Livingston Parish School Board v. Lofton
This text of 422 So. 2d 1357 (Livingston Parish School Board v. Lofton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its suit to enforce the school compulsory attendance law.
The issue is the propriety of the procedure employed. We dismiss the appeal.
The Livingston Parish School Board, through its Supervisor of Child Welfare and Attendance, filed suit against Harold David Lofton and Wanda Nichols Lofton, parents of Davina Lofton, seeking a monetary judgment under LSA-R.S. 17:221, which reads in pertinent part:
“A. Every parent, tutor, or other person residing within the state of Louisiana, having control or charge of any child between the ages of .seven and fifteen, both inclusive, i.e., from the seventh to the sixteenth birthday, shall send such child to a public or private day school provided that any child below the age of seven who legally enrolls in school shall also be subject to ‘the provisions of this Subpart. Every parent, tutor, or other person responsible for sending a child to a public or private day school under provisions of this Subpart shall also assure the attendance of such child in regularly assigned classes during regular school hours established by the school board.
“Whoever violates the provisions of this Subsection or any other provisions of this subpart shall be fined not more than fifteen dollars. Each day the violation continues shall constitute a separate offense.
“Visiting teachers or supervisors of child welfare and attendance, with the approval of the parish or city superintendents of schools, shall file proceedings in court to enforce the provisions of this Subpart.”
Defendants testified that they kept their daughter, who was within the age limit of the statute, out of school during the entire 1980-81 school year and that their religious beliefs prevented Davina’s return to school. Defendants did not claim any exemption from compulsory attendance1 and stated [1359]*1359that Davina was not enrolled in any approved home study program as permitted under LSA-R.S. 17:236.2 Defendants further stipulated to the allegations of the petition that at the time of the filing of the suit, Davina had not been in school for 127 days.
The trial judge gave oral reasons in rendering judgment in favor of defendants. Essentially these reasons were that he believed a monetary judgment against the defendants would not entice or persuade them to send their child to school; that the 1980 act providing for home study programs diminished the effect of the statute; that a compromise was still possible whereby a home study program satisfactory to all parties could be formulated and approved and that, as a last resort, the child could be taken from her parents. He noted that a petition had been filed in the juvenile docket of the court and that a public defender had been appointed to represent the child.
The intention of the legislature in enacting LSA-R.S. 17:221 was to obtain the compulsory attendance at school of all children between the ages of seven and fifteen except those specifically declared to be exempt. State v. Pettifield, 210 La. 609, 27 So.2d 424 (1946). The terms of the statute are mandatory. LSA-R.S. 1:3. The penalty provision of this section, which states that a violator “shall be fined,” limits the discretion of the trial judge and mandates the imposition of a fine “not more than fifteen dollars” for each violation.
A review of the record establishes a clear and continuing violation of Section 221.
Nevertheless, we dismiss the appeal.
The statute, we hold, contemplates two methods of enforcement. The first is through criminal proceedings as contained in the second paragraph. The second is through civil proceedings with court orders and contempt proceedings as contemplated in paragraph three.
The first is clearly penal in nature, is to be conducted in the name of the state and is to be conducted by the district attorney. A provision for imprisonment was eliminated only as late as the 1976 amendment to the statute.
We believe that plaintiff has pursued the wrong remedy.
We therefore dismiss the appeal at appellant’s costs.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
422 So. 2d 1357, 8 Educ. L. Rep. 213, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 8425, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/livingston-parish-school-board-v-lofton-lactapp-1982.