L.L. v. Diego Sanchez

District Court, C.D. California·Decided October 14, 2025·No. 5:25-cv-00546·Unknown

Opinion

LMuiicsh Aae.l C Sa. rCriallrori, lElos,q E.,s SqB., NSB 7N03 29588 878 DSeelneinses eE Ost.r aGdaas-tVéliullmel,a S, SBBNN 2 8325747919 4 CARRILLO LAW FIRM, LLP GASTÉLUM LAW, APC 1499 Huntington Drive, Suite 402 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION South Pasadena, CA 91030 3767 Worsham Ave. Long Beach, California 90808 Tel: (626) 799-9375 Tel: (213) 340-6112 Fax: (626) 799-9380 Fax: (213) 402-8622 Email: lac4justice@gmail.com Email: dgastelum@gastelumfirm.com mc@carrillofirm.com sestradavillela@gastelumfirm.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff, L.L.

Richard A. Jorgensen, SBN 200618 15137 Woodlawn Avenue Tustin, CA 92780 Tel: (949) 851-9900

Attorneys for Defendant, DIEGO SANCHEZ [Additional counsel on following page]

L.L., an individual, ) CASE NO.: 5:25−cv−00546 SSS (DTBx) ) (Case Assigned to Honorable Sunshine ) Suzanne Sykes, District Judge; Honorable Plaintiff, ) David T. Bristow, Magistrate Judge) ) v. ) DISCOVERY MATTER )

BEAUMONT POLICE ) ) [ P P R R O O T P E O C S T E I D V ] E S O TI R P D U E L R A T ED DEPARTMENT, a public entity; ) CITY OF BEAUMONT, a public ) entity; CHIEF SEAN THUILLIEZ, ) Action Filed: February 28, 2025 individually; DIEGO SANCHEZ, ) individually, and DOES 1 through 10, ) individually, jointly and severally, ) ) Defendants ) ) ) ) ) ) Eugene P. Ramirez, Esq., SBN 134865 MANNING & KASS ELLROL, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP 225 Broadway, Suite 1200 San Diego, CA 92101 Phone: (619) 515-0269 Fax: (619) 515-0268 Email: eugene.ramirez@manningkass.com Email: Kayleigh.anderson@manningkass.com Email: eugene.hanrahan@manningkass.com Attorneys for Defendants, City of Beaumont, Beaumont Police Department, and Chief Sean Thuilliez

1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS/GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to a confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 12.3, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order does not entitle them to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants may produce certain documents in this case that contain personal medical, employment or financial information. Such information may implicate the privacy interests of the party and are properly protected through a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) protective order. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (“Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a ‘party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense.’ Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (a party’s privacy rights are to be protected through a “carefully crafted protective order.”). As Plaintiffs are seeking and Defendants may produce, among other things, internal, security sensitive, third party and law enforcement private and confidential information, administrative, personnel and institutional documents, which contain sensitive information that the City of Beaumont believes need special protection from public disclosure. The documents identified in this Protective Order, which Defendants believe in good faith constitute or embody confidential information which the City of Beaumont maintains as strictly confidential and are otherwise generally unavailable to the public, or which may be privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under state or federal statutes, court rules, case decisions, or common law, are therefore entitled to heightened protection from disclosure. 2. DEFINITIONS 2.1 Action: this pending federal law suit. 2.2 Challenging Party: a Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of information or items under this Order. 2.3 “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: information (regardless of the medium or how generated, stored, or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), as specified above in the Good Cause Statement, and other applicable federal privileges. 2.4 Counsel: Outside Counsel of Record and House Counsel (as well as their support staff). 2.5 Designating Party: a Party or Non-Party that designates information or items that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.6 Disclosure or Discovery Material: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, or tangible things), that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter. 2.7 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this Action. 2.8 House Counsel: attorneys who are employees of a Party to this Action. House Counsel does not include Outside Counsel of Record or any other outside counsel. 2.9 Non-Party: any natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity not named as a Party to this action. 2.10 Outside Counsel of Record: attorneys who are not employees of a party to this Action but are retained to represent or advise a party to this Action and have appeared in this Action on behalf of that party or are affiliated with a law firm which has appeared on behalf of that party, and includes support staff. 2.11 Party: any part to this Action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and Outside Counsel of Record (and their support staffs). 2.12 Producing Party: a Party or Non-Party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in this Action. 2.13 Professional Vendors: persons or entities that provide litigation support services (e.g., photocopying; videotaping; translating; preparing exhibits or demonstrations; and organizing, storing, or retrieving data in any form or medium) and their employees and subcontractors. 2.14 Protected Material: any Disclosure or Discovery Material that is designated as “CONFIDENTIAL.” 2.15 Receiving Party: a Party that receives Disclosure or Discovery Material from a Producing Party. 3. SCOPE The protections conferred by this Stipulation and Order cover not only Protected Material (as defined above), but also (1) any information copied or extracted from Protected Material; (2) all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations of Protected Material; and (3) any testimony, conversations, or presentations by Parties or their Counsel that might reveal Protected Material. Any use of Protected Material at trial shall be governed by the Orders of the trial judge. This Order does not govern the use of Protected Material at trial. 4. DURATION Once a case proceeds to trial, all of the information that was designated as confidential or maintained pursuant to this protective order used or introduced as an

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