Liu v. Blanche
This text of Liu v. Blanche (Liu v. Blanche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 5 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JIN LIU, No. 25-2550 Agency No. Petitioner, A078-446-352 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 30, 2026**
Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Jin Liu seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The parties are
familiar with the facts, and we do not recite them here. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act deprives us of jurisdiction to review
Liu’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen as to his applications
for asylum and statutory withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (“[N]o
court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien
who is removable by reason of having committed a [covered] criminal offense.”);
Coria v. Garland, 114 F.4th 994, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2024) (Section 1252(a)(2)(C)
bars judicial review of challenges to a final order of removal against criminal
aliens raised in a motion to reopen). Liu remains removable under Section
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for his conviction of an aggravated felony related to illicit
trafficking of a controlled substance, and Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for his
conviction of a controlled substance violation. He also presents no colorable
“constitutional claims or questions of law” over which we could retain jurisdiction.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Section 1252(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdictional bar leaves only Liu’s request for
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) intact. Coria, 114 F.4th at
1000. Although Liu filed his motion to reopen more than six years after the BIA’s
initial decision, that motion is based on changed country conditions and is not
subject to the standard ninety-day time limit. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii).
We do not decide whether Liu carried his burden to establish a “material”
2 25-2550 change in conditions in China, id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), because Liu does not
establish prima facie eligibility for CAT relief. Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76
F.4th 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2023). In support of his application for relief, Liu
submitted an affidavit from his father claiming that local police in Tianjin came to
his home and demanded that Liu return to China to stand trial for the “crime of
secession,” a “Receipt” indicating membership in the Chinese Democracy Party in
the United States, photographs of Liu attending demonstrations, press releases by
the United States government discussing Chinese government activities in this
country, and articles discussing Chinese government activities in this country and
elsewhere. That threadbare evidence is plainly insufficient for purposes of a CAT
claim. There was no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that Liu’s
evidence did not establish “a reasonable likelihood,” id. at 1179–81, that “it is
more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured” by, “at the instigation of, or
with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official . . . or other person acting in
an official capacity” if removed to China. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2),
1208.18(a)(1). Liu’s evidence is too generalized and speculative to support the
conclusion that the treatment that he would receive upon removal to China would
amount to torture. See Sarkar v. Garland, 39 F.4th 611, 623 (9th Cir. 2022)
(collecting cases).
3 25-2550 PETITION DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.1
1 The stay of removal (Dkt. No. 2) will dissolve when the mandate issues.
4 25-2550
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