Liza Edmond v. Ronney Guillory

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 6, 2019
• Docket: CA-0018-0437
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-437

LIZA EDMOND

VERSUS

RONNEY GUILLORY, ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-20170401 HONORABLE PATRICK L. MICHOT, DISTRICT JUDGE

JOHN D. SAUNDERS JUDGE

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED. Katherine Paine Martin Gretchen Heider Mayard John Edward Ortego Martin Mayard, L.L.C. 200 Beaullieu Drive, Building 3A P. O. Box 81338 Lafayette, LA 70598-1338 (337) 291-2440 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company Ronney Guillory

Harold D. Register, III 102 Versailles Blvd., Suite 620 Lafayette, LA 70501 (337) 735-4443 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT: Liza Edmond SAUNDERS, Judge

The issue presented in this case is the extent to which Plaintiff’s damages were

caused by the February 4, 2016 automobile accident.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This is a personal injury lawsuit arising out of a February 4, 2016 automobile

accident wherein Plaintiff, Liza Edmond (“Ms. Edmond”), allegedly injured her

neck and back when the vehicle being driven by Defendant, Ronnie Guillory

(“Guillory”), crossed an intersection without yielding to oncoming traffic and struck

her vehicle. Ms. Edmond has a history of multiple prior automobile accidents in

which she injured her neck and back, including two or three minor accidents; an

accident that occurred in October 2007; another in December 2007; another in

August 2014; and a severe accident that occurred in January 2016, less than a month

prior to the subject accident.

Prior to trial, the trial court denied Ms. Edmond’s Motion in Limine to strike

and exclude any and all evidence of prior accidents, injuries, and/or claims in which

she had been involved. Also, prior to trial, it was stipulated that Guillory was at

fault for the accident.

On March 12, 2018, the trial court found that twenty-five percent of Ms.

Edmond’s medical treatment resulted from the subject accident and awarded Ms.

Edmond $1,972.40 in special damages and $3,000.00 in general damages. It is from

this decision that Ms. Edmond appeals, alleging two assignments of error.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR:

1. The Trial Court erred when it allowed evidence of prior accidents and prior injuries of Liza Edmond in the trial of the above captioned matter.

2. The Trial Court’s award to Liza Edmond of $4,972.40 in damages was abusively low when the injuries suffered by Liza Edmond as a result of the instant case clearly are more serious than the damages awarded herein. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE:

In her first assignment of error, Ms. Edmond contends that the trial court erred

when it allowed evidence of her prior accidents and injuries at trial. We find no

merit to this contention.

The trial court has great discretion in its consideration of evidentiary matters

such as motions in limine. Heller v. Nobel Ins. Group, 2000-261 (La. 2/2/00), 753

So.2d 841; Furlough v. Union Pacific RR Co., 33,658 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/31/00), 766

So.2d 751, writ denied, 2000-2929 (La. 1/12/01), 781 So.2d 556. On review, the

appellate court must determine whether the trial court abused its great discretion in

ruling on a motion in limine.

As a result of the trial court’s denial of Ms. Edmond’s Motion in Limine in its

entirety, Guillory was able to introduce evidence of her prior accidents and injuries,

including the lawsuit filed by Ms. Edmond involving the severe accident that

occurred in January 2016, less than a month prior to the subject accident. Ms.

Edmond argues that the evidence of her prior accidents and injuries should have

been excluded because “[a]lthough relevant . . . it’s probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” La.Code Evid. 403. Ms. Edmond

contends that the evidence was clearly prejudicial to her as it allowed the trial court

to attribute percentages to the damages it awarded to her based on injuries from both

the January 9, 2016 accident and the subject accident of February 4, 2016.

Contrary to Ms. Edmond’s assertions, Guillory argues that because Ms.

Edmond has had multiple injuries to the same parts of her body, which she claims to

have injured in the subject accident, including a severe accident less than a month

earlier, it was imperative for the trial court to consider her documented medical

2 history in order to make an informed decision as to whether her complaints changed

or worsened as a result of the subject accident and to assess her credibility. In

support of this argument, Guillory relies on Brown v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 95-

1172, p. 19 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/20/96), 671 So.2d 1049, 1060, which states

“[E]vidence of prior injury and claims is admissible insofar as they bear upon any

issue before the court, including credibility, and to establish whether the disability

is causally related to the particular accident.”

Following a October 2007 automobile accident Ms. Edmond sought treatment

for pain in her neck and right shoulder. She rated her pain as an 8. After the

December 2007 automobile accident, Ms. Edmond sought treatment for pain in both

legs and pain in her lower back. She also complained of headache pain. X-rays

were taken of her neck and low back as well as a CT scan of her head. She rated her

pain as an 8 out of 10.

The August 28, 2014 accident involved an incident where Ms. Edmond’s

vehicle was struck on the driver’s side while she was stopped at a red light. The day

following that accident, Ms. Edmond sought treatment at Southwest Medical Center.

Her chief complaint was severe neck and back pain. Her diagnosis was muscle strain

in her neck and back.

The January 9, 2016 accident involved an incident where a tree fell on the

hood of Ms. Edmond’s vehicle as she was driving. As a result of that incident, Ms.

Edmond’s vehicle went from traveling 35 or 40 mph to an immediate stop. Her air

bags deployed, and her vehicle was totaled. The day following the accident, Ms.

Edmond sought treatment at Lafayette General Medical Center. Her chief complaint

was pain in the upper part of her neck, and upper and some lower back pain. Her

diagnosis was cervical strain and lumbosacral strain. She returned to the emergency

3 room on January 18, 2016, with additional complaints of pain in her hips radiating

down her legs.

The subject accident of February 4, 2016 occurred when Ms. Edmond’s

vehicle was struck by the vehicle being driven by Guillory when he crossed an

intersection without yielding to oncoming traffic. That same day, Ms. Edmond

sought treatment at Lafayette General Medical Center. Her chief complaint was pain

in her lower back and the right side of her neck. Lafayette General’s records from

this date reflect that the hospital staff observed Ms. Edmond sitting in the bed

comfortably, actively on her cell phone, in no acute distress, walking without

difficulty, ambulating well, with full range of motion of her neck on exam, no

tenderness, normal strength, and a normal exam. She moved her arms and legs

without difficulty. She was diagnosed with a cervical and lumbosacral strain, which

is the same diagnosis she had after the January 9, 2016 accident.

Ms. Edmond did not receive any additional treatment for over a month, until

she reported to Metropolitan Health Group. On her second visit on March 30, 2016,

Ms. Edmond rated her pain, which she indicated was primarily in her low back, as a

4. Throughout her remaining treatment with Metropolitan Health Group, Ms.

Edmond rated her pain between a 3 and a 6. At no time during her treatment with

Metropolitan Health Group did she rate her pain higher than the pain she was

experiencing in the weeks following the January 9, 2016 tree accident, leading up to

the subject accident. Ms. Edmond was discharged pain free in November 2016

without restrictions.

Ms. Edmond did not seek any additional medical treatment until she was

involved in another automobile accident, on June 15, 2017. As a result of that

accident Ms. Edmond once again sought medical treatment complaining of neck and

back pain. 4 At trial, under direct examination, Ms. Edmond did not disclose any prior

accidents or the ongoing problems she was experiencing prior to the subject accident

or the impact the prior ongoing problems were having on her life. Instead, she

testified:

Q And you’re saying that after the February 4, 2016 accident that’s whenever your neck and back started to hurt?

A Yes.

By allowing Ms. Edmond to be cross-examined regarding her prior accidents

and injuries, the trial court learned that statement was simply not true. The trial court

learned that Ms. Edmond had been involved in an accident on January 9, 2016, just

three and a half weeks prior to the subject accident in which: (1) her vehicle was

totaled; (2) she told the officer at the scene that she was hurt; (3) she injured both

the left and right sides of her neck, and her “whole back” hurt; (4) she sought medical

treatment the following day, rating her pain as a 7; (5) she returned to the emergency

room on January 18, 2016 reporting that she was still in severe pain and had not

gotten any better; (6) she could not get out of bed for two or three days following

the accident; and (7) she missed work.

When asked how her neck was doing during the three and a half weeks

between the accidents, Ms. Edmond initially testified at trial that she would have

rated the pain as a 4 or a 5 during that timeframe. However, this rating was not

consistent with her prior sworn testimony in her September 2017 deposition at which

time she testified that her left sided neck pain would have been rated as an 8 during

that timeframe. Ms. Edmond admitted at trial that her upper and low back pain was

a “7” between the two accidents, which is inconsistent with the pain rating she gave

the emergency room personnel. Ms. Edmond’s pre-accident pain did not

spontaneously resolve. In fact, when she filed suit in July 2016 for the injuries

5 sustained in the January 2016 tree accident, she was still alleging ongoing neck and

back pain. Thus, by Ms. Edmond’s own admission, the neck pain from the January

2016 tree accident continued for about a year and a half after that accident.

The trial court also heard evidence that, unlike the January 2016 accident,

after the subject accident: (1) Ms. Edmond did not report any injury at the scene; (2)

her primary concern was for her vehicle; and (3) she declined the assistance of an

ambulance. Later that night, she reported to Lafayette General Medical Center and

was asked to rate her pain. At trial, she suggested she would have rated it as a 7 or

an 8. However, when provided with the records, she noted that her pain had actually

been rated as a 6, lower than it had been in either of the two hospital visits within

the month prior to the accident.

The primary issue at trial was whether Ms. Edmond’s alleged injuries and

treatment were caused by the subject accident or the prior accidents. With respect

to the measure of damages, the court learned that: (1) Ms. Edmond did not receive

any additional medical treatment for over a month, when she returned to

Metropolitan Health Group; (2) throughout her testimony and even in her treatment

with Metropolitan Health Group, Ms. Edmond attempted to deny or downplay her

prior injuries and complaints and exaggerate her post-accident problems; (3) in the

initial questionnaire at Metropolitan Health Group, Ms. Edmond denied being

involved in any prior accident; (4) and Dr. Mack’s March 7, 2016 report indicating

“According to the patient’s history, the above symptoms did not exist prior to the

subject accident of 2/4/16, and it is my opinion they were caused by the accident,”

was incorrect due to the inaccurate history provided by Ms. Edmond in which she

denied having been involved in any prior accident. Importantly, according to the

evidence, Ms. Edmond was never actually seen by Dr. Mack, while treating at

6 Metropolitan Health Group, and she testified that she could not describe what Dr.

Mack looked like.

Moreover, at trial Ms. Edmond further testified that she had ongoing problems

related to the subject accident. However, the evidence reflects that she was doing

well and did not seek any additional medical treatment until she was involved in a

subsequent automobile accident on June 15, 2017. At that time, Ms. Edmond once

again complained of neck and back pain, never indicating that she had any prior or

ongoing problems from either of the 2016 accidents. Thus, Ms. Edmond’s

inconsistent statements in her medical records, deposition, and testimony regarding

the January 2016 tree accident revealed during trial were relevant in the trial court’s

determination of whether her current complaints were related to the subject accident.

In light of Ms. Edmond’s ongoing symptomatic complaints for which she was

actively treating at the time of the subject accident, the evidence of her prior

accidents and injuries was clearly admissible.

After reviewing the record before this court, it is clear that the trial court

sought to hear all evidence relevant to Ms. Edmond’s claim to determine whether

any of the treatment rendered to Ms. Edmond was necessitated by the subject

accident or her prior accident(s), including the one less than a month earlier. We

find that the evidence is relevant to whether Ms. Edmond sustained any aggravation

to her prior injuries due to the subject accident. It is also relevant to a credibility

determination. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO:

In her second assignment of error, Ms. Emond contends that the trial court’s

award of $3,000.00 in general damages was abusively low. We find no merit to this

contention.

7 An appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in absence

of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Stobart v. State, through DOTD, 617

So.2d 880 (La.1993); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). A two-tiered test

must be applied in order to reverse the findings of the trial court:

1) The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and

2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987), quoting, Arceneaux v. Dominque, 365

So.2d 1330, 1333 (La. 1979).

In Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1260 (La. 1993), cert

denied, 510 U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059, (1994), our supreme court stated as follows

concerning the review of general damage awards:

[T]he role of an appellate court in reviewing general damages is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. Each case is different, and the adequacy or inadequacy of the award should be determined by the facts or circumstances particular to the case under consideration.

. . . . The initial inquiry is whether the award for the particular injuries and their effects under the particular circumstances on the particular injured person is a clear abuse of the “much discretion” of the trier of fact. Only after such a determination of an abuse of discretion is a resort to prior awards appropriate and then for the purpose of determining the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion. Id. at 1260 (citations omitted).

Ms. Edmond argues that the trial court’s award of twenty-five percent of her

medical expenses and $3,000.00 in general damages is abusively low. “A victim is

entitled to compensation for an aggravation of a preexisting condition or injury.”

Tobin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 So.2d 946, 950 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,

580 So.2d 923 (La.1991). She contends that because Guillory’s negligence

aggravated a previous condition, he must compensate her for the full extent of the

aggravation.

8 Guillory argues that the trial court’s award of twenty-five percent of Ms.

Edmond’s medical expenses and $3,000.00 in general damages is not abusively low

when the evidence reflects that: (1) she had been involved in a severe accident 3 ½

weeks prior to the subject accident in which her vehicle was totaled; (2) she

complained of the same injuries during the 3 ½ weeks leading up to the subject

accident; (3) she had severe enough pain from the prior accident that she sought

emergency care and was actively seeking additional care at the time of the subject

accident; (4) she rated her pain after the subject accident lower than she rated it

before the subject accident; and (5) the only medical testimony relating to Ms.

Edmond’s complaints to the subject accident was based on an inaccurate assumption

that she did not have any symptoms before the accident, by a doctor who never

examined her.

Our review of the record reveals Ms. Edmond did not prove any objective

worsening as a result of the February 2016 accident. Moreover, the only evidence

to support a finding that Ms. Edmond’s pain intensified after the subject accident

was her own self-serving testimony, which was contradicted by the evidence

presented at trial raising serious concern about its veracity and suggesting it should

carry very little weight. As such, we find that the trial court’s award for the injuries

claimed by Ms. Edmond under the circumstances of this case did not constitute an

abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of $3,000.00 in

general damages and twenty-five percent of Ms. Edmond’s medical expenses.

CONCLUSION:

On appeal, Ms. Edmond argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence

of her prior accidents and injuries and by rendering an abusively low damages award.

Finding no merit to these arguments of error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling on

these issues. 9 Costs of these proceedings are assessed to Liza Edmond.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Uniform Rules– Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.