Littles v. Bodiford

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedFebruary 22, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00468
StatusUnknown

This text of Littles v. Bodiford (Littles v. Bodiford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Littles v. Bodiford, (D.S.C. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Dwight Alonso Littles, Jr., ) C/A No.: 1:22-468-JMC-SVH ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ORDER AND NOTICE ) Scotty Bodiford and Greenville ) County Council, ) ) Defendants. ) )

Dwight Alonso Littles, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Scotty Bodiford (“Bodiford”) and Greenville County Council (“Council”) (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. I. Factual Background Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Greenville County Detention Center (“GCDC”) and alleges the facility has no quarantine procedures and does not test newly-booked inmates. [ECF No. 1 at 5]. He claims he tested positive for COVID twice and was not taken to the hospital. . at 7. Plaintiff complains that the holding cells have a television but no cameras. . at 6. He claims he was forced to use the same linens and jumpsuit for over two weeks and was not given a shower for nine days. . He alleges he does not have access to legal

material. . He requests immediate release and $50,000 in damages. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits

an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. , 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim 7based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

attorneys. , 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. ., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should

do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can

ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. ., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it

clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. , 556 U.S. 662, 677‒78 (2009); , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on

its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. , 556 U.S. at 678‒79. B. Analysis 1. Insufficient allegations as to Bodiford

Plaintiff’s complaint contains no factual allegations against Bodiford. To the extent Plaintiff has sued Bodiford in his supervisory capacity, he has failed to state a claim under § 1983. The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in

illegal action. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); , 690 F.2d 1133, 1142–43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” , 556 U.S. at 676; , 737 F.2d 368, 372–74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable

risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). Plaintiff does not alleged Bodiford is responsible for, or even aware of, the conditions of which he complains. Therefore, Bodiford is subject to summary dismissal.

2. Council is Not a “Person” To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed

by a person acting under the color of state law. , 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In this case, Council is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. A sheriff’s department, detention center, or county council is a group of people or buildings that is not considered a legal entity subject to suit , 27 F. App’x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical

department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); 68 F.Supp.2d 602, 626–628 (D.Md.1999) (holding that several municipal sub-divisions such as county council, permits department, and the office of zoning commissioner are not “persons” under §

1983) (rev’d and remanded on other grounds); , 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Accordingly, Council is subject to summary

dismissal. NOTICE CONCERNING AMENDMENT Plaintiff may attempt to correct the defects in his complaint by filing an amended complaint by March 17, 2022, along with any appropriate service

documents. Plaintiff is reminded an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. , 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Shelby v. City of Atlanta
578 F. Supp. 1368 (N.D. Georgia, 1984)
Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md.
68 F. Supp. 2d 602 (D. Maryland, 1999)
Harden v. Green
27 F. App'x 173 (Fourth Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Littles v. Bodiford, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/littles-v-bodiford-scd-2022.