J-S25022-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
LIVE NATION ENTERTAINMENT, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WEBER GALLAGHER SIMPSON : STAPLETON FIRES & NEWBY, LLP, : CHANGE 4 GOOD, INC., ERIC : No. 2361 EDA 2023 BLUMENFELD, HOLY GHOST MET : MASTER TENANT, LLC, DIVINE : HOSPITALITY MET, LLC, HOLY : GHOST HEADQUARTERS REVIVAL : CENTER AT THE MET, INC., : RAYMOND ANTHONY MOLOCK, LAFF : OUT LOUD, INC., AND PATRICK J. : STAPLETON : : : APPEAL OF: ERIC BLUMENFELD, : HOLY GHOST MET MASTER TENANT, : LLC, DIVINE HOSPITALITY MET, LLC :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 220300657
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2024
Eric Blumenfeld, Holy Ghost Met Master Tenant, LLC (“Met Master”) and
Divine Hospitality Met, LLC (“Divine Hospitality”) (collectively, “the Blumenfeld
Defendants”) appeal from the order granting leave to Weber Gallagher
Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby, LLP and Patrick J. Stapleton (collectively,
“the Weber Defendants”) to disclose privileged documents relating to their
legal representation of the Blumenfeld Defendants. We reverse and remand. J-S25022-24
The plaintiff, Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (“Live Nation”), operates a
live entertainment venue in the former Metropolitan Opera House referred to
as “the Met.” The trial court summarized the allegations Live Nation brought
in its complaint as follows:
[Live Nation alleged the defendants] engaged in a secret, wide- ranging, fraudulent and tortious conspiracy and scheme to divest [Live Nation] and its vendor of their valid and enforceable liquor license [at the Met], [and] to remove [Live Nation] from [the Met] so that [the Blumenfeld Defendants] would operate the Met in their place, all in an effort to take over [Live Nation’s] business and improvements through fraud.
[Live Nation] also alleged that [the Weber Defendants] breached their duties of loyalty and full disclosure and violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 requiring them to avoid conflicts of interest by: placing [the Blumenfeld Defendants’] interests above those of [Live Nation]; concealing and failing to disclose the scheme to divest [Live Nation] of its vendor’s liquor license and thereby interfering with [Live Nation’s] ability to operate the Met; submitting the fraudulent application before the [Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (“PLCB”)]; making patently false statements to the PLCB in furtherance of the plot; and through the other conduct set forth above.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/22/23, at 1-2 (quotation marks and footnotes omitted,
format altered, some alterations in the original).
Essentially, Live Nation alleges that the Blumenfeld Defendants
schemed to take over its operations at the Met. To effectuate this scheme, in
March 2021, Met Master – one of Blumenfeld’s companies, that leases the Met
to Live Nation – wrongfully petitioned for and obtained a confessed judgment
for ejectment against Live Nation for non-payment of rent. However, Live
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Nation successfully petitioned the court to open the confessed judgment. The
judgment was opened two months later, in May 2021.
Live Nation alleges that the following month, in June 2021, another
company of Blumenfeld’s, Divine Hospitality, entered an agreement with Met
Master to lease the Met. Divine Hospitality also purchased a liquor license from
a third party and applied to the PLCB to use that license at the Met. During
the applications process, Divine Hospitality allegedly knowingly
misrepresented to the PLCB that it was the sole tenant at the Met, that Live
Nation was no longer permitted to operate at the Met because of the confessed
judgment (which had since been opened), and that the liquor license held by
Live Nation’s concessions vendor was invalid. According to the complaint, the
PLCB will only issue one liquor license for any given location.
According to Live Nation, the Weber Defendants represented Divine
Hospitality when it applied for the transfer of the liquor license and filed the
fraudulent application with the PLCB. Live Nation alleges that at the same
time, the Weber Defendants legally represented Live Nation “in multiple
premises liability matters,” and previously represented Live Nation regarding
its operations at other venues. Live Nation alleges the Weber Defendants
failed to inform it that they had undertaken representation of the Blumenfeld
Defendants or that Divine Hospitality had applied for a liquor license at the
Met. See Complaint, filed 3/4/22, at ¶¶ 5, 26-30, 45-46, 48, 54, 56, 59-65.
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In addition, Live Nation alleges that Met Master, in concert with other
named defendants,1 held for-profit events at the Met between June 2021 and
February 2022, without its consent. These defendants used special occasion
liquor permits they obtained from the PLCB without disclosing to the PLCB that
there was an existing liquor license for the Met. Live Nations claims this
violated both the terms of its lease with Met Master and liquor licensing laws,
thereby jeopardizing the liquor license held by its concessions vendor. Live
Nations alleges that the applications for the special occasion permits, while
not filed by the Weber Defendants, “were the brainchild” of the Weber
Defendants and Blumenfeld Defendants. Id. at ¶ 71.
Count I of the complaint requested a permanent injunction to prevent
all defendants from making any attempt to invalidate Live Nation’s vendor’s
liquor license or to seek any liquor license at the Met during the term of Live
Nation’s lease. It also sought to preclude them from hosting events at the Met
in which liquor is sold or permitting liquor to be consumed at any event not
hosted by Live Nation.
Count II, against Met Master, alleged abuse of process for wrongfully
pursuing a confessed judgment in ejectment against Live Nation.
Counts III, IV, V, and VI were for tortious interference, unfair
competition, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting tortious conduct. These
____________________________________________
1 The other parties listed in the caption as defendants (Change 4 Good, Inc.,
Holy Ghost Headquarters Revival Center at the Met, Inc., Raymond Anthony Molock, and Laff out Loud, Inc.), are not part of this appeal.
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counts were against all defendants, including the Weber Defendants. These
counts alleged the defendants interfered with Live Nation’s contract with its
concessions vendor, which requires it to hold a liquor license; harmed Live
Nation’s commercial relationships; conspired to commit unlawful acts; or
rendered substantial assistance to those committing the foregoing.
Count VII was for breach of contract against Met Master and another
defendant for hosting events at the Met that were prohibited by the lease and
jeopardized the liquor license held by Live Nation’s concessions vendor.
Count VIII, for “malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty,” was against
the Weber Defendants. It incorporated all preceding allegations in the
complaint. It stated the Weber Defendants
breached their duties of loyalty and full disclosure and violated Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 requiring the [Weber Defendants] to avoid conflicts of interest by: placing the [the Blumenfeld Defendants’] interests above those of Live Nation; concealing and failing to disclose the scheme to divest Live Nation of its vendor’s liquor license and thereby interfering with Live Nation’s ability to operate at the Met; submitting the fraudulent application before the PLCB; making patently false statements to the PLCB in furtherance of the plot; and through the other conduct set forth above.
Id. at ¶ 115. It also generally alleged the Weber Defendants deviated from
the standard of care required of Pennsylvania attorneys.
The relief Live Nation requested for each count was “compensatory and
punitive damages in an amount in excess of the statutory minimum for
arbitration, plus judgment interest and such other and further relief as this
Court deems just and appropriate.” See, e.g., id. at ¶ 119.
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The Blumenfeld Defendants filed preliminary objections. 2 The court
issued an order sustaining the preliminary objections in part. It dismissed
Counts III, IV, V, and VI to the extent that these counts were based on filing
the complaint in confession of judgment in ejectment or the application to
transfer the liquor license. The court held, “As the liquor license was not
transferred and the application to transfer was withdrawn, [Live Nation] has
not suffered any actual harm and the claims fail.” Order, 9/15/22, at 1-2. It
ruled, “As for the other conduct alleged by [Live Nation], the allegations of
general damages are sufficient to state a claim.” Id. at 2 n.1.
The Weber Defendants filed a motion for leave to disclose their
privileged client file relating to their representation of the Blumenfeld
Defendants. They asserted that Live Nation served them with a document
request for the file, and that its disclosure was necessary for their defense
against Live Nation’s claims. 3
The court entered an order instructing the Weber Defendants to produce
all non-privileged documents in the Blumenfeld Defendants’ client file and to
deliver any privileged documents to chambers for in camera review. The ____________________________________________
2 According to the docket, Live Nation filed an answer to the preliminary objections on April 29, 2022. This document is not in the certified record, reproduced record, or supplemental reproduced record.
3 Previously, the court granted the Blumenfeld Defendants’ emergency motion
to preclude the disclosure of the privileged documents. However, the court did so without prejudice to the Weber Defendants to “file a motion seeking to produce privileged documents if necessary to establish a defense to the claims set forth in the complaint as they exist following [the order deciding preliminary objections].” Order, 9/15/22, at 1.
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Weber Defendants filed a responsive memorandum arguing that disclosure of
the entire file, including all privileged communications, would be necessary to
prove their defense.
The court held argument4 and granted the motion.5 It granted the Weber
Defendants leave to produce “all of the documents contained in Binder No. 1
and Binder No. 2 concerning their representation of [Divine Hospitality’s]
application for a liquor license at [the Met],” finding that disclosure of those
documents “reasonably necessary” for the Weber Defendants to establish their
defense. Order, 9/13/23, at 1. It found that “document-by-document review
of the documents in these binders is unnecessary in light of Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6(c)(4)’s exception to a lawyer’s duty of
confidentiality[.]” Id. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court elaborated that it
did not grant the Weber Defendants leave to disclose the entire client file, but
only the contents of Binders Nos. 1 and 2 – which include the privileged
communications surrounding the application for the liquor license – to prove
the extent of their communications with the Blumenfeld Defendants regarding
the license application:
Here, this court relied on Pa.R.P.C. 1.6(c)(4) in granting the Motion for Leave to disclose [the] Weber Defendants’ specific documents to [Live Nation]. This court did not order [the Weber Defendants] to produce the entire client file, only specific documents contained in Binder No. 1 and Binder No. 2. The ____________________________________________
4 The argument was not a matter of record. See Letter, 10/6/23.
5 The court granted the motion based on the recommendation of the judge pro tempore that presided over the hearing.
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documents were concerning the Weber Defendants’ representation of the application for a liquor license at the premises. The production of the specific documents is necessary to demonstrate what information [the] Blumenfeld Defendants conveyed, as well as what it did not convey, to [the] Weber Defendants. The partial release of the specific documents creates doubt as to Weber Defendants are withholding damaging documents in their client file. In other words, the only means [the] Weber Defendants have of proving they were not part of [the Blumenfeld Defendants’ alleged] scheme and making this defense is to show all the information they were provided by [the] Blumenfeld Defendants concerning their representation of the application for a liquor license.
Trial Ct. Op. at 4-5.
The Blumenfeld Defendants appealed. 6 They raise the following issues:
Is the Weber Defendants’ professed belief that production of the Client File is necessary for them to establish a defense to Live Nation’s sole remaining claim against them objectively reasonable?
Should the Trial Court have reviewed the documents at issue in camera to determine if their production is reasonably necessary for the Weber Defendants to establish a defense to Live Nation’s sole remaining claim against them[?]
The Blumenfeld Defendants’ Br. at 3 (trial court answers omitted).
The Blumenfeld Defendants argue that the trial court abused its
discretion because Rule 1.6(c)(4) requires the disclosing attorney to
reasonably believe that the disclosure of the confidential information is
necessary for its own defense, and here, the Weber Defendants could not have
reasonably held this belief. The Blumenfeld Defendants assert that the only
6 Divine Hospitality Group, LLC, while listed as an appellant on the notice of
appeal, is a non-party to the below action. Following our issuance of a rule to show cause, and upon that entity’s praecipe to do so, we discontinued the appeal as to Divine Hospitality Group, LLC.
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remaining claim against the Weber Defendants is Count VIII, alleging they
breached a fiduciary duty to Live Nation by engaging in a conflict of interest.
Live Nation posits that, accordingly, the only defenses available to the Weber
Defendants are (1) they did not represent Live Nation at the time of the events
in question or (2) their representation of the Blumenfeld Defendants at the
same time was not adverse to Live Nation. The Blumenfeld Defendants assert
that the answers to either question would not be established by disclosure of
the privileged communications with the Weber Defendants.
They also argue that the mere fact that the Weber Defendants applied
for a liquor license to replace Live Nation’s liquor license constituted a conflict
of interest, regardless of whether the Weber Defendants made any
misrepresentations in the application. They further argue that, even if the
question of whether they informed the Weber Defendants that the confessed
judgment had been opened was relevant, the absence of this information in
the client file would not prove whether they disclosed that fact to the Weber
Defendants, as they could have done so orally. They also argue that disclosure
of their communications with the Weber Defendants would not prove whether
the Weber Defendants were independently aware of the status of the
confessed judgment — or should have been — as it was a matter of public
record.
Second, the Blumenfeld Defendants argue the court should have
conducted an in camera review to determine whether any of the privileged
documents support a defense for the Weber Defendants. The Blumenfeld
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Defendants contend it is not reasonable for an attorney to disclose her entire
file, and the court should have acted as an “objective arbiter of
reasonableness.” The Blumenfeld Defendants’ Br. at 20.
The Weber Defendants respond that disclosure of the file is necessary
because it will establish
that they did not (i) engage in any conflict of interest when they represented Divine Hospitality in pursuing its liquor license application; (ii) engage in any alleged fraudulent and tortious conspiracy or scheme to divest Live Nation of its liquor license at the Met; (iii) engage in any fraudulent and tortious conspiracy or scheme to harm Live Nation’s business interests; (iv) knowingly submit a false liquor license application to the PLCB on behalf of Divine Hospitality; and (v) knowingly assist Divine Hospitality with taking action adverse to the interests of Live Nation.
The Weber Defendants’ Br. at 29. The Weber Defendants assert that the claims
against it are not limited to a conflict of interest, but include malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty, and that these claims are premised on allegations of
wrongful and tortious conduct. The Weber Defendants also argue the
Blumenfeld Defendants waived the issue of whether the court should have
conducted an in camera review by failing to specifically request this from the
trial court, and that is not required by Rule 1.6(c)(4).
“Generally, on review of an order concerning discovery, an appellate
court applies an abuse of discretion standard.” McNeil v. Jordan, 894 A.2d
1260, 1268 (Pa. 2006). However, “[w]hether the attorney-client privilege or
the work product doctrine protects a communication from disclosure is a
question of law.” Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Bethlehem v. Vivian, 99 A.3d 534,
540 (Pa.Super. 2014). We review questions of law under a de novo standard
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and with a plenary scope. McNeil v. Jordan, 894 A.2d at 1268; Saint Luke’s
Hosp. of Bethlehem, 99 A.3d at 540.
Pennsylvania law provides that, in general, communications between
attorneys and clients are privileged and not discoverable. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5928 (defining privileged information as confidential communications made to
an attorney by a client, and providing counsel is not permitted to testify to
privileged information); Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1(a) (providing non-privileged
documents relevant to the subject matter are discoverable). Attorney-client
privilege “is founded upon a policy extrinsic to the protection of the fact-finding
process. The intended beneficiary of this policy is not the individual client so
much as the systematic administration of justice which depends on frank and
open client-attorney communication.” Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Bethlehem, 99
A.3d at 550 (citation omitted).7
Here, the trial court relied on Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6(c)(4). This rule states that a lawyer “shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client” without the client’s consent, except “to the extent
that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary. . . to establish a defense” to a
claim against them “based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or
to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s
7 See also Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510, 514 (Pa.Super. 1980) (en
banc) (“To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance”) (citation omitted).
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representation of the client[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1.6(a), (c)(4). The explanatory
comment to the Rule explains that this self-defense exception applies to
allegations by a third party that the lawyer and client committed wrongs in
concert. Id. at Explanatory Comment, ¶ 14.
Rule 1.6 is an ethical rule that applies to confidential information
obtained in relation to an attorney’s representation of a client; it does not
control whether certain materials are privileged or beyond the scope of
discovery. See Perelman v. Raymond G. Perelman Revocable Tr., 259
A.3d 1000, 1007-10 (Pa.Super. 2021) (differentiating between the ethical
confidentiality provisions of Rule 1.6 and attorney-client privilege).
Nonetheless, “when it is shown that the interests of the administration of
justice can only be frustrated by the exercise of [attorney-client] privilege, the
trial judge may require that the communication be disclosed.” Id. at 1008
(citation omitted). While Rule 1.6(c)(4) is not controlling, this Court in
Perelman concluded that it can “provide a justification for a lawyer’s
disclosure of client confidences,” and a trial court may rely on it when allowing
the production of privileged documents. Id. at 1010. The holder of any
privilege waives the privilege by asserting a claim or defense in litigation and
then attempting to prove that claim or defense by reference to the otherwise
privileged material. Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 253 (Pa. 2011).
To assess whether disclosure of the privileged communications between
the Weber Defendants and the Blumenfeld Defendants is necessary to
establish a defense to the allegations against the Weber Defendants, we must
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examine the counts against them that remained after the court decided the
Blumenfeld Defendants’ preliminary objections.
Count I is against all defendants, to enjoin them from making further
attempts to obtain a liquor license at the Met or allowing liquor to be consumed
at the Met at events not hosted by Live Nation. Live Nation requests the
injunction “to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated through money
damages.” Compl. at ¶ 83. Whether Live Nation is entitled to injunctive relief
designed to prevent future harm is not dependent on the past communications
between the Blumenfeld Defendants and Weber Defendants.
Counts III through VI8 are against all defendants, including the Weber
Defendants, for tortious interference, unfair competition, conspiracy, and
aiding and abetting tortious conduct. Regarding the Weber Defendants, the
complaint alleges they assisted the Blumenfeld Defendants/Divine Hospitality
in applying for a liquor license at the Met; knowingly made misrepresentations
to the PLCB during that process; did not disclose these activities to Live
Nation; and masterminded the applications for the special occasion permits
that other parties used to host for-profit events at the Met that injured Live
Nation’s commercial relationships.
The court sustained the preliminary objections to these counts to the
extent the claims are based Divine Hospitality’s application to transfer a liquor
license to the Met, because the license never transferred and Live Nation
8 Counts II and VII do not name the Weber Defendants.
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suffered no harm. However, the privileged documents at issue contain
communications pertaining only to their representation of Divine Hospitality
for its application for a liquor license. We fail to see how the contents of these
documents are necessary to prove a defense to claims that have been
dismissed on the basis that there were no damages alleged. Furthermore, the
holder of the privilege has not put the privileged documents in issue here.
The court did not rule that Live Nation has failed to allege damages
resulting from the other conduct in which the Weber Defendants were
allegedly involved: i.e., assisting other named defendants in applying for the
special occasion permits. However, the court only ordered production of
documents related to Divine Hospitality’s application for a liquor license. It did
not order disclosure of the entire client file, or any communications
purportedly related to the applications for the special occasion permits. As the
documents at issue do not pertain to these claims, their production would not
provide a defense.
Count VIII is against the Weber Defendants specifically. This final count
alleges the Weber Defendants breached two of their fiduciary duties to Live
Nation – the duty of loyalty and the duty of disclosure – and engaged in a
conflict of interest in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7.
We note Count VIII also generally alleges legal malpractice by the Weber
Defendants. However, Live Nation has not alleged the Weber Defendants
failed to adhere to the appropriate standard of care when representing Live
Nation in its unrelated legal matters. Rather, Live Nation’s malpractice claim
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is wholly based on allegations that the Weber Defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by assisting the Blumenfeld Defendants in pursuing the liquor
license and the special occasion permits.9
We reiterate that the Rules of Professional Conduct are not substantive
law, and a violation of the Rules does not, in and of itself, constitute legal
malpractice. In re Est. of Pedrick, 482 A.2d 215, 217 (Pa. 1984). However,
to the extent the Rules embody common law, such as the fiduciary duties an
attorney owes to her clients, conduct which constitutes a violation of the Rules
may be actionable. Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602
A.2d 1277, 1284-85, 1288 (Pa. 1992).10 Relevant here, common law imposes
civil liability on attorneys who breach their fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty
by engaging in conflicts of interest. Id. at 1285-86; see also Dougherty v.
Pepper Hamilton LLP, 133 A.3d 792, 797-98 (Pa.Super. 2016) (discussing
Maritrans).
To recover damages in a malpractice action premised on a breach of
fiduciary duty, the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship with the defendant; (2) that the defendant negligently or
intentionally failed to act in good faith and solely for the plaintiff’s benefit; and
(3) that this caused the plaintiff to suffer injury. Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. ____________________________________________
9 Live Nation has not alleged the Weber Defendants breached their duty of confidentiality when representing the Blumenfeld Defendants.
10 The Rules may also inform the standard of care relevant to prove the breach
of a fiduciary duty in a malpractice action in lieu of expert testimony. See Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 67 (Pa. 1989).
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Co., 288 A.3d 76, 88 (Pa. 2023); see also Maritrans, 602 A.2d at 1286
(citing actions for damages resulting from conflicts of interest where law firm
usurped client’s business opportunity and where law firm assisted in
undercutting former client’s business relationships).
As we found above, because the trial court ruled that Live Nation
suffered no injury from the application for the liquor license, the disclosure of
the privileged documents pertaining to that issue is unnecessary to defend
against that claim. And, while Live Nation also alleges the Weber Defendants
assisted other named defendants in obtaining special occasion permits, the
documents at issue pertain only to the Weber Defendant’s representation of
Divine Hospitality in its application for a liquor license. Therefore, their
disclosure would not exculpate the Weber Defendants against the other claims
against them.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 11/14/2024
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