998 ME 87 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)

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