Littlejohn & Co. v. United States

9 Ct. Cust. 207, 1919 WL 21346, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 44
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJune 3, 1919
DocketNo. 1953
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 9 Ct. Cust. 207 (Littlejohn & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 9 Ct. Cust. 207, 1919 WL 21346, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 44 (ccpa 1919).

Opinion

Montgomery, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

These importations were assessed under paragraph 235, which provides, among other things, for “* * * pepper, black or white; capsicum or red pepper, or cayenne pepper; and clove stems, 1 cent per pound; * * * ground spices, in each case, the specific duty per pound enumerated in the foregoing part of this paragraph for unground spices, and in addition thereto a duty of 20 per centum ad valorem; * *

The assessment was made on the basis that these were dutiable at the full rate of 1 cent per pound and 20 per cent ad valorem, while the importers claim that paprika is not a red pepper within the meaning of the provision, or at least is not so known to the trade.

A similar question was presented and fully discussed in an opinion by Barber, Judge, in Vandegrift & Co. v. United States (8 Ct. Cust. Appls., 1; T. D. 37121). In that case the court overruled the contention of the importers on the record as presented, saying, however, in the course of the opinion:

We are not unmindful that wholesalers might among themselves exclude paprika from the term “red pepper.” But the common employment of that term by them in the retail trade, with no further explanation therefor than what has been given, suggests to us that they use it in the wholesale trade also and is consistent therewith. At any rate, it tends to so far weaken the proof of commercial designation that we decline to be persuaded on the whole record that such designation has been established, as claimed by the importers.

It was further said, after discussing the subject of legislative adoption of previous rulings:

While this may not preclude importers from establishing a commercial designation that warrants a different classification, we think in the present case the attempt to do so has failed.

The importers have made a fuller record — that is to say, they have called more witnesses who have testified that paprika would be excluded from the term “red pepper” in wholesale dealings.

The case, in all its phases, has been given a careful examination, the evident confidence of the importers’ counsel and the able presentation which he has given of the case having fully merited such [209]*209attention. It would not be profitable, however, to repeat the discussion which was had in the Vandegrift case. As to the questions which were there decided, it will suffice to say that upon full consideration of the arguments presented by counsel, we are not induced to reopen the questions which were there fully considered, nor are we satisfied that any error was committed in reaching the conclusion that the court there pronounced.

The single question, therefore, left in the case is that of commercial designation. In the former case testimony very similar to that which is presented in this record was adduced. In fact, both records are before us, the Vandegrift record having been received on the trial.

The effort has been to show that the Spanish paprika is not a red pepper commercially; that it is such botanically and in common speech seems not to be denied. But the claims are twofold: First, that in its uses it is chiefly used by sausage makers and catsup makers for coloring purposes. As to this we are satisfied that while it may be used for that purpose, the use of the material in making catsup is for the double purpose of obtaining a certain flavor and for its coloring properties, and that the same thing is true as to the meats. Indeed, an examination of the testimony of the witnesses who were questioned upon this subject leaves little room for doubt about this.

But it is manifest that the Spanish paprika has other purposes- and other uses than those indicated. It is to a very considerable extent done up in packages which have sifter tops the same as other pepper packages.

The effort to show that there is no pungency to this article fails. It is true that there is less pungency or biting qualities than in other peppers. But the testimony, fairly analyzed, discloses that there is also a marked distinction between the biting qualities of cayenne pepper ground from the small fruited chillies and peppers ground from other capsicums which admittedly produce red pepper, so that the distinction becomes one of degree of pungency as between the present importation and ordinary red pepper.

It is fairly open to inference that the witnesses who by their testimony exclude paprika (Spanish and Hungarian alike) from the peppers commercially known as red peppers, are guided more by their understanding of what constitutes red pepper than by trade terms actually employed. The attempt is made to discriminate between degrees of pungency or the biting taste of paprika and red peppers or cayenne peppers. This is illustrated by the examination of one of the witnesses, thus:

Q. What excludes it from the category of articles which you say your trade recognizes as ground capsicum or red pepper or cayenne pepper? — A. Because it has not the pungency or biting qualities of cayenne pepper.
[210]*210Q. Is that the general trade understanding according to your experience? — A, Yes, sir.

When it is noted that a large proportion of the red pepper ground from capsicum, admittedly dutiable as capsicum or red pepper, has not the same pungency or biting taste as cayenne pepper, and that some of the dealers do not list red peppers as such at all, the inference is at least justifiable that in the effort to exclude paprika from the classification of red peppers or capsicum the witnesses have set up a standard of quality more exacting than the statute warrants, for the testimony fully establishes that cayenne pepper is made by grinding the pods of small fruited chillies and of cherry capsicums''. One importer testified that he imports from 50 to 70 tons of red peppers, of which about 30 tons are capsicums not suitable for cayenne. This product is presumably sold ás red pepper. This importer testifies that Hungarian paprika is not sold under the name of red pepper, but that it is red pepper. He undertakes to say that the reason it-is not sold as red pepper is because it has not sufficient strength to qualify it as a capsicum or cayenne pepper, and yet it appears that the article is sold with labels of “rosen paprika,” meaning in Hungarian, red pepper, and it has also, in the case of one large wholesaler at least, a sublabel “sweet red pepper.” '

It is also significant that while paprika is listed separately from red pepper when the latter is listed at all, it happens in two of the price lists that have been introduced in evidence that no such commodity as red pepper is listed. Neither is capsicum. On the other hand, other price lists list red pepper and do not list cayenne.

The truth would seem to be that these are all red peppers; that there is no such established commercial use of the term “red pepper” as precludes reference to the common meaning of that term; and that the term “capsicum” or “red pepper” includes .all red peppers .derived from capsicum, including Hungarian and Spanish paprika, as the names of the latter import.

In so far as the testimony of the witnesses consisted of a comparison of the pungency or biting qualities of cayenne pepper with the importation, it would be of little value, as admittedly there is a red pepper which is less biting than the cayenne pepper.

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Bluebook (online)
9 Ct. Cust. 207, 1919 WL 21346, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 44, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/littlejohn-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1919.