Ljunggren v. Bureau of Human Resources

Superior Court of Maine·Decided May 2, 2007·No. KENcv-06-296·Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-06-296 -T:; l ' f'/ I U J. A)" f\, l_ I ,", .r."

CLAUDIA LJUNGGREN and JON LJUNGGREN,

Plaintiffs

v. ORDER ON MOTION

BUREAU OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al.,

Defendants

This matter is before the court on the State's motion to dismiss. Claudia and Jon

Ljunggren ("Plaintiffs") have filed a complaint seeking to recover money damages for

the State's alleged breach of contract for not reimbursing Claudia for the health

insurance fees paid by her husband to cover her as a dependent under his plan when

Claudia was entitled to free state health insurance under the terms of her disability

retirement.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the

complaint. Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882,885 (Me. 1995). When reviewing a motion

to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are accepted as true. ld. In ruling

on a motion to dismiss, the court should "consider the material allegations of the

complaint as admitted and review the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts

that would entitle the plaintiffs to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Bussell v. City

of Portland, 1999 ME 103,

appropriate only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief 2

under any set of facts which he might prove in support of his claim. Dutil v. Burns, 674

A.2d 910, 911 (Me. 1996).

The State argues that the Plaintiffs claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign

immunity. "The Law Court has adopted the majority view that the sovereign, i.e., the

State of Maine, is immune from suit and that it is 'necessary that the sovereign's consent

to be sued be given by the Legislature, as the only appropriate body to speak in this

regard on behalf of the sovereign."' Cote v. State of Maine, PORSC-CV-02-297, 2002 Me.

Super. LEXIS 152, *3 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Sept. 23, 2002) (Cole, J.) (quoting Drake

v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 543 (Me. 1978).

However, "under Drake, the Law Court left open the possibility that the State

could legislatively waive its sovereign immunity in a breach of contract claim by

enacting a general scheme that contemplated such contracts." ld. Therefore, under the

relevant analysis for a motion to dismiss, viewing the complaints allegations as true, the

plaintiffs need to demonstrate that the statutory provisions providing state workers

health insurance benefits were enacted under a general scheme that contemplated a

contractual relationship between the state and the worker.

The plaintiffs rely on 26 M.R.S.A. § 979-D(l)(C), State Employee Labor Relations

Act ("SERLA"), as the source of the State's consent to enter into a contractual

relationship with its employees. The State argues that §979-D(I)(E), however, excludes

from this contractual relationship (collective bargaining) "matters which are prescribed

or controlled by public law." The State argues that health insurance benefits are

specifically prescribed by 5 M.R.S.A. § 285, thus, these benefits cannot be a contractually

negotiated. Therefore, the court cannot find that the Legislature has authorized the

State, through SERLA, to enter into any contract with regards to health benefits, and the

State has not waived its sovereignty. 3

The plaintiffs argue that SERLA authorized the executive branch to enter into

binding agreements concerning state employees, which binding agreement obligated

the state to provide health plan coverage under the terms of its language.

For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint

are accepted as true. Paragraph 17 of plaintiffs' complaint:

The collective bargaining agreement in effect between the State of Maine and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Institutional Services Unit (which covered Mrs. Ljunggren) as of March 17, 1998 and at the time Mrs. Ljunggren's application for disability retirement was granted in fact provided in Article 23, among other things, '[t}he State, shall provide health plan coverage for employees pursuant to Title 5 § 285.

While the State could not negotiate the terms of group health benefits because the

statute defines eligibility, coverage, and payment, the State did contractually agree to

provide the coverage pursuant to the statute. Therefore, the obligation to provide

health plan coverage pursuant to Title 5 M.R.S.A. § 285 not only became a statutory

obligation but also a contractual obligation pursuant to the Collective Bargaining

Agreement.

The Union could not negotiate the terms of the health plan coverage. Control of

the coverage and its terms is in the legislature pursuant to the statute. However, by

inclusion of the language as stated, the State has created a term of the contract that it

will comply with the terms of Title 5 M.R.S.A. § 285.

The terms of the statute cover both active employees and retired employees.

5 M.R.S.A. § 285(7). There is no reason for this court to conclude that the contract

incorporating section 285 does not include rights of retirees under certain

circumstances. The circumstance in question is whether Mrs. Ljunggren was

considered an employee while she, was entitled to Disability Retirement Benefits.

Again, taking the terms of the complaint to be true, paragraph 12 provides: 4

After Mrs. Ljunggren's Application for Disability Retirement Benefits was granted, she was required to resign from her position at AMHI to terminate her employment in order to commence receiving disability retirement benefits; Ms. Ljunggren resigned her position as required on or about March 23, 2000.

If Mrs. Ljunggren was not considered an employee under the terms of the contract, it

would not have been necessary for her to resign her position some two years after she

was unable to work and her application for Disability Retirement Benefits was granted.

Accordingly, the court is satisfied that the State negotiated a contract with its

employees containing a provision obligating it to provide group health benefits in

accordance with the terms of the statute. The terms of the statute are not negotiable by

law but the State negotiated an obligation to provide whatever benefits are contained in

the statute. Therefore, this court is satisfied that the legislature has waived sovereign

immunity in the matter of breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement; in fact, it has

violated the Group Health Plan statute.

The entry will be:

Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.

Dated: May 2- , 2007 Donald H. Marden Justice, Superior Court CLAUDIA LJUNGGREN - PLAINTIFF SUPERIOR COURT PO BOX 32 KENNEBEC, ss. VIENNA ME 04360 Docket No AUGSC-CV-2006-00296 Attorney for: CLAUDIA LJUNGGREN DAVID SANDERS - RETAINED 11/27/2006 PO BOX 271 DOCKET RECORD LIVERMORE FALLS ME 04254

JON LJUNGGREN - PLAINTIFF PO BOX 32 VIENNA ME 04360 Attorney for: JON LJUNGGREN DAVID SANDERS - RETAINED 11/27/2006 PO BOX 271 LIVERMORE FALLS ME 04254

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Related

Plimpton v. Gerrard
668 A.2d 882 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1995)
Dutil v. Burns
674 A.2d 910 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1996)
Bussell v. City of Portland
1999 ME 103 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1999)
Drake v. Smith
390 A.2d 541 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1978)