Livingston v. State

18 Nev. 352
Nevada Supreme Court·Decided July 15, 1884·No. No. 1187·Published

Opinion

By the Court,

IIawley, C. J.:

The act of the legislature providing for the purchase of the territorial bonds, for the benefit of the school fund, declares that the commissioners therein named are authorized to purchase the bonds, “if they can purchase the whole issue, (three hundred and eighty thousand dollars,) and not otherwise, if such purchase can be made at such rate of premium as would guarantee to the purchaser four and one-half per cent, per annum interest on the amount paid during the life of the bonds so purchased.” (Stat. 1879, 15 sec 3.) In pursuance of the provisions of this act, the commissioners purchased the bonds from appellants. One hundred and sixty thousand dollars were delivered February 1, 1879, and two hundred and twenty thousand dollars were delivered April 1, 1879. At the time of the purchase there was six thousand three hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three and one-third cents interest [355] due on the one hundred and sixty thousaud dollars bonds, and one thousand seven hundred and forty-one dollars and sixty-six and two-thirds cents on the two hundred and twenty thousand dollars bonds. The amount paid for interest to date of purchase was eight thousand and seventy-five dollars. The amount paid for the bonds was four hundred ninety-one thousand six hundred and twenty-seven dollars and fifteen cents, making the total amount paid to appellants four hundred and ninety-nine thousand seven hundred and two dollars and fifteen cents. The territorial bonds so purchased were issued on March 1, 1872, and were made payable in fifteen years, with interest thereon at nine and one-half per cent, per annum. Interest coupons were attached to the bonds, and were made payable September 1st and March 1st of each year. The bonds would be due March 1, 1887. At the time of the delivery of the bonds to the commissioners, appellants claimed that there was an error in the method of computation in arriving at the amount that should be paid, and this suit was instituted by them for the recovery of the sum of sixteen thousand one hundred and eighty-five dollars and seventeen cents, a balance alleged to be due them on the purchase of the bonds.

Accepting as correct the theory contended for by appellants, that the amount to be paid is to be ascertained by an interpretation of the statute, and waiviug all the preliminary and technical objections urged by respondent’s counsel against the right of appellants to recover in this action, we are called upon to answer the question: “ What is the sum which the state, under the terms of the law, is to pay for the bonds?” Appellants claim that, inasmuch as the interest on the bonds is payable semi-annually, the state must settle every year with itself, and must pay interest on its bonds every six months ; that the owners of the bonds were entitled to have this interest taken into the calculation at the end of each year, instead of at the end of the life of the bonds; that the rule of settlement should be to “compute the interest on .the principal sum from the time when [356] the interest commenced, to the time of the first payment in each case, then settle; deduct the excess of interest due to Livingston from the sum due to the state. . The balance will be n new principal; and so on to the end. ’ ’ The authorities cited in favor of this method of computation have reference solely to the rule of computing interest in cases of partial payments on notes, or other evidences of indebtedness ; and the rule is stated as follows :

“Compute the interest on the principal sum from the time when the interest commenced, to the first time when a payment was made, which exceeds, either alone or in conjuctiou with the preceding payments, if any, the interest at that time due; add that interest to the principal, and from the sum subtract the payment made at that time, together with the preceding payments, if any, and the remainder forms a new principal, on which compute and subtract the interest as upon the first principal; and proceed in this milliner to the time of the judgment.” (2 Pars. Bills and N. 425, and authorities there cited.)

This rule is one of almost universal application in the class of cases referred to, and is always to be applied in such, a manner as to prevent the interest forming a part of the principal so as to carry interest. It cannot, therefore, be invoked in favor of the rule as claimed by appellants in a case like this, because if the interest-on the bonds in question is to be added to the principal each year, a settlement then made, and a new principal given, it requires no argument to show that such a computation would result iu the interest drawing some interest.

Other authorities are cited to the effect that the interest coupons attached to the bonds were negotiable securities, and that the holders thereof might collect interest thereon after they became due, if the same was not paid at. maturity. 'These principles will be admitted as correct, as they have not been questioned, and have no special application to the facts of this case. No question is raised as to the power of the legislature to pass a law authorizing a computation to be made upon the method claimed by appellants. The [357] question is whether the law, as passed, authorizes such a method of computation. If the bonds had not been purchased, the state would only have been required to pay the holders the amount of the principal and interest thereon at the rate of nine and one-half per cent, per annum for the life of the bonds. Of course, the bonds were of greater value to the holders on account of the interest being made payable semi-annually, because the interest when paid could be reinvested in other securities. A banking-house or capitalist engaged in the business of loaning money and discounting debts, due at a future time, would naturally take this fact into consideration in ascertaining thé present value of the bonds, and would, doubtless, give more for the bonds than if the interest was not to be paid until the maturity of the bonds. Appellants might, therefore, have refused to sell the bonds to the state on the ground that they were of greater value than the sum ottered, and if they thought the method of computation invoked by the commissioners and other experts was not just and equitable, they ought to have refused to deliver the bonds upon such terms. The law could not, and did not attempt to, compel appellants to sell the bonds. The sale was optional upon their part. They were at liberty, if they saw fit, to sell the bonds for a less amount than they received; but in no event can they recover any greater amount than the statute authorizes to be paid. Upon what method of calculation is this sum. to be determined ?

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Livingston v. State, 18 Nev. 352 (Neb. 1884).

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