Little v. Herndon

77 U.S. 26, 19 L. Ed. 878, 10 Wall. 26, 1869 U.S. LEXIS 1040

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: April 30, 1870
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice NELSON

delivered the opinion of the court.

The principal question is, whether there is anything in the act of February 21st, 1861, indicating an intention, on the part of the legislature, to change the course of decision which the courts of Illinois had made, on the subject of a tax deed, made without evidence of a preceding judgment, and to give validity and effect to the naked deed of the officer ?

The argument in favor of the construction of the statute which the plaintiff in error would establish is placed upon the introductory words of the act: “All deeds hereafter made by the proper officer in pursuance of sales of real estate for the non-payment of taxes shall be held,” &c. It is contended that the words should be construed as meaning simply the deed of the “ proper officer,” and nothing more, and that they impliedly, at least, exclude the necessity of giving any evidence of the judgment, order of sale, or precept. But we are inclined to think that this idea fails to give full effect to the language-used. The de'ed must not only be made by the proper officer, but must be made “in pursuance of sales of real estate for the non-payment of'taxes.” How are those sales made according to the law of Illinois? As we have seen, after a judgment rendered-by the court against the parcel of land for default in payment of the taxes, on order of sale, and-precept to-the officer. Unless these steps have first been .takep, the sale cannot be said to be in pursuance of sales of real estate 'for the non-payment of taxes, ae provided in the act. It is, perhaps, not inappropriate to look ' at the consequences that-might attend any different interpretation. • If the naked deed of the'officer is sufficient to impose the condition upon the owner to pay all taxes and costs, and ten per cent, interest, before he' can be permitted to attack the deed for any irregularity, except as specified in the act itself, then a deed without a judgment, or order of sale' (as these are not within the exception), would be just as available for the purpose as if founded on a judgment and • order of sale. It is not necessary to stop to point out the abuses to which such an interpretation would naturally lead.

In the case of Spelman v. Curtenius

* the court observed “that a regular tax deed, founded upon a valid judgment and precept, is made by the statute primd facie evidence of every fact necessary to authorize a recovery, upon it; but, as it is only primd facie evidence, it follows that there must be some way of contesting the case made by deed, else it would be conclusive of those facts of which the statute expressly declares it shall be primd facie evidence merely.” The opinion then points out many.grounds and objections 'that would overthrow this primd facie evidence and defeat the title. And, we- think, it is this primd fade title, thus explained, which is fairly embraced in the introductory language of the act of 1861.

In the ordinary case of a title to land, set up by virtue of a sale under a judgment and execution, the party is bound to give evidence of the judgment and execution to support this title. Without these, the sheriff’s or marshal’s deed would be a nullity. And it would be singular, in these tax sales, so stringently scrutinized by the courts, and every prerequisite prescribed by the legislature before a sale rigidly enforced, if the act in question was intended to dispense with the necessity of producing the judgment and_ precept as- the foundation of the sale and of the validity of the deed. For these reasons we are inclined to think that the construction of the statute by the court below was right, and should be affirmed.

We regret that this statute has not come under the review of the courts of the State, as we should have been relieved from this examination of it. But, after a diligent search into the reports of their decisions, we have not been able to find any case involving its construction except one, which holds that the act is not retrospective.*

A minor objection below was to the admission of one of the' patents, on the ground of an erasure: The court left the question to the júry, which was quite as favorable a ruling as the defendant could ask. In the absence of any proof on the subject the presumption is that the correction was made before the execution of the deed. In a recent case in the Queen’s Bench, Lord Campbell, Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the .court, after- referring to the note in Hargreve & Butler’s Coke Littleton, 225 6, where this rule was asserted, observed: “This doctrine seems to us to rest on principle. A deed cannot be altered after it is •executed without a fraud or wrong;- and the presumption is against fraud or wrong.”† The cases are not uniform In this country, but the most stringent leave the question to the jury.‡

Another objection was to the admission of the deed in evidence from Hood- to Herndon, which was executed and acknowledged in the State of 'Virginia. But it appears that the acknowledgment was taken in conformity with the laws of Virginia at the time the deed was executed, which, according to the laws of Illinois, was sufficient to admit it to be there recorded, and to be given in evidence.*

JüDSMENT AEEIRMED,

12 Illinois, 411.

Conway v. Cable, 37 Illinois, 90.

Doe v. Catomore, 16 Adolphus & Ellis, New Series, 745.

Lewis v. Payn, 8 Cowen, 76; Jackson v. Jacoby, 9 Id. 126; Hatch v. Hatch, 9.Massachusetts, 312.

Secrist v. Green, 3 Wallace, 744; Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Id. 513.