Littlefield v. Acadia Ins. Co. CV-03-220-B 05/11/04
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Daniel Littlefield
v. __________________________Civil No. 03-CV-220 ____________________________________ Opinion No. 2004 DNH 084 Acadia Ins. Co., et. a l .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This cases arises out of a tragic event on Lake
Winnipesaukee. On August 11, 2002, Daniel Littlefield drove his
father's 36-foot yacht into another boat causing the death of one
of its passengers, John Hartman. Littlefield was convicted of
negligent homicide. Hartman's estate and his widow, Karen
Hartman, have brought a wrongful death action against
Littlefield, now pending in state court. Littlefield filed this
action also, seeking a declaratory judgment that Acadia Insurance
Company ("Acadia") is obliged to indemnify him for any damages
awarded. Acadia seeks summary judgment on the ground that the
policy's "criminal acts" exclusion relieves it of any obligation
to indemnify Littlefield. Littlefield has filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, I grant Acadia's motion and deny Littlefield's cross-motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Daniel Littlefield crashed into another boat while operating
his father's yacht. John Hartman, a passenger on the other boat,
was killed. Following the accident, Littlefield was indicted on
two felony counts. He was convicted of a violation of N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 630:3 (I), a class B felony. The charge on which
Littlefield was found guilty states that he "did negligently
cause the death of another while operating a boat, in that Daniel
Littlefield operated a boat . . . and failed to keep a proper
lookout and the boat operated by Daniel Littlefield struck a boat
in which John Hartman was a passenger and that John Hartman died
as a result of the injuries received in the collision." (Pl.'s
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 4). John Hartman's estate and widow
brought a civil suit for damages against Littlefield.
Littlefield's father's yacht was covered by an insurance
policy by Acadia, which was in effect at the time of the
accident. The policy excludes coverage for any "loss, damage or
expenses caused by or resulting . . . [from] any loss, damage or
liability willfully, intentionally or criminally caused or
- 2 - incurred by an insured person." (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Aff.
Patrick M. O'Toole Ex. A at 8). Acadia seeks summary judgment on
the ground that coverage is barred by the policy's criminal acts
exclusion.1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 327
(1st Cir. 1996). A genuine issue is one "that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] . . . may reason
ably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) . A material fact is one
1 In an objection to Acadia's motion, Karen Hartman argues that Acadia has waived any right it may have to exclude coverage based on the "criminal acts" clause. She relies on her characterization of Acadia's interrogatory responses, claiming that Acadia has never before sought to enforce this exclusion. I read Acadia's responses differently. Acadia did not claim that it had never enforced the clause. It only stated that it could not respond because its files were not catalogued in a manner that would readily yield an answer.
- 3 - that affects the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. In ruling on
a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Oliver v. Digital Eguip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105
(1st Cir. 1988).
Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at
trial, it must "make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of [the] element[s] essential to [its] case" to avoid
summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). It is not sufficient for the nonmovant to "rest upon
mere allegation[s] or denials [contained in that party's]
pleading." LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st
Cir. 1993) (guoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). Rather, to
establish a trial-worthy issue, there must be enough competent
evidence "to enable a finding favorable to the nonmoving party."
Id. at 842 (internal citations omitted).
Where the moving party bears the burden of persuasion at
trial, the movant must support its position with materials of
evidentiary guality. See Desmond v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso),
37 F.3d 760, 763 n.l (1st Cir. 1994). Further, "[the] showing
- 4 - must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier
of fact could find other than for the moving party." Lopez v.
Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1516 (1st
Cir. 1991) .
I apply these standards to the parties' summary judgment
motions.
III. ANALYSIS
I interpret the policy using New Hampshire law. See Acadia
Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 116 F.3d 599 (1st Cir. 1997). Accordingly, I
first outline New Hampshire's relevant rules of policy
construction and then apply those rules to the facts at issue in
this case.
A. Policy Construction Rules
Determining the meaning of a provision contained in an
insurance policy presents a guestion of law that must be resolved
by the court. Pro Con Constr., Inc. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 147 N.H.
470 (2002); High Country Assocs. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 139
N.H. 39, 41 (1994). When answering this guestion, the court must
first determine whether judicial precedent "clearly defines [the]
term at issue." Coakley v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 136 N.H.
- 5 - 402, 409-10 (1992). If such precedent exists, the court "need
look no further than that definition." Id.
If a prior Supreme Court decision has not previously defined
a disputed policy term and the policy itself does not define the
term, the court must "construe the policy in the light of what a
more than casual reading of the policy would reveal to an
ordinarily intelligent insured." Coakley, 136 N.H. at 410
(internal guotations omitted).
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Littlefield v. Acadia Ins. Co. CV-03-220-B 05/11/04
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Daniel Littlefield
v. __________________________Civil No. 03-CV-220 ____________________________________ Opinion No. 2004 DNH 084 Acadia Ins. Co., et. a l .
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This cases arises out of a tragic event on Lake
Winnipesaukee. On August 11, 2002, Daniel Littlefield drove his
father's 36-foot yacht into another boat causing the death of one
of its passengers, John Hartman. Littlefield was convicted of
negligent homicide. Hartman's estate and his widow, Karen
Hartman, have brought a wrongful death action against
Littlefield, now pending in state court. Littlefield filed this
action also, seeking a declaratory judgment that Acadia Insurance
Company ("Acadia") is obliged to indemnify him for any damages
awarded. Acadia seeks summary judgment on the ground that the
policy's "criminal acts" exclusion relieves it of any obligation
to indemnify Littlefield. Littlefield has filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, I grant Acadia's motion and deny Littlefield's cross-motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Daniel Littlefield crashed into another boat while operating
his father's yacht. John Hartman, a passenger on the other boat,
was killed. Following the accident, Littlefield was indicted on
two felony counts. He was convicted of a violation of N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 630:3 (I), a class B felony. The charge on which
Littlefield was found guilty states that he "did negligently
cause the death of another while operating a boat, in that Daniel
Littlefield operated a boat . . . and failed to keep a proper
lookout and the boat operated by Daniel Littlefield struck a boat
in which John Hartman was a passenger and that John Hartman died
as a result of the injuries received in the collision." (Pl.'s
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 4). John Hartman's estate and widow
brought a civil suit for damages against Littlefield.
Littlefield's father's yacht was covered by an insurance
policy by Acadia, which was in effect at the time of the
accident. The policy excludes coverage for any "loss, damage or
expenses caused by or resulting . . . [from] any loss, damage or
liability willfully, intentionally or criminally caused or
- 2 - incurred by an insured person." (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Aff.
Patrick M. O'Toole Ex. A at 8). Acadia seeks summary judgment on
the ground that coverage is barred by the policy's criminal acts
exclusion.1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 327
(1st Cir. 1996). A genuine issue is one "that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because [it] . . . may reason
ably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) . A material fact is one
1 In an objection to Acadia's motion, Karen Hartman argues that Acadia has waived any right it may have to exclude coverage based on the "criminal acts" clause. She relies on her characterization of Acadia's interrogatory responses, claiming that Acadia has never before sought to enforce this exclusion. I read Acadia's responses differently. Acadia did not claim that it had never enforced the clause. It only stated that it could not respond because its files were not catalogued in a manner that would readily yield an answer.
- 3 - that affects the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248. In ruling on
a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and
determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Oliver v. Digital Eguip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105
(1st Cir. 1988).
Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at
trial, it must "make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of [the] element[s] essential to [its] case" to avoid
summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). It is not sufficient for the nonmovant to "rest upon
mere allegation[s] or denials [contained in that party's]
pleading." LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st
Cir. 1993) (guoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). Rather, to
establish a trial-worthy issue, there must be enough competent
evidence "to enable a finding favorable to the nonmoving party."
Id. at 842 (internal citations omitted).
Where the moving party bears the burden of persuasion at
trial, the movant must support its position with materials of
evidentiary guality. See Desmond v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso),
37 F.3d 760, 763 n.l (1st Cir. 1994). Further, "[the] showing
- 4 - must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier
of fact could find other than for the moving party." Lopez v.
Corporacion Azucarera de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1516 (1st
Cir. 1991) .
I apply these standards to the parties' summary judgment
motions.
III. ANALYSIS
I interpret the policy using New Hampshire law. See Acadia
Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 116 F.3d 599 (1st Cir. 1997). Accordingly, I
first outline New Hampshire's relevant rules of policy
construction and then apply those rules to the facts at issue in
this case.
A. Policy Construction Rules
Determining the meaning of a provision contained in an
insurance policy presents a guestion of law that must be resolved
by the court. Pro Con Constr., Inc. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 147 N.H.
470 (2002); High Country Assocs. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 139
N.H. 39, 41 (1994). When answering this guestion, the court must
first determine whether judicial precedent "clearly defines [the]
term at issue." Coakley v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 136 N.H.
- 5 - 402, 409-10 (1992). If such precedent exists, the court "need
look no further than that definition." Id.
If a prior Supreme Court decision has not previously defined
a disputed policy term and the policy itself does not define the
term, the court must "construe the policy in the light of what a
more than casual reading of the policy would reveal to an
ordinarily intelligent insured." Coakley, 136 N.H. at 410
(internal guotations omitted). If the policy term is unambiguous
when construed from this perspective, the court must give the
term its plain meaning. Id. If, however, an ordinarily
intelligent insured could reasonably interpret the policy in more
than one way and one of the plausible interpretations favors
coverage, the policy must be construed "in favor of the insured
and against the insurer." High Country Assocs., 139 N.H. at 41.
In determining whether a term reasonably can be interpreted
in more than one way. New Hampshire courts look to (1) the plain
language of the policy provision in dispute, see High Country
Assocs., 139 N.H. at 41; (2) whether differences of opinion exist
among other jurisdictions concerning the meaning of the term, see
Hoepp v. State Farm Ins. Co., 142 N.H. 189, 191 (1997); and (3)
whether dictionaries provide alternative definitions of the term.
- 6 - see Hudson v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 142 N.H. 144, 146-47
(1997); Coakley, 136 N.H. at 417.
B. Application
The policy excludes coverage for "any loss, damage or
incurred by an insured person." (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Aff.
Patrick M. O'Toole Ex. A at 8). It is undisputed that the
damages for which Littlefield seeks indemnification were the
result of his criminally negligent behavior. Acadia thus argues
that this undisputed fact plainly brings the case within the
scope of the policy's criminal acts exclusion because Littlefield
"criminally caused" the damages for which he is seeking
indemnification. Littlefield, in turn, contends that the phrase
"criminally caused" is ambiguous. Because the exclusion appears
in the same sentence with exclusions for "willfully" and
"intentionally" caused damages, he argues, a reasonable person
would construe the exclusion to similarly apply only to willful
or intentional crimes.
I agree with Acadia. It is well understood that negligence
can be criminal when it results in death. The policy does not
expressly limit the exclusion to intentional crimes and the mere
- 7 - fact that the phrase is grouped with exclusions for willfully and
intentionally caused acts would not cause a reasonably informed
insured to read a limitation into the exclusion that it does not
contain. Accordingly, I hold that the policy unambiguously
excludes the claim for which Littlefield seeks indemnification.2
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I grant Acadia's motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 8). Littlefield's cross-motion for
summary judgment is therefore denied (Doc. No. 10) .
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge
May 11, 2 004
cc: Gordon A. Rehnborg, Jr., Esg. Leonard W. Langer, Esg. William D. Pandolph, Esg. Emile R. Bussiere, Esg.
2 I also reject Littlefield's argument that the exclusion in unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy. While reasonable people can disagree about whether an insurance company should be permitted to offer insurance that fails to cover liability that results from criminally negligent conduct, the arguments supporting Littlefield's position are not so strong as to render the clause unenforceable.