Livson v. Pazer

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Livson v. Pazer

121 A.D.3d 952, 993 N.Y.S.2d 915

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 22, 2014

Docket2013-07438

StatusPublished

This text of 121 A.D.3d 952 (Livson v. Pazer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Livson v. Pazer, 121 A.D.3d 952, 993 N.Y.S.2d 915 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated May 13, 2013, which granted the motion of the defendants Shelley Pazer and Gary Baronofsky for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that she did not sustain a *953 serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, and that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Dmitry Zarudyansky which sought the same relief.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendants Shelley Pazer and Gary Baronofsky.

The defendants established their respective prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants.

Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Hinds-Radix, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), dated May 13, 2013, which granted the motion of the defendants Shelley Pazer and Gary Baronofsky for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that she did not sustain a *953 serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident, and that branch of the cross motion of the defendant Dmitry Zarudyansky which sought the same relief.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendants Shelley Pazer and Gary Baronofsky.

The defendants established their respective prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants.

Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Hinds-Radix, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

121 A.D.3d 952, 993 N.Y.S.2d 915, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/livson-v-pazer-nyappdiv-2014.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack